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Abstract
This research analyses policy responses  to disasters  in Chile. The main objective is  to 
explore linkages between temporally and spatially distant processes of policy, 
governance and decision-making, and the materialisation of disaster vulnerability in 
the form of ‘unsafe conditions’. The study focuses on the progression of vulnerability 
in a post-disaster context, critically reflecting on the multiplicity of agencies and 
pressures in creating and increasing vulnerability of a specific territory at local scale. 
The central argument is  that the Chilean model of disaster risk management and 
reduction is dominated by top-down and reactive approaches that tend to diminish 
the potentials  of policy responses to disasters  and ultimately became sources  of 
vulnerability and risk.
The research’s analytical framework is  grounded in disaster studies  and specifically it 
adopts a social constructionist approach to disaster, vulnerability and geographical 
scale focused on the Pressure and Release model. The latter allows  one to look at 
the state territorial organisation of Chile as  a structural factor in the national model 
of disaster management, and to place root causes and dynamic pressures of 
disaster vulnerability within the multi-scalar configuration of the country. The thesis 
chooses  the Chaitén volcanic eruption that occurred in May 2008  in Los Lagos 
Region of Chile, and the disaster policy context in the country as the empirical base 
on which the argument is put forward. 
Several policy responses  are examined using qualitative methods at national, 
regional and local scales, revealing the centralisation of disaster governance in Chile 
as  a key factor in producing inadequate responses  to the disaster that failed to 
utilise people’s  knowledge and local organisational capacities. This  disaster policy 
context mediated the materialisation of four unsafe conditions in Chaitén: the 
uneven distribution of risks; the limited access  to services; the erosion of trust in 
public authorities; and the weaknesses of emergency planning.
The research re-problematises  and suggests  new ways of ‘thinking vulnerability’ and 
disaster governance from a wider multi-scalar perspective. It explains that when 
policy responses to disasters do not consider local capacities  and realities, these can 
facilitate the (re)production of unsafe conditions, and contribute to and perpetuate 
the generation of risks  over time. This could help  to challenge some still dominant 
views  found in Chile and in many other national governments that dissimulate the 
causality of disaster generation and risk accumulation.
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Chapter ONE
Introduction
This doctoral journey began in 2008 when I moved to Berlin from Temuco, Chile, 
with the intention of preparing myself to research social issues. I studied 
management, planning and development linked to urban development in the 
Global South, and I learnt various  theories, methodologies  and techniques  that 
helped me to develop my interest in disasters. But it was  not until the 8.8-magnitude 
Maule earthquake struck Chile in 2010 and the comparable 7.0-magnitude Haiti 
earthquake in the same year that I became interested in disasters, and especially in 
the underlying causes that contributed to the enormous  difference in the impact of 
these two events.
When I started the research back in 2011 my main aim was to understand how 
macro forces and widespread processes  such as globalisation and political 
economic policies  could exacerbate vulnerability to disaster at local levels. Chile’s 
socio-economic and political history is  linked to the current centralisation of power 
and resources  (Atienza and Aroca, 2012), privatisation of public services, and 
deregulation of various  sectors  (Solimano, 2012). This  has increased inequality 
which, in turn, has precipitated an uneven distribution of vulnerability across  regions 
and population groups, with isolated and marginalised communities  being 
particularly vulnerable (Pulgar Pinaud, 2014a).
The translation of vulnerabilities  and risks  from global and national level to local 
levels has long been a topic of social scientific research, but as yet there is no 
consensus amongst central and local governments about how to reduce disasters 
and risks  and the development of such consensus  is hindered by other more urgent 
—although complementary— work on resilience, sustainable development and 
adaptation to climate change (Maskrey, 2016). Vulnerability to disaster and the risk 
of disaster are highly complex issues that encompass  environmental, cultural, social, 
economic and political factors. There is no single, uncontested cause of disasters, or 
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the factors governing vulnerability, risk and their mitigation. This  may have 
contributed to the confounding of vulnerability and risk (Cardona, 2006). This  thesis 
takes a practical approach, examining some aspects  of policy responses to disasters 
and decision-making that are particularly relevant to vulnerability and risk, and looks 
at how communities  at risks, governments, policies, and institutions relate at multiple 
scales in response to disaster. This thesis recognises, however, that the environment 
and extreme events  contribute to the aetiology of disaster, the impact of disasters, 
vulnerability to disasters and the risk of disasters.
This was the case in the aftermath of the Chaitén disaster in southern Chile. Chaitén 
is  a remote port city that was  affected by a volcanic eruption in 2008  and its path to 
recovery has been difficult. Generally termed a ‘local disaster’ by the media and 
politicians, the Chaitén eruption provides  an opportunity for a case study of how 
apparently ‘local’ vulnerability is in fact embedded in the wider geographical and 
temporal context and involves a complex web of national, regional, and local social 
relations, including governance, power and gender relations, and economic and 
political processes. Thus, the study of widespread processes nested on global and 
national levels, and of vulnerable conditions  at urban and local levels, involves  the 
shift from a single scale of analysis —Chaitén city— to focusing on the ‘process’ of 
vulnerability creation. It is  at this point that adopting a ‘perspective of scale’ begins 
to seem both interesting and necessary to the simultaneous analysis of the 
phenomena of disaster vulnerability and risk from different geographical and 
temporal perspectives. In this  thesis I adopt a perspective of scale to capture the 
social relations linked to disaster risk management (DRM) and disaster risk reduction 
(DRR) in Chile as they are configured at different spatial levels. I focus on the vertical 
and horizontal links between local and extra-local levels. Specifically, I investigated 
the processes of centralisation and decentralisation of the Chilean state from 
historical and territorial administrative perspectives, to try to explain why the current 
Chilean model of DRM and DRR is  highly centralised, top-down and reactive, and 
how policy responses  to disaster —embedded within this  model— may have 
facilitated the reproduction of vulnerability during the aftermath of the Chaitén 
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disaster. By model of DRM and DRR I refer to a particular mode of dealing with the 
reduction and management of risks and disasters.
Chaitén is  in Los Lagos region, about 1,000 kilometres south of Santiago, the capital 
of Chile. The community has  experienced several difficulties —related to policy 
responses to disasters  and the model of managing risk reduction— in its  efforts to 
recover from the volcanic eruption, when about 8,000 men and women were living 
in the community. Figure 1.1 briefly illustrates  the ‘before and after’  of the volcanic 
mudflows that divided the city in May 2008, whilst Figure 1.2 shows the period of 
the four policy responses analysed during the research.
Figure 1.1. Chaitén before and after the volcanic eruption
Sources: elaborated by the author (2017); satellite image from IGM (2012) and Google Earth Pro (2016)
2005 2016
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Legend
Blanco river course (post-disaster, after May 2008)
Former Blanco river course (before May 2008)
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Figure 1.2. Analysed period of policy responses in the Chaitén disaster, 2008-2013
2009 2010 20122011 2013
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The Chaitén disaster attracted considerable attention from national media and 
politicians, resulting in a series of recovery strategies that encompassed economic 
and social benefits, compensation, relocation, and finally reconstruction. Despite the 
huge recovery effort, which was not exempt from conflicts between actors  at 
national, regional, and local levels, the city of Chaitén remains  vulnerable to volcanic 
hazard. The process  of evacuation and recovery overseen by the central government 
between 2008  and the end of 2010 had several unforeseen effects that mean it is 
now assumed that the lives of the people of Chaitén are now more at risk than they 
were before 2008. Some of the locally specific ‘unsafe conditions’ observed during 
the study relate to the uneven distribution of risks, limited access to services, erosion 
of trust in authorities and weaknesses  in emergency planning. However, it is not just 
the central government’s disaster response strategy that is  in question, factors 
relating to community participation and political mobilisation, governance and 
political-administrative centralisation of power and decision-making —especially 
those related to DRM and DRR— are just as  crucial to understanding how and why 
the people of Chaitén are still at risk.
For instance, the ‘erosion of trust in authorities’  detected among Chaiteninos —as 
Chaitén people call themselves— can be linked to the central government’s 
centralising approach to the emergency response, recovery and reconstruction from 
2008  onwards. This  centralising approach is  not, however, an isolated phenomenon; 
it is part of the Chilean political regime’s  general tendency towards centralisation 
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which has prevailed since the 1970s. In describing ‘erosion of trust in authorities’ as 
a vulnerability factor in Chaitén I mean that lack of ‘trust’ can exacerbate vulnerability 
by altering evacuation strategies and by diminishing the impact of compensation 
and recovery policies  (Cutter et al., 2003). Testimony from several interviews 
conducted during research for this thesis  indicate an important local consensus: in 
the event of another volcanic eruption Chaiteninos will not follow the authorities’ 
instructions  as they did in 2008  and so they may react negatively to any new plans 
for ‘evacuation’ of the city. The reasons for this  relate to regional and national 
processes: ‘misinterpretations’ by the central government and authorities 
concerning the existence of a volcano in the area and the ‘tremors’ before volcano 
eruption; an unplanned evacuation that split up families; poor supervision of 
spending on subsidies and concerns about the misuse of public funds; the decision 
to lift the ban on inhabiting the North sector but not considering the South; the 
abandonment of the New Chaitén project after two years of planning, ‘spending’ 
and consultation; the creation of a ‘parallel’ authority —i.e. Presidential Delegate— 
which bypassed local and regional governments. This thesis  looks at all these 
factors, from specific local vulnerabilities to national factors.
1.1 Objectives, justification, and questions
The objective of the thesis  is  to utilise the case of post-disaster Chaitén to re-
problematise the progression of disaster vulnerability and risk from a scalar 
perspective, by examining how the social construction of disasters and policy 
responses to them are articulated at inter-connected and hierarchically related 
scales. In this instance ‘re-problematising’ means  looking again at the causes of 
disasters from a social constructionist perspective, paying particular attention to 
disaster vulnerability and the socio-economic and political processes that 
precipitate it. Vulnerability tends to manifest as ‘unsafe conditions’ in specific social 
groups  and spaces (Wisner et al., 2004) but a multiplicity of actors, rules, and 
processes related to DRM at different geographical and social scales  are also 
extremely important to its course and reveal the grave significance of the root 
causes of disaster risk and vulnerability (Tierney, 2012). Decision-making processes, 
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policy responses, political economic regimes, and powerful institutions  involved in 
DRM and DRR are not always clearly or directly responsible for the ‘unsafe 
conditions’; instead they may be the roots  and drivers underlying the development 
of ‘unsafe conditions’  and hence the ultimate cause of disasters. This  particular 
extended view of disasters embeds  them in a political economic context and 
recognises  that ‘social relations’, ‘structures  of domination’, ‘class confrontations’, and 
other forms  of social struggle are the origins of disaster vulnerability and risk 
(Gunewardena and Schuller, 2008; Wisner et al., 2004).
This view is  also called the “vulnerability approach” (Wisner at al., 2004, p.10), which 
rejects the assumption that disasters are ‘causes’ in any simple way by external 
natural events. This  thesis adopts  this perspective because it enables one to 
examine the structural factors  contributing to disaster risk. Extending our ambitions 
beyond simply seeking to reduce disaster risk and seeking to tackle the factors that 
create disaster risk depends on detailed investigation of contemporary and 
historical causes  of vulnerability. Such work would support the integration of disaster 
risk reduction in the many wider contexts  that foment and perpetuate vulnerability 
(Lewis  and Kelman, 2012). Although I agree that other approaches  to research on 
resilience and hazards  are necessary, in my view, the problematic of disasters —i.e. 
the relevant theoretical concepts  and practical realities, the debate about causality, 
and its  factual reduction— cannot be thoroughly overcome by means of such studies 
alone. If we are fully to understand and tackle the causes of disasters, we cannot 
afford to neglect investigations into the principles  that ‘govern’ their social nature, as 
social interventions  are a far more promising way of reducing the incidence and 
impact of disasters  than interventions in the natural world (Hewitt, 1983; Quarantelli, 
1998; Wisner et al., 2004). The value of addressing problematic disaster issues 
through the lens of vulnerability is  based on the idea that putting in places  measures 
to reduce disaster risk and increase resilience depends on societal foundations such 
as  equal access  to power and institutions, effective reduction of poverty and 
inequality, amongst others. Using a vulnerability framework, it is  possible to identify 
such foundations  and eventually tackle the root causes of risk to people. In other 
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words, this  thesis  is  based on the idea that the more effort we devote to uncovering 
and understanding the root causes of disasters, the more powerful reasons there will 
be to mobilise men and women and governments for efforts to reduce disaster risk. 
As  Wisner et al. (2004, p.61) noted, “[disaster]  problems will recur again and again in 
different and increasingly costly forms unless  underlying causes  are tackled”. 
Although the theoretical and disciplinary debate that this thesis addresses is 
deployed in Chapter Three, a clarification of key concepts is in order.
Disaster research is  polarised into two strands. One emphasises  the ‘trigger 
role’  (Wisner et al., 2004) of extreme natural events such as earthquakes and 
hurricanes  and encompasses post-disaster research on human responses, trauma, 
crisis  and humanitarian intervention, and the economic, legal, and political 
consequences  of disasters (see examples in Alexander, 1993; Dynes, 1970; Smith, 
1996). The second has emerged over the last forty years  from social sciences 
research. Although this  perspective does  not deny the relevance of natural hazards 
as  triggers  events, it emphasises the multiple ways in which social systems  produce 
disasters by making people vulnerable (see examples in Hewitt, 1983; Pelling, 
2003a; Wisner et al., 2004). This  thesis  takes the second perspective as  its  starting 
point.
This social perspective puts  ‘vulnerability’  at the centre of the debate. I use the term 
‘disaster vulnerability’ or ‘vulnerability to disaster’ to refer to the circumstances  and 
characteristics of an element of interest —i.e. community, system, or asset— that 
influence its capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the negative 
impact of a natural or anthropogenic extreme event (Wisner et al., 2004). To 
understand and value vulnerability correctly it is  necessary, however, to connect it at 
the theoretical and epistemological levels  with the concepts  of disaster and risk. In 
essence, disasters and disaster risk are produced by the combination of a hazardous 
event, either natural or anthropogenic, and a vulnerable asset, people, or 
community. At a conceptual level, the equation ‘hazard × vulnerability [ × exposure ] 
= risk → disaster’ (Cardona et al., 2012) helps  to illustrate how disasters  and risk are 
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produced. Important determinants  of the impact of a hazardous  event are: where 
people live and work, their level of preparedness, hazard protection, governance, 
information, education, wealth, and health. Nevertheless, the circumstances above 
mentioned have nothing to do with nature per se  as  they are produced and 
exacerbated by socio-economic, socio-ecological, political and cultural factors 
(Pelling, 2003a; Wisner et al., 2004). Likewise, the vulnerability approach is based on 
the assertion that society has  little control over sudden natural hazards (Davis, 
1978), whereas  vulnerability is  solely a product of society (Wisner et al., 2004). This 
idea was developed by Wisner et al. (2004) in their disaster Pressure and Release 
(PAR) model, which focuses  analytical attention on the social production of 
disasters. The PAR model treats the production of vulnerability as the outcome of the 
sequential operation of socio-economic and socio-ecological, political and/or 
cultural forces, a process  referred to as the ‘progression of vulnerability’. As shown in 
Figure 1.3, the concept of social production of disaster vulnerability is  based on the 
idea that to understand disasters fully we need to track back the structural factors  or 
‘root causes’ and ‘dynamic pressures’ that materialise vulnerability. 
Figure 1.3. The disaster Pressure and Release (PAR) model
ROOT 
CAUSES
DYNAMIC
PRESSURES
UNSAFE
CONDITIONS
DISASTER
HAZARDS
1
THE PROGRESSION OF VULNERABILITY
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RISK=
Hazard x
Vulnerability
R=HxV
Source: Wisner et al. (2004), adapted by the author (2017)
This thesis is ‘standing on the shoulders  of giants’ in that its starting point was 
seminal works such as  Hewitt (1983), Quarantelli (1978; 1998), Wijkman and 
Timberlake (1984), and Wisner et al. (2004), which asserted that to prevent disasters 
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and promote effective disaster risk reduction and resilience, it is  essential to reduce 
vulnerability and to tackle its  root causes. Reducing vulnerability should be a core 
policy objective of DRM and DRR, although one cannot neglect the probability of 
the occurrence of natural hazards, and their magnitude in specific social, cultural, 
economic and political contexts  (Aragón-Durand, 2007; Wisner et al., 2004). There 
has, however, been little research on policy responses  to disasters  and decision-
making as causes  and drivers  of vulnerability and risk; multi-level studies  have 
tended to focus on infrastructural causal factors  and institutional susceptibility to 
disasters (MOVE project, 2012).
Adopted here that serves as  key register on which I ground the present work is  the 
concept of ‘scale’. By scale I refer to the succession of two or more social, economic, 
ecological, geographical, political and cultural spaces  differentiated by size, level, 
and relationally (Howitt, 1998; Montello, 2001). Throughout the thesis  I used the 
concept of ‘geographical scales’ to capture aspects  of social, economic and political 
order and their spatial configuration at different levels. Two important aspects  to 
consider here vis-à-vis  the debate around disaster vulnerability and risk are: a) scales 
are social constructions and b) scales  need to be considered relationally. The first 
point is stating that social relations and struggles  produce geographical scales  as 
they need space to delineate their scale: locally, regionally, nationally or globally 
(Swyngedouw, 1992). Accordingly, the spatial and scalar materialisation of social 
struggles  varies  over time depending on the extension and contraction of the 
struggle itself, making scales  malleable and “historically changeable” (Brenner, 
2001, p. 599). Consider, for instance, how geo-political boundaries have been 
transformed over the course of human history, and how the ‘global’  scale has 
contracted since the rise of ever faster transport networks and communication 
technologies (Castells, 1996). The second point relates  to the relative nature of 
scales, in other words what make sense of one geographical scale —e.g. urban— is  its 
relationship to other geographical scales —e.g. regional, national, global— (Brenner, 
1998)  through “its upwards, downwards, and transversal links” (Brenner, 2009a, p.
72). According to Brenner (2000), social relations  are spatially demarcated through 
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the creation of specific institutional configurations such as national, regional and 
municipal governments. The resultant spatial ‘unit’ —e.g. urban, national, and local— 
of the social relationship  indicates  the function and dynamics of a given 
geographical scale, but this  spatial ‘unit’ can be only grasped relationally in terms  of 
its hierarchical links to other levels  of a broader multi-scalar configuration. This is 
particularly relevant in the case of certain multi-scalar phenomena such as  disaster 
vulnerability, for which the causal factors  are nested, articulated, and distributed 
over multiple interconnected geographical scales. Thus, another aim of this  thesis  is 
to explore epistemological links  between disaster vulnerability and geographical 
scales, referring particularly to how the spatio-temporal dialectic of decentralisation 
and centralisation struggles  in Chile have affected DRM and DRR with regard to 
decision-making and policy response to disasters.
Finally, in Chaitén the risks  and vulnerability to volcanic hazard and floods have not 
been significantly reduced, despite the efforts  of policy makers, institutions and 
Chaiteninos over the first two years after the disaster (CIMM T&S Consultores, 2010; 
Ugarte and Salgado, 2014). Thus the main research question was: How have policy 
responses to disasters influenced the progression of disaster vulnerability, at 
different scales, in post-disaster Chaitén? Addressing this question entailed 
exploratory and inductive research, looking at how institutions, policy responses, 
and stakeholders at different geographical scales  contributed to the production of 
vulnerability and how they should contribute to reducing it. To make it easier to 
address  this  primary research question I formulated some subsidiary questions  that 
contribute incrementally to addressing the subject of study, working from the micro 
to the macro level:
• What are the ‘unsafe conditions’ in Chaitén that place people at risk of 
experiencing future disasters?
• Why have policy responses to disasters in Chaitén not effectively reduced 
vulnerability?
28
• How and why did the Chilean model of DRM facilitate the production and 
progression of specific vulnerabilities in post-disaster Chaitén?
These questions  were intended to introduce the research inductively, that is, the 
research was intended to progress  from more specific observations of the ‘unsafe 
conditions’ in Chaitén, to possible explanations, disciplinary debates, and 
implications for theory.
1.2 Methodology: research design and methods
Although the research strategy, methodology and methods used in this  research are 
detailed in Chapter Two, an introduction of key considerations  is  necessary. The first 
concerns  the epistemological debate about the production of disasters, risk and 
vulnerability. There are three main schools of thought in this  debate, the behavioural 
paradigm (BP), the structural paradigm (SP) and the mutuality paradigm (MP). The 
BP couples  a hazard-centred approach to geo-physical processes  underlying 
disasters with a conviction that they can be anticipated by advancing societal 
knowledge of nature. The SP highlights the role of structural factors  in society, such 
as  social relations and structures of domination (Bankoff et al., 2006). Proponents of 
the SP advocate tackling the underlying (social)  causes of disaster vulnerability as 
the most effective way of reducing disaster risks. The MP is  the most recent and 
refers  to the ‘mutuality’ of vulnerability and natural hazards  due to complex 
interactions between nature and society (Hilhorst, 2006). The increased attention 
paid to environmental problems that have been linked to development and 
anthropogenic climate change is an indication of the MP’s  importance. However, 
despite its  relevance it is  relatively easy to lose focus when natural and social sub-
systems  are combined in a more complex system of environmental and social 
relations (Hilhorst, 2006). For that reason, and because my interests were centred on 
the aftermath of disaster and on rapid-onset natural hazards (intensive risk) such as 
mudflows and volcanic hazards  in Chaitén in particular, I believed that the MP was 
less appropriate as a framework for my research than the SP, at least initially.
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A second consideration was the attempt to bridge two bodies of literature with 
apparently different methodological perspectives. Whilst the production of 
disasters, risks  and vulnerability is  approached from a structural perspective, in 
disaster studies geographical scales are often considered from a positivist 
perspective (Fekete et al., 2010), that is  as ‘physical’ manifestations within nature, as 
self-enclosed, static containers  where social processes merely unfold (Brenner, 
2009a). This positivist view contrasts with the idea of disasters  as social constructions 
produced on and affecting multiple levels, and it may hinder observation of the 
relations between macro social processes  and unsafe conditions  at local level. For 
this  reason, I adopted a social constructionist approach to geographical scales 
either. A social constructionist approach assumes  that societal and individual 
knowledge, experience and perceptions  are always historically, culturally, and 
linguistically mediated (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Hacking, 1999). This means 
that perceptions of ‘reality’, including scales, disasters, vulnerabilities  and their 
complex geography, are never a direct reflection of physical conditions  ‘out there’; 
‘reality’ must be understood as a specific, situated and contingent reading of 
physical conditions  (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). This  thesis  acknowledges the 
initial differences between these two core concepts, disasters and scales, but deals 
with them from a similar methodological perspective, namely the social 
constructionist perspective. This perspective is well known in disaster research 
(Cardona, 2006)  as  well as in literature on scales  (Brenner, 2001; Marston, 2000), and 
it encompasses the methodological approaches  used in this research, such as the 
study of historically contextualised socio-spatial relations.
The study of policy responses to disaster and decision-making at multiple temporal 
and spatial levels led to the selection of the PAR model as  the analytical framework 
for this  thesis. Within disaster studies, the PAR model is  a well-known framework for 
supporting the construction of explanations  based on the social causes of disasters, 
risks, and vulnerability (Wisner et al., 2004). The aim of this thesis, in using the PAR 
model, is to explore how vulnerability ‘materialised’ in space and ‘accumulated’ 
locally in Chaitén, and to describe how the territorial structure of the Chilean state 
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may have influenced the scalar distribution and organisation of DRM and DRR, and 
hence of policy responses and decision-making. Additionally, this thesis  seeks  to 
look at potential links  between the literature on disaster and scales, as  they are rarely 
dealt with together although they share conspicuous relations.
Although I am aware of the limitations of case-based research (Yin, 2003), another 
consideration that it is important to mention in this  introduction is  the use I have 
made of the ‘case study strategy’ to investigate “a contemporary phenomenon 
within its  real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2003, p.13). In post-disaster Chaitén, the 
ʻphenomenonʼ is the progression of vulnerability and risks, and the ʻ contextʼ is Chile 
—Chilean institutions for DRM and DRR, policy response to disasters, and Chilean 
territorial organisation— the context in which ‘root causes’, ‘dynamic pressures’, and 
‘unsafe conditions’ are situated.
The main step in the operationalisation of the intellectual approach set out here, 
including the PAR model, consisted of drawing a provisional storyline of events and 
processes in post-disaster Chaitén, covering the period from May 2008  to early 
2014, similar to Figure 1.2 on page 22, and explained later in the methodological 
second chapter. The aim was  to identify key moments  and periods, as well as 
processes and mechanisms, in which the state and the Chaitén community 
interacted on various levels to produce certain specific ‘unsafe conditions’.
Because the research moved between the policy response context in Chile and the 
Chaitén disaster, I considered it crucial that the national level be considered first, as 
it contextualises  the policy responses and decisions made by national, regional and 
local governments  during and after the Chaitén disaster. Figure 1.4 below explains 
briefly that the case study is addressed from two different entry points. One could 
be called the ‘top-down’ entry point, as it attempted to reflect the progression of 
vulnerability in Chaitén from general processes  in Chile such as  its state territorial 
organisation and model of DRM. In contrast, the second could be called ‘inductive’ 
or ‘bottom-up’, because it tried to reflect the progression from the specificity and 
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locality of Chaitén, that is, from its  unsafe conditions, policy responses and decision-
making. This  diagram will be used several times  during the empirical fourth and fifth 
chapters to articulate the case study from these two entry points.
Figure 1.4. Case study entry points
First entry point
‘Top-down’ ‘Bottom-up’
Second entry pointCASE STUDY
Chapter Four Chapter Five
The case of  post-disaster Chaitén
Unsafe conditions
e.g. uneven distributions of risks
Policy responses
MAJOR MINOR
PROGRESSION OF VULNERABILITY
temporal and spatial-scale dimension
The Chilean context
State territorial 
organisation of Chile
Model of DRM/DRR
e.g. centralisation
Vulnerable conditions in Chaitén were identified using qualitative methods such as 
interviews, focal groups and field observations, as well as through the analysis of 
secondary sources such as  research outputs and grey literature. Interviewing and 
document analysis became the most important methods of collecting data on how 
different institutional forms of DRM and DRR, policy responses and decision-making 
processes emerged and influenced people’s vulnerability. I used the term 
‘institutional forms’ to refer to formally or informally codified social practices or 
structures that govern some behaviour within society (Brenner, 2009a; Ostrom, 
2010), the term encompasses both formal and informal organisations. The storyline 
of post-disaster Chaitén was  complemented by analysis of the historical formation of 
geographical scales in Chile, with particular attention being paid to the 
repercussions  of such formation for the scalar configuration of DRM and DRR. For 
this  reason, I analysed relevant political events by examining historical documents 
such as  history books, archival records  in libraries and national databases, research 
papers and grey literature. The storyline gave me an overview of the multi-scalar 
process of vulnerability production in the post-disaster context of Chaitén, as  well as 
32
allowing me to work out the relationships between the wider processes of political 
and economic centralisation and local vulnerabilities.
Field research was  carried out between early March and mid-September 2013 with 
one collaborator, in three different places in Chile: Chaitén, Puerto Montt (the capital 
of Los Lagos Region), and Santiago de Chile. Final interviews were carried out and 
answers  to follow-up questions were obtained remotely, via telephone and email 
correspondence. Some information, and peer feedback, was  collected through 
participation in academic events such as  conferences and seminars in Chile, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom between 2014 and 2015.
Interviewees were selected and approached using a snowball stratified sampling 
technique. As the research was  inductive, interviewing evolved from the ‘informal 
conversational interview’ to the ‘general interview guide approach’ (Gall et al., 
2003), the former approach was used at the beginning of the study, when I visited 
Chaitén for the first and second times —in March and July 2013. Guided interviewing 
was often used with interviewees from the national and regional governments, 
academia, and civil society organisations. In total, I visited Chaitén three times, in 
March, July, and September 2013, and carried out 27 interviews, 2 focus  groups, 
and several participant observations, as well as obtaining access to municipal 
records and documents. I also visited Puerto Montt twice, in July and September 
2013. In Puerto Montt I interviewed a total of 7 people from the Regional 
Government and the regional division of the National Emergency Office (ONEMI), as 
these institutions had considerable influence on the relations between policy 
responses and decision-making and the community during the post-disaster 
phases. These interviewees  were also selected using the snowball stratified 
sampling technique, but the choices were also informed by media archives and 
institutional reports. The same procedure was used for the rest of interviews in 
Santiago de Chile, where 32 informants  from national government officials, non-
governmental organisations  (NGOs), and academia were selected. In the period of 
the fieldwork, a total of 66 individuals participated in in-depth and guided 
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interviews, focus  groups, and telephone interviews. See a complete list of 
participants in the Appendix 1.
Other techniques  used were field observations  and analysis  of documentary sources 
such as  archival records, reports  and accountability books issued by government 
institutions at national, regional, and local level, as well as  items from media archives 
such as newspapers articles, press  releases, documentary films, news  interviews etc. 
In most of cases, document analysis was used as  a complementary data collection 
procedure, in support of triangulation (Bowen, 2009), to establish convergence with 
or corroborate data from other sources such as  interviews and observations. Field 
observations were conducted in accordance with the suggestions  of Yin (2003): in 
group discussions  and personal conversation between two or more participants with 
another researcher, assistant or mediator guiding the interaction. Participant and 
non-participant observations  also took the form of walks  through the North and 
South sectors  of Chaitén and the surrounding areas. I made participant observations 
as  a ‘visiting researcher’ and ‘guest’ in two disaster research centres  in Chile, the 
Research Centre for Vulnerability and Socio-natural Disasters  (CIVDES) at the 
Universidad of Chile (between March and August 2013) and the National Research 
Centre for Integrated Natural Disaster Management (CIGIDEN) at the Pontificia 
Universidad Católica de Chile (PUC) (in December 2014). On both visits  I was able to 
observe diverse academic discussions and comments  on policies, governmental 
efforts, and initiatives on DRM and DRR in Chile, and on the case of Chaitén. Both 
direct and participant observations were registered as written notes and pictures.
The methods used in the research are subject to several limitations. Possibly the 
most evident is  the difficulty of generalising the study’s  findings. The fact that the 
study was case-based research, embedded in the historical and geographical 
context of Chile, and the post-disaster Chaitén community in particular, as well as 
being linked to a specific rapid-onset natural hazard —i.e. volcanic eruption—, makes 
deeper and robust explanations  as well as the refinement of theory more difficult. 
For instance, it would have been interesting to carry out similar fieldwork in other 
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Chilean communities recently affected by intensive risks, for example the Calbuco 
volcanic eruption in April 2015 —also in Los Lagos  Region— or to pursue a more 
detailed analysis of other processes and factors  that have a critical influence on DRM 
and DRR, such as  public spending and budgeting. In practice I was only able to 
approach these similar cases  and processes  though secondary sources such as 
media archives  and institutional reports. Nevertheless, the historical analysis  of scale 
formation in Chile and its  repercussions for the configuration of DRM and DRR is 
original, as is the application of the PAR model to a Chilean case.
As  well as these empirical limitations, there are other methodological limitations  that 
affect the contribution this  research makes to debate within the disaster studies 
discipline. Perhaps the most obvious is that the study was  framed within the 
Structural Paradigm and takes a political economic perspective, which limited the 
analysis  of social structural factors and meant setting aside environmental and socio-
ecological that are also important to understanding of disasters. However, I believe 
that using the case of post-disaster Chaitén to investigate socio-environmental 
relations surrounding disaster would have been inappropriate, because the Chaitén 
disaster was  intimately tied to a rapid-onset natural event. Another limitation relates 
to the fact that I collected most of the data personally, and probably influenced the 
responses and behaviour of interviewees in some way. Likewise, the analysis  and 
interpretation of data, as  well as  the delineation of findings, is  unavoidably 
influenced by my history, views, values  and beliefs  (Yin, 2003), making this  study 
subjective. However, because I was aware of my position within the study, of being a 
mestizo, heterosexual, cisgender male, and have lived in the southern Chile for most 
of my life, I tried to reduce bias by obtaining convergent data using several different 
qualitative methods, and by making use of peer review wherever possible. I have 
done my best to provide accurate explanations  from the case study and its 
implications  for efforts  at disaster risk reduction. Throughout the thesis  I indicate and 
warn the reader about these limitations  and scope of this work. In the final chapter, I 
also point out several areas for future research.
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1.3 Structure of the thesis
The case research process was iterative, oscillating between the macro and micro, 
making bidirectional connections between general Chilean processes  and locally 
specific processes  contributing to materialisation of vulnerability in Chaitén. The 
structure of the thesis  therefore warrants explanation. The structure mirrors  the 
bottom-up development of the research, which moved inductively from the case 
study to theoretical issues. Chapter Two presents  the methods used and discusses 
the research methodology. Chapter Three sets  out the disciplinary concepts  of 
disaster, risk, vulnerability and scales as well as their theoretical implications to give 
the reader a sense of the debates  in the field. This chapter also outlines the 
analytical framework used to interpret the case study data and findings. The next 
two chapters  are interlinked and present the case study itself. Chapter Four analyses 
the historic and administrative-territorial context of Chile, offering a close look at the 
Chilean model of DRM and DRR. Chapter Five describes and analyses  the localities 
and the material conditions of post-disaster Chaitén. The final part of the thesis 
offers conclusions that connect the findings  of the case study to the general debate 
on recovery and vulnerability and to the research questions.
Chapter One introduces the thesis  and the next chapter discusses  the research 
strategy and the methodological design in more detail. Over four sections I seek to 
connect the study approaches  with the methods for literature review, as well as  with 
the fieldwork and its techniques for data collection and analysis. I introduce the 
debate around vulnerability, disasters, and scales to develop the research questions 
and limitations of the study.
In Chapter Three I set out the theoretical background of the thesis  and the analytical 
framework. Over five sections I discuss historical views and interpretations  of 
disasters and risks, looking at disasters  as  ‘acts of god’ and as ‘acts of women and 
men’ and describing how interpretations of disaster have evolved. I look at the 
different disciplines dealing with disaster phenomena, describe the current state of 
disaster research and then discuss the re-problematisation of the progression of 
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vulnerability and risk. This  forms the basis for a detailed discussion of disasters  as 
social constructions that situates  the study within the Structural Paradigm. I argue 
that vulnerability is  a key factor in tackling the problematic of disaster —i.e. its 
theoretical and practical conceptualisation, the debate about causality, and its 
factual reduction. Then I examine the literature and academic debate on 
vulnerability to disasters: this contains an historical review, facing physical, social, 
and ecological interpretations  of vulnerability. In particular, I analyse the 
‘progression of vulnerability’  through the PAR model, which enables  me to introduce 
contemporary ideas  about geographical scales to my analysis of vulnerability and its 
causes. The final sections  discuss  how the study of the geographical distribution and 
hierarchical organisation of certain socio-economic and political processes can help 
us to understand how vulnerability is  produced, progresses and finally how it 
‘materialises’ within specific communities and social groups at local scale.
After the chapter dealing with theoretical background, the thesis continues with two 
chapters  —Chapter Four and Five— dedicated to the case study. Although the 
research process  oscillated between macro and micro levels, I consider it vital to 
begin by providing a description of the Chilean context in which policy responses 
and decision-making during the evacuation, relocation and eventual reconstruction 
of Chaitén were embedded.
Chapter Four describes  the history, institutions  and territorial context of Chile. I start 
by offering a historical review of disasters in Chile in order to highlight the dominant 
narrative of Chilean disasters in its history, which emphasises  their naturalness  and 
sees them as a ‘struggle against nature’. I explain how this view and some of the 
disasters Chile has experienced have influenced the creation and characteristics  of 
the Chilean model of DRM and DRR. The next section is a historical review of the 
state territorial organisation of Chile, which has been characterised by political 
decentralisation and centralisation, based on how social processes have historically 
changed the national and sub-national geographical scales in Chile, and how today 
the relations between these scales is  in terms  of territorial administration. Chapter 
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Four ends  with an analysis  of the aspects of the institutional organisation of DRM 
and DRR that were crucial to policy responses  and decision-making in post-disaster 
Chaitén: the ONEMI, the National Plan of Civil Protection (PNPC), emergency 
procedures, legal frameworks and territorial planning instruments (IPTs).
Chapter Five dives deep into the case of post-disaster Chaitén to explore policy 
responses and decision-making on emergency, recovery strategies, relocation, and 
reconstruction, and their effects on vulnerability and risk in the current Chaitén. In 
the early part of the chapter I describe the geography and economy of Chaitén prior 
to the eruption in 2008, and look at the crucial days immediately before and after 
the volcanic eruption, focusing on meetings  between public authorities and people, 
the links  between the supposed ‘tectonic’ movements  and the lack of information, 
the ‘dormancy’ of the volcano and the evacuation and emergency response. Then I 
analyse the recovery strategy, including compensatory measures  and decision-
making at different geographical levels  and by different actors, including politicians, 
government officials, regional and local authorities  and Chaiteninos. The following 
can be considered ‘outputs’ of decisions  about the disaster response: the ‘occupied’ 
city of Chaitén and the ‘rebels’, the New Chaitén project, subsidies and other 
benefits and the eventual reconstruction of North Chaitén. The final section attempts 
to articulate comprehensively both macro and micro levels  of study —the Chilean 
context and Chaitén— by highlighting multi-scalar relations  between centralisation 
and the geographical distribution and hierarchical organisation of DRM and DRR, as 
well as their repercussions for the materialisation of vulnerability in Chaitén.
Finally, Chapter Six aims to answer the research questions and offer general 
conclusions about the research process  and set out the implications of the findings. 
In the quest for answers  I link the research findings  to the literature reviewed in 
Chapter Three in order to draw out the epistemological implications  for the field of 
disaster research, specifically findings  about how policy responses  to disasters  and 
decision-making in a context post-disaster may contribute, counterintuitively, to the 
production and reproduction of vulnerabilities  and risks. Following this, I describe 
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some of methodological innovations  and practical implications arising from the 
thesis. The methodological innovation involves the use of scatter diagrams to 
visualise a multi-scalar perspective for the analysis of vulnerability progression. The 
practical implications take the form of guidance on policy and practice that 
emphasises the need for holistic evacuations, planning and decentralisation of 
DRM. Finally, I offer some reflections  about the research processes  from my 
perspective as a researcher, and I call for further research that takes into account 
analyses of root causes  and dynamic pressures  at multiple  scales into assessments 
of vulnerability.
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Chapter TWO
Research strategy and methodology
Introduction
This chapter introduces  the research strategy and methodology adopted in this 
study. The goal was to analyse the relationships between temporally and spatially 
distant policies and governance processes, and the local ‘materialisation’ of ‘unsafe 
conditions’ in Chaitén. The following four sections  outline the research plan, the 
research questions, theoretical propositions, methods  for field research, analysis, 
and the limitations of the study.
The first section details the research strategy by introducing the primary and 
secondary research questions as well as the propositions, which aim to guide data 
collection and analysis. I summarise key antecedents from the literature on disasters 
and scales  to connect the rationale of the study with the research question and 
analysis  phases, such as those from social constructionist approaches to causes  of 
disasters. In this  section, I also deal with the justification, selection of and approach 
to the case of post-disaster Chaitén. I specify the units  of analysis  and other 
elements of the case study design such as  the ‘explanation building’ method 
described by Yin (2003).
In the second section, I describe the research methodology. I initiate  it by 
considering pros and cons of using quantitative and qualitative approaches for data 
collection vis-à-vis the nature of a case study and potential data, to substantiate the 
study as ‘qualitative research’. Then, the post-disaster —i.e. from 2008  onwards— and 
research periods  —i.e. March to September 2013— are explained, while the selection 
of the sub-fieldwork locations  —i.e. Chaitén, Puerto Montt, and Santiago— is  justified. 
In this  section, I also describe the different qualitative methods and how they were 
applied during the study: in-depth and guided interviews; participant and non-
participant observations; and document analysis. Finally, the study of the social 
production of geographical scales  in Chile is  approached from a historical stand 
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point, a view used as a ‘proxy’ to better understand the centralisation and top-down 
approach of the model of disaster risk management (DRM) in Chile.
The third section introduces the analytical framework of the study, characterised by 
the Structural Paradigm within the study of disasters, a social constructionist 
approach to disaster, vulnerability, and scales, and the Pressure and Release (PAR) 
model. The details  of the analytical framework are then addressed and linked with 
the theoretical elaboration in Chapter Three.
Finally, the last part discusses some limitations  of this  case-based research and 
generalisation, both empirical and theoretical according to Ritchie and Lewis 
(2003), specifically on how the case of Chaitén may help to better understand the 
way in which policy responses to disasters  may, counterintuitively, contribute to 
reproducing existing risks or producing new ones. Limitations were linked to the 
interpretative process of analysis and positionality, the scope of findings in relation 
to the composition of the sample —i.e. strata and size—, and the inherent limitations 
linked to the analytical framework and methods —i.e. PAR model and the omission of 
socio-environmental processes.
2.1 Case Study Strategy
A case study is  an “empirical inquiry that investigates  a contemporary phenomenon 
within its  real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2003, p.13). In the case of post-disaster 
Chaitén, the  ʻ phenomenonʼ  is  the progression of vulnerability and its  ʻcontextʼ would 
be the Chilean system of rules, social relations, structures of domination, institutions 
for DRM and DRR, cultural practices, and all processes  and circumstances  where 
‘root causes’, ‘dynamic pressures’, and ‘unsafe conditions’ are situated. Both the 
phenomenon and the context are inherently complex in the sense of being multi-
dimensional, multi-level, and dynamic. Thus, the analytical framework and the 
research strategy must capture this complexity.
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This case study investigated the progression of vulnerabilities by adopting the PAR 
model, which enabled exploring the structural factors of risks and disasters 
associated with governance, politics, and economic issues. Although some of these 
structural factors of risks have emerged in the literature on resilience and social-
environmental change (Adger, 2000; Birkmann, 2006a; Aragón-Durand, 2009), the 
very problem of disasters  —including the theoretical and practical conceptualisation, 
causality debate, and factual reduction— needs  to be focused on the social tenets 
that ‘govern’  disaster causation, beside their very natural condition, to embrace 
more deliberately their political and social dimensions. With this  position, this  work 
situates itself in a political economy perspective of disasters  and applies the PAR 
model as the analytical framework to guide the investigation.
According to Yin (2003), a case study should be selected as  a research strategy 
when its application responds at least to one of five different uses:
“To explain causal links when real-life interventions such as surveys and 
experimental research are too complex, to  describe the intervention of a 
phenomenon and its real-life context, to illustrate diverse subjects in evaluated 
phenomenon, to  explore those dimensions in which the evaluated phenomenon is 
not clear or when the study may be a meta-evaluation, that is, a study of an 
evaluation study”.
(Yin, 2003, p.15; own emphasis)
Thus, a case study was  adopted given the rationale behind the research objectives. 
Overall, this study aims for a deeper comprehension of the social production of risks 
by explaining causal links between the productions  of vulnerability in post-disaster 
contexts on different geographical scales. In doing so, it explores relevant and 
contemporary perspectives  on disaster studies by incorporating the social science 
notion of geographical scales  and illustrates the progression of vulnerability as a 
multi-scalar phenomenon. Yin (2003, p.21)  proposed five fundamental components 
for a case-based research design:
• Study's questions;
• its propositions or hypothesis, if any; 
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• its unit(s) of analysis;
• the logic linking the data to the propositions; and
• the criteria for interpreting the findings.
In this  study, I adopted these five components and adapted them to the case of 
post-disaster Chaitén. The research questions, propositions, and units  of analysis  are 
outlined throughout this chapter, while the logic that links  data with propositions 
and the criteria for interpreting the findings are delineated in tandem with the next 
chapter —the theoretical background and analytical framework. As can be seen, the 
latter two emerge from the literature and the analytical framework selected for this 
study, including the social constructionist approach to disasters, vulnerability, and 
geographical scales, and the PAR model, which guide the research analysis. The five 
components are important for the research design, as they represent a logical 
sequence that connects  the empirical data to a study's initial research questions 
and, ultimately, to its  conclusions  (Yin, 2003). However, before posing the research 
questions, I wish to briefly explain the reasons and motivations for selecting a case 
study. In terms of operationalisation of research, post-disaster Chaitén and the 
context of Chile have been selected as the object of this  study mainly for four 
reasons:
Academic interest
Chile is  constantly affected by natural extreme events  —e.g. earthquakes and volcano 
eruptions— and is  subject to the negative impacts of disasters. Thus, Chile offers  a 
wide range of cases  in which the ‘root causes’ of vulnerability, ‘dynamic pressures’ 
and ‘unsafe conditions’ can be investigated. Specifically, the recent case of post-
disaster Chaitén offers  a valuable opportunity to dig into a multi-scalar perspective 
on the progression of vulnerability, since Chaitén is  a remote port-city located in 
Southern Chile  embedded in a well-defined geographical and scalar configuration 
of national, regional, and local politics  and social relations. By being geographically 
remote, and politically and economically distant from national and regional centres, 
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the case of post-disaster Chaitén is convenient to investigate as  its  actual ‘local’ 
vulnerability can be clearly separated from influential and distant processes 
occurring at macro levels —e.g. political shifts in the national government and 
political centralising forces. Figure 2.1 summarises  the key distant processes  and 
decisions that may have influenced the current situation in Chaitén. In grey blocks, 
the main post-disaster phases are depicted —response, recovery, relocation, and 
reconstruction—, while the red areas indicate relevant actors  and their participation 
over time. Although each of these processes and decisions are discussed in greater 
detail in the following chapters, the figure reflects  the interplay between national 
and local factors in the production of vulnerability in Chaitén.
Figure 2.1. National-local interplay in post-disaster Chaitén
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Given its  peculiar historical and geographical conditions, the case of post-disaster 
Chaitén works  well to explore structural aspects  of disaster governance and policy 
responses in Chile connected to a local materialisation of vulnerability, rendering 
evident the connections, for instance, between centralisation of decision-making in 
DRM and the ‘erosion of trust in authorities’ in Chaitén. Such reflections, however, 
could only be achieved through the combination of a locally based case study and 
the analysis  of governance structures, institutions, and the multiplicity of actors 
involved in DRM. The case of post-disaster Chaitén is  valuable because during the 
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emergency response, recovery strategy, relocation plan, and reconstruction of 
Chaitén —totalling about 4 years—, the Chilean model of DRM operated, without 
ambiguity, on different scales. The remoteness of Chaitén, as well as the spatial 
distance of Los  Lagos Region from Santiago, allowed investigating and more easily 
distinguishing and differentiating national and regional processes  from those nested 
at local levels.
Contribution
Despite the interest mentioned above, there are currently no studies investigating 
the progression of vulnerability on different geographical scales, or applying a multi-
scalar perspective in the broader context of Chile. Additionally, disaster studies 
scholars have acknowledged the need for expanding knowledge on the social, 
economic, political, and cultural causal factors of disasters  and vulnerability, and 
therefore the need to conduct more social science research from a multi-scalar 
perspective addressing both major and minor scale factors simultaneously (IRDR, 
2012; UNDP and MINVU, 2014; UNISDR, 2011).
Access and research support
Chile has  a favourable open access system for most of its  governmental services, 
which includes historical repositories of reports, documents, legal frameworks, and 
the like. Among the governmental open access sites, ‘Ley Chile’ (BCN, 2017) by the 
National Congress Library is  a key site, with access to an extensive archive of laws, 
bills, and other parliamentary documents. Similarly, the website ‘SINIM’ or National 
System for Municipal Information (SINIM, 2016) provides historical records  on 
municipal governments’ administration and expenditure. In addition, since 2008, 
political and government services are subject to Law Nº  20,285 or ‘Transparency 
Law’ (Ministerio Secretaría General de la Presidencia, 2008), which ensures  access to 
information on the administration of the state for any citizen.
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Language and reliance on secondary material
Given that an important part of this  research is based on secondary material, my 
command of Spanish —my mother tongue and the official language in Chile— 
facilitates access and analysis of sources. Likewise, several sources  were found from 
international organisations  such as the World Bank or United Nations where most of 
the information, including on Chile, is published in English. Thus, my command of 
both Spanish and English provide an opportunity to expand the range of 
documentary sources.
2.1.1 Research questions
Before presenting the research questions, it is  necessary to introduce basic ideas 
that sustain their rationale, specifically the multi-scalar progression of vulnerability, 
which is fully articulated in Chapter Three.
Disaster vulnerability is  a multidisciplinary subject that builds  on a wide range of 
substantive ideas such as  entitlement failure and theories  of hazards. Entitlement-
based explanations  of vulnerability have focused almost exclusively on the social 
realm of institutions, well-being and on class, social status  and gender as  important 
variables  while vulnerability research on natural hazards  developed an integral 
knowledge of environmental risks  with human response drawing on geographical 
and psychological perspectives in addition to social parameters of risk (Adger, 
2006). One approach to disaster vulnerability has been sketched out by Wisner et al. 
(2004) and conceptualised into the Pressure and Release (PAR) model. According to 
its authors, disaster vulnerability consists  of the circumstances and characteristics of 
an element of interest —i.e. community, system, or asset— that influences  said 
community’s  capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the negative 
impacts of a natural or human-made extreme event, and likewise make the 
community susceptible to extreme impacts  (Wisner et al., 2004). In this  model, 
vulnerability production is  modelled in a dynamic sequence of social, economic, and 
political forces  at different times in a process  named the ‘progression of 
vulnerability’ (see Figure 2.2).
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Figure 2.2. The PAR model and its potential scalar dimensions
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Source: Wisner et al. (2004), adapted by the author (2017)
The PAR model assumes  that a disaster occurs at the intersection of two opposing 
forces: those processes  generating vulnerability on the one hand, and natural 
extreme events on the other. The figure above depicts a ‘nutcracker’, with emphasis 
on the increasing ‘pressure’ on a given community or element arising from either 
side, from their vulnerability, and from the impact of a hazard (Wisner et al., 2004).
The PAR model highlights  the ‘progression of vulnerability’. Through this process, 
vulnerability is  ‘developed’ and ‘advances’ from its ‘root causes’, ‘dynamic pressures’, 
to ‘unsafe conditions’. Although the PAR model does not explicitly elaborate this, it 
does touch upon the multi-scalar dimension of the progression of vulnerability, 
proposing a hierarchically organised process  that takes  place in and through 
differentiated spaces  over time. Wisner et al. (2004) and Pelling (2003a) have 
theorised that the ‘root causes’ and ‘dynamic pressures’ of disasters may be 
geographically dispersed and temporally distant from the affected area, and from 
the ‘unsafe conditions’. While unsafe conditions may often be evident at local or 
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urban scales, root causes  and dynamic pressures are articulated at major 
geographical scales: national and global.
Having briefly outlined the central feature of the PAR model, the essence of the 
research questions  is, thus, oriented towards the epistemological debate on disaster 
vulnerability as  a ‘process’: its production, progression, and ultimately its 
materialisation in the form of unsafe conditions  for the people of Chaitén. Then, as 
the research is  inductive, the construction of the storyline that answers  the research 
questions  is  organised from the micro to macro levels, that is, from the specificity of 
the local unsafe conditions in Chaitén —e.g. erosion of trust in authorities— to 
widespread processes in the context of Chile —e.g. political centralisation. 
The research questions are:
• What are the ‘unsafe conditions’ in Chaitén that place people at risk of 
experiencing future disasters?
• Why have policy responses to disasters in Chaitén not effectively reduced 
vulnerability?
• How and why did the Chilean model of DRM facilitate the production and 
progression of specific vulnerabilities in post-disaster Chaitén?
Thus, the principal inquiry that the above questions pose is: How have policy 
responses to disasters influenced the progression of disaster vulnerability, at 
different scales, in post-disaster Chaitén? All these seek to illustrate the scalar 
organisation within the social construction of disaster vulnerability, and to ascertain 
the ‘scale’ of the progression of vulnerability: its geographical extension, its socio-
spatial hierarchisation, and its scale-specific materialisation.1
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1 By ‘scale-specific materialisation’, this study views disaster risk and vulnerability emerging and 
becoming evident at minor geographical scales namely local and urban (Maskrey, 1993a; 1993b; 
Pelling, 2003b).
2.1.2 Theoretical propositions
For Yin (2003), making a hypothesis  or proposition explicit helps the researcher 
answer the research questions: “the proposition helps  us  to focus attention on 
obtaining data and to ignore other data” (Yin, 2003, p.111). The theoretical 
propositions are formulated to bring potential answers  to the research questions 
that undergird the process of data collection and analysis  to the surface. Based on 
these research questions, a number of propositions are established at two levels: 
one oriented at case-based research and the other addressing the theory and 
interdisciplinary debate on vulnerability and disasters.
• Disaster vulnerability in Chaitén persists despite various post-disaster efforts in 
part because policy responses did not consider the local reality, demands, and 
capacities of men and women in relation to their pre-existing social and 
economic conditions. 
• The Chilean model of DRM and DRR policy responses to disasters is 
centralised in terms of decision-making and budgeting. Institutions dealing 
with DRM and DRR are organised in a top-down approach and distributed at 
different geographical scales, with the national level being the most powerful 
arena where decisions are made, while local actors’ agency, capacities and 
expectations tend to be looked down upon. 
• Policy responses are embedded in disaster governance structures that can be 
organised and distributed on different geographical scales. When policy 
responses to disasters do not consider local realities, demands, and 
capacities, as in the case of Chaitén, the progression of vulnerability can initiate 
its multi-scalar path to materialisation from distant root causes and dynamic 
pressures to local, specific, and unsafe conditions.
These propositions also aim to contribute to possible theories. In this  case, although 
theory developments are linked to the bounded system of policy responses  to 
disasters in Chile, they aim to expand our understanding of the social production of 
vulnerability by connecting policy responses  to underlying factors of vulnerability 
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with a multi-scalar perspective. Yin (2009) asserted that theory development is  both 
the basis  and the starting point of the case study method. In this thesis, I developed 
research questions  and theoretical propositions  that are informed by relevant 
literature, although they were also refined by an iterative process of re-evaluation 
insofar as the data collected were suggesting potential contributions beyond those 
initially projected. The figure below shows the general case study method proposed 
by Yin (2009). However, the idea is  to adapt this method to the case of Chaitén. In 
the next section, I will propose the research method of this  study, alongside with the 
adoption of a single case study design and description of the units of analysis.
Figure 2.3. The case study method
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2.1.3 Units of analysis, and other elements of the case study design
Case study research can be either based on a single or multiple cases, and also have 
a ‘holistic’  or ‘embedded design’ depending of the unit(s) of analysis  determined for 
the study (Yin, 2003). In the case of Chaitén, the embedded design considers two 
units  of analysis in a single case. Figure 2.4 shows Yin’s  basic types of designs  for 
case studies.
Figure 2.4. Basic types of designs for case studies
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For Leedy and Ormrod (2010), the unit of analysis deals  with the fundamental 
problem of defining what the ‘case’ is. For that reason, Yin (2009) asserted that a 
tentative definition of the unit of analysis  is  strongly related to the way the 
researcher has previously defined the initial research questions. From this 
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perspective, the scope of this research builds on a single-case design/embedded 
units  of analysis  of the relations  between policy responses to disasters and the multi-
scalar progression of vulnerability in post-disaster Chaitén from 2008  until 2014. As 
theoretical frameworks  can shed light on the potential units  of analysis  too (Yin, 
2009), I utilised the PAR model to identify two units of analysis: one that looks  at the 
general institutional forms  for and mode of DRM and DRR in Chile, thus  touching 
upon the disaster governance structure as its context —this  includes different 
institutions and actors as well as relations  situated on different geographical scales. 
The other unit of analysis  looks  at the production of disaster vulnerability in Chaitén 
—i.e. unsafe conditions— through the processes  and mechanisms of policy responses 
during evacuation, relocation, and reconstruction (see Figure 2.5).
Figure 2.5. The research process
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Figure 2.5 summarises the research decisions regarding the contribution to 
knowledge and to ‘develop  theory’ in the field of disaster vulnerability. The study is 
defined as  ‘qualitative research’ where qualitative methods  and data sources  are 
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drawn from: interviews, observations, and qualitative document analysis. As 
described above, the single-case design at hand encompasses two ‘embedded 
units  of analysis’ that work to connect the research on different scales. The ultimate 
goal of this thesis is to arrive at conclusions  that contribute to knowledge and to 
develop policy implications.
Likewise, the logic linking the collected data to the propositions  is established 
through the ‘Explanation Building’ method (Yin, 2003). Essentially, explanation 
building consists  of analysing the general case study data by building an 
explanation about the case and the phenomenon. In most cases, explanation 
building occurs in a narrative form that constructs a storyline around the data, the 
propositions, and the research questions. In this case, the basis as well as  the 
structure of the explanation building is  given by the PAR model, based on the way 
the progression of vulnerability occurs: root causes, dynamic pressures, and unsafe 
conditions. In order to increase precision, Yin (2003)  appealed to the iterative nature 
of explanation building, then the following steps were conducted in order:
• Making an initial proposition about the phenomenon: e.g. disaster vulnerability 
in Chaitén persists despite various post-disaster efforts in part because policy 
responses did not consider the local reality, among others;
• Comparing the findings of the case against the statement of the propositions;
• Revising the propositions;
• Revising other details of the case against the revision;
• Repeat this procedure as many times as needed.
Finally, as  mentioned earlier, the criteria for interpreting the findings  is established 
through a social constructionist approach to vulnerability, disasters, and scales, and 
the PAR model. The rationale behind the selection of these approaches  and 
frameworks is  delineated in Chapter Three. In the following sections, I describe the 
research methodology, including the period of fieldwork, methods  utilised, and an 
introduction to the analytical approach.
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2.2 Research methodology 
The research methodology utilised in this thesis builds  on the case study method 
looking at the bounded system of policy responses to disasters, the model of DRM 
and DRR in Chile, and disaster vulnerability in post-disaster Chaitén. It aims  to 
explore and describe specific linkages between temporally and spatially distant 
processes —e.g. policy responses, governance and decision-making, institutions—, 
and the local ‘materialisation’ of vulnerability in the form of ‘unsafe conditions’ in 
Chaitén. 
In contrast to a positivist or naturalistic approach to disaster and risk, which see 
these as factual realities independent of subjective value judgements, the thesis’ 
methodology deals with a constructivist approach, that is, with the power and 
functions  of discourses  and institutions  in constructing the socio-natural ‘reality’ of 
risks and disasters, as well as  with the role of the researcher —the observer— in the 
process of research (Cohen and Manion, 1994; Mertens, 2005). Thus, the methods 
and instruments for data collection, and the analytical framework employed in this 
study are tied to this constructivist approach. In the next chapter, I will explore 
different disciplinary and historical traditions  approaching disaster, risk, and 
vulnerability to sustain these as social constructions. Hence, a component of this is 
the examination of disaster and scale literature. The literature review seeks to 
engage in the epistemological debate on the progression of vulnerability, the 
causes of disasters, and the implication of geographical scales, all crucial to 
approach and answer the research questions. On the other hand, by utilising the 
PAR model, I also try to articulate these two bodies of literature: as  the PAR model 
implicitly refers to geographical scales as  the arenas where root causes, dynamic 
pressures, and unsafe conditions are organised (Wisner et al., 2004). Then, the PAR 
model works  not only as  a main analytical register but also as a connector of 
literature bodies too. This operation is addressed in Chapter Three: in this chapter, 
however, I focus on the methods and the research design.
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Before introducing the period of research and methods employed during the study, 
I briefly outline some considerations on the pros and cons  of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches used in this study.
2.2.1 Considerations of quantitative and qualitative approaches
Here, some brief considerations  for using quantitative and qualitative data and 
methods  are presented to outline some methodological implications  for the study, 
the fieldwork, and the data analysis.
Quantitative
Frequently, quantitative researchers must infer the cause and the effect of a given 
event through the selection of their independent and dependent variables —in 
which case independent variables are manipulated (cause) and the dependent are 
observed (effect). Nevertheless, this  is difficult to apply in social research due to 
independent and dependent variables being unreachable (O'Brien, 2006). In the 
research of Chaitén, variables are not subject to manipulation. However, inferring 
about the causes and effects —i.e. root causes  and unsafe conditions— can be made 
based on the quantitative evidence collected from secondary sources such as 
accounting reports  and statistics. For instance, in Chapter Five, an analysis  of the 
municipal budget in Chaitén accounted for the high dependence of the city on the 
national economy, revealing the hierarchical and vertical relationship  between 
Chaitén and the state during recovery and reconstruction phases.
Both quantitative and qualitative methods  seek to generalise their findings. 
Generalisation is using a sample to explain the whole. In quantitative methods, the 
idea that a sample could be representative of the whole is  often used (Creswell, 
1994). According to Creswell (1994), a researcher can generalise the findings of a 
given sample just until to the ‘whole’ from which it was obtained —i.e. a school, a 
town, a city and country—, but it can never be generalised beyond that sample 
frame. Thus, it does  not matter how many surveys and questionnaires  were used, it 
will be very difficult to get the complete picture of a given phenomenon, especially 
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social phenomena. For these reasons, this  study does not attempt to generalise the 
findings into the general debate on the social production of disasters, but rather 
aims to provide insights for the refinement of a theoretical debate. Likewise, the 
scope of research findings can represent, in the best case, the contemporary 
Chilean context.
Qualitative
According to O'Brien (2006), qualitative research is  difficult to replicate. Most case 
study procedures  and methods  are collected and followed by the researcher as  well 
as  the data analysis. Most critiques point out that the researcher’s  findings are 
affected by his  or her interests, about how he or she decided to put attention on one 
or another element or people, and so on. Aware of these limitations of qualitative 
methods  such as  in-depth interviews  and participant observations —as  they were 
used in the fieldwork— some measures  were taken, such as  triangulation. As Creswell 
(1994, p.8) explained, “being objective is an essential aspect of competent inquiry, 
and for this  reason researchers must examine methods  and conclusions for bias. For 
example, standards  of validity and reliability are important in quantitative research”. 
One of these standards  of validity widely used in qualitative research is  triangulation 
through the use of multiple sources  (Jick, 1979). In the study of Chaitén, 
triangulation was pursued through the use of multiple sources as a means of 
seeking convergence across different methods: interviews —stratified on different 
scales in Chile—, focus  groups, field observations, and documentary analysis. For 
instance, unsafe conditions  such as  the ‘uneven distribution of risks’ between North 
and South sectors  in Chaitén were corroborated by interviews, observations, and the 
analysis of socio-demographic and economic records.
In general, this study can be considered ‘qualitative research’ based on the type of 
evidence collected throughout the investigation, as  well as the methods  utilised. As 
mentioned in the introductory chapter, interviewing, participant and non-participant 
observation, and document analysis were the main techniques  applied. 
Nevertheless, in several moments  of the study, quantitative data from secondary 
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sources  such as from government reports  were collected and employed during the 
analysis: municipal budgets, public spending in DRM, among others. Here it worth 
mentioning that documents were mainly in Spanish. In this regard, I analysed them 
in the same language, although the results and quotes (if necessary) were in 
expressed in English. The method of documentary analysis, and others, is  explained 
in greater detail in the section on research methods (section 2.2.3). 
2.2.2 Period of research and feedback
The doctoral research began in September 2011, with enrolment in the MPhil/PhD 
programme at the Bartlett Development Planning Unit (DPU), University College 
London (UCL). Initial stages  were centred on exploring the area of research, and 
examining a constantly expanding literature on relevant theory, and documents and 
published material regarding the Chaitén disaster.
After upgrading from MPhil to PhD candidate in September 2012, the fieldwork 
research took place for one prolonged period of time, in order to optimise time and 
financial resources —Santiago de Chile is 12,000 kilometres  from London, or about a 
16-hour flight— and likewise because the fieldwork also considers several ‘sub-
fieldworks’ within Chile. Figure 2.6 displays  the fieldwork period between March and 
September 2013, and in December 2014 —almost 8  months in total. Selecting 
Santiago de Chile as the ‘base station’ for the fieldwork was  due to most data 
sources  —e.g. libraries  and institutional collections— and interviewees from key 
institutions being located in the city. Several sub-fieldworks were carried out in the 
city of Puerto Montt —capital of Los  Lagos  Region— and Chaitén. I visited Puerto 
Montt in March and July 2013 for two or three days  each time, while Chaitén was 
visited on three occasions: in March, July, and September 2013 for about one week 
each visit. During these periods, I conducted interviews in Santiago, Puerto Montt, 
and Chaitén, and focus groups  and field observations  in Chaitén and Santiago. Final 
concluding interviews and follow-up questions were obtained remotely via 
telephone, videoconference, and email.
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Figure 2.6. Fieldwork and sub-fieldwork periods
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Regarding the Chaitén disaster, the time span for analysis  encompasses  post-
disaster events  from May 2008 to late 2014, among them: the meetings held by 
regional government authorities, specialists  and people prior to the volcanic 
eruption; the emergency response and evacuation; short-term compensations and 
recovery subsidy programmes; the political figure of the Presidential Delegate for 
the Chaitén disaster; the New Chaitén project; and the group of men and women 
that decided to return to Chaitén despite the ban to inhabit it —i.e. ‘the rebels’, see 
Figure 2.7.
Figure 2.7. Chaitén post-disaster
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The figure above situates the investigated processes within the timeline of post-
disaster Chaitén. The overlapping processes  and decisions  that were often 
controlled by national actors —although regional and local actors also mediated— 
portrays the complexity of the post-disaster timeline, and the challenges it posed for 
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the research design. A detailed exploration and analysis of these processes and 
decision, as well as their interrelations, are provided in Chapter Five. 
Before addressing the research methods, it is worth mentioning here that valuable 
insights  and feedback were collected through participation either as a presenter or 
moderator in conferences and seminars, in Chile, Germany, and United Kingdom 
between 2013 and 2015. The feedback I received during these events  had an 
immense value since it helped me to test the robustness  of the argument of the 
thesis, as well as  to rethink some of the interviewees  and institutions selected for the 
study. For example, in a roundtable2  that took place on December 16, 2014, the 
ONEMI’s  national director Rodrigo Toro pointed out —referring to the presentation I 
did previously— the ‘success’ of the Chaitén case by arguing that nobody died. That 
‘self-confidence’ attitude about the supposed ‘success’ intrigued me because it 
contrasted with the appraisal from Chaitén people. That guided me later to look at 
the ‘life saving’ discourse during emergencies  within ONEMI’s documents  and 
politicians’ media releases, and discuss it in a holistic preparedness  for emergency 
response. Most of the feedback received during these events was documented in 
the form of written notes and audio recordings. A complete list of attended events 
can be found in Appendix 2.
2.2.3 Research methods
The case study methods  introduced below look at the model of DRM and DRR 
policy responses in Chile and disaster vulnerability in post-disaster Chaitén. They 
aim to examine and characterise relevant relationships  between temporally and 
spatially distant processes —e.g. policy responses, governance and decision-
making, institutions—, and the local ‘materialisation’ of vulnerability in Chaitén. The 
selection of the methods  also considered the post-disaster time span from 2008 
onwards —so it required a historic review—, and the inherent complexity linked to the 
60
2 This roundtable took place within the 8th ChileGlobal Encuentros Conference. The session was called 
‘Disasters, Emergency, and Reconstruction in Chile’. 
multiplicity of actors and their positions  within a multi-scalar system, which required 
a stratification of interviews and documentary analysis.
Interviews and focus groups
An important part of the study and the fieldwork comprises conducting in-depth 
and guided interviews and focus groups with key informants and actors at different 
geographical and institutional levels: for instance, interviews  with ONEMI officials  at 
national, regional and local levels. I decided to use interviewing as  a data collection 
technique for several reasons. Firstly, it allows for factually ‘exploring’ the case of 
post-disaster Chaitén, since at the start some processes  and actors  remained unclear 
or not confirmed. Thus, interviews being more like guided conversations rather than 
structured queries allowed for the stream of questions to be more fluid and 
exploratory, especially in-depth interviews at the beginning of the study. In addition 
to the ONEMI, informants from other relevant institutions were contacted, for 
example from: 
• Congress of Chile
• Ministries of Interior and Public Security, Public Works (MOP), Housing and 
Urbanism (MINVU), Finance, Social Development, Agriculture, National 
Property, and the Ministry of Health (MINSAL)
• Subsecretariat for Regional Development and Administration (SUBDERE)
• Government of Los Lagos Region
• Provincial Government of Palena
• Municipality of Chaitén
• Neighbourhood and community organisations in Chaitén such as the ‘Sons 
and Friends of Chaitén’ and ‘Potable Water Committee of Chaitén South’, 
among others.
Experts, scholars, and practitioners at different geographical levels were also 
approached, including from universities, research centres, and NGOs. Among them: 
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the National Research Center for Integrated Natural Disaster Management 
(CIGIDEN) at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, the Research Center for 
Vulnerability and Socio-natural Disasters (CIVDES) at the Universidad de Chile, the 
Laboratory of Territorial Planning or Laboratorio de Planificación Territorial  (LPT) at 
the Universidad Católica de Temuco, Universidad de Los Lagos, the Lift Chile 
Challenge or Desafío Levantemos Chile, Observatory for the Reconstruction or 
Observatorio de la Reconstrucción, and Ámbito Consultores.
As  the research was inductive, the first batch of interviews took place in Chaitén in 
March 2013 to discern the actual vulnerability. Unsafe or vulnerable conditions 
described by interviewees during these first round of interviews  were then 
converged alongside data collected through technical reports and scientific articles 
—these are properly referenced in Chapter Five. Eleven interviewees were 
approached using a snowball stratified sampling technique. Atkinson and Flint 
(2004) defined snowballing as a qualitative method for gathering subjects who then 
provide the names of other relevant actors. This  technique was especially useful for 
dealing with the difficult problem of obtaining respondents as they were few in 
number and require higher levels  of trust in order to initiate contact, such as  the 
politicians and government officials contacted to talk about the Chaitén case 3 and 
the local leaders in Chaitén. 
Taking advantage of my professional network, I contacted via email from London, in 
December 2011, two colleagues who worked in Chaitén post-disaster researching 
for academia and NGOs. They gave me an initial overview of potential key 
informants  who could provide essential information about vulnerable conditions  in 
Chaitén. One particular informant, Patricia Troncoso4, a local leader who was 
immensely valuable in our first meeting in March 2013, provided me access  to all 
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3 In the initial interviews with government officials, there was a clear political tension around the 
Chaitén disaster as they first asked me not to record the interviews or not to use their name in any 
published material.
4 Fictitious name. At the end of this section, on ‘ethical considerations’ I explain why I decided to use 
fictitious names for all research participants.
other local leaders, both in the North and South sectors of Chaitén. In most cases, I 
approached the interviewees in the company of a person who had referenced him 
or her previously. This was  true for approaching most of the community leaders. On 
other occasions, for local government officials  such as  the Mayor and the Head of 
Police in Chaitén, I telephoned them using the contact details  provided by other 
interviewees. In these circumstances, I always used the names  of the person who 
gave me his  or her contact details, in order to facilitate approaching the potential 
informant. Although the informants were mainly community leaders from different 
neighbourhood groups, there were also representatives  from public services such as 
police, health, and firefighters in Chaitén. As  the research was inductive, interviewing 
evolved from the ‘informal conversational interview’ to the ‘general interview guide 
approach’ (Gall et al., 2003), being first applied at the beginning of the study when I 
visited Chaitén the first and second time —in March and July 2013 respectively. 
Guided interviewing was applied often with interviewees from the national and 
regional governments, academia, and civil society. In the case of government 
officials, these interviews looked at the role of institutions  and their decisions in 
relation to the evacuation, recovery, relocation, and reconstruction of Chaitén. 
Interviews  with experts and relevant informants in Chaitén looked at the same 
relations but in combination with their perceptions on vulnerable conditions  in 
Chaitén (see samples of interview records in Appendices 3 and 4).
Once the interviewees were contacted, I arranged the encounters  at places  where 
interviewees may feel comfortable to talk openly, such as in their offices, houses, and 
sometimes in cafeterias, and on the street. To conduct the interviews, I used my own 
experience in previous research and techniques  described by several authors 
(Leedy and Ormrod, 2010; Nelson, 2012). I viewed interviews as personal 
encounters where social skills, avoiding judgemental attitudes, engaging with the 
respondent —but keeping track of the questions—, and active listening techniques 
were utilised —such ‘please repeat’, ‘really?’, ‘tell me more about that’. Basically, the 
point was to let the respondents tell their own story on their own terms. I asked 
simple but direct questions such as ‘What was  your experience during the 
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evacuation?’ or ‘how did you and/or the ONEMI react when you received the 
emergency call from Chaitén in May 2008?’ trying to elicit a descriptive answer from 
the respondents. 
I always  initiated the encounters by introducing myself and the objectives  of the 
interview (very briefly), and I asked the interviewees  to introduce themselves too. 
Subsequently, I continued with ‘warming up’ questions —something that the 
respondent could answer easily and at some length (though not too long)— in order 
to put us  more at ease and make the rest of the interview flow more smoothly. Then, 
I started with the questions related to the subject of study, which varied from one 
interviewee to another depending of the institution or organisation and the 
geographical scale at which she or he was situated. In general, the conversations 
included these topics  and structure: 1) presentation and introduction, 2) about the 
evacuation, 3) recovery —i.e. compensation, benefits and subsidies—, 4) the 
relocation and New Chaitén project, and 5) reconstruction. After 30 minutes and one 
hour, I started to end the interviews  by mentioning that we were approaching the 
end at the same time I asked the final questions, and by making a short summary of 
the talk at the end —in case the interviewee desired to add or re-comment about 
something addressed or not in the interview. Finally, I always thanked them for their 
time and dedication, and I offered my contact details  in case they would like to make 
further comments on the discussed topics.
In total, I visited Chaitén three times  for 27 interviews, two focus  groups, and several 
participant observations, and in some cases  for accessing municipal records and 
documents: in March, July, and September 2013. I also visited Puerto Montt two 
times for interviews: in March and July 2013. In Puerto Montt, I interviewed eight 
people total from the Regional Government of Los  Lagos and the ONEMI’s  regional 
division, as these institutions  played an influential role in the relation between policy 
responses and decision-making and the community during the post-disaster phase. 
They were selected using the snowball stratified sampling technique too, but also 
informed by media archives and institutional reports.
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In Santiago de Chile, I conducted 31 interviews during March until September 2013 
and in December 2014 that included people from national government institutions, 
NGOs, and academia. Informants  were contacted in different ways, with most of the 
executive government officials  being approached through my personal and 
professional network, while in other cases, officials were approached through formal 
channels  such as letters, emails, and telephone calls to their offices. Similar 
procedures were taken for approaching experts and practitioners.
In a few cases, interviews were cancelled, and in other cases they had to be 
conducted by telephone because it was not possible to find a convenient date and 
time. It must be noted that the initial interview plan encompassed about 50 
interviewees, however several interviews and interviewees  suggested other relevant 
contacts who were accordingly contacted to be interviewed.
During the fieldwork in Chile to late 2014, a total of 66 individuals  participated in in-
depth and guided interviews, focus groups, and telephone interviews. This included 
any follow-up  in the form of informal conversations  on email or other verbal 
communications. In two sub-fieldworks in Chaitén, focus groups  and interviews were 
assisted by another researcher, Cristian Albornoz Espinoza from the CIVDES at the 
Universidad de Chile who had been involved in previous research activities in 
Chaitén.
Alongside the sampling process, the interviewees’ universe was stratified according 
to different levels  of organisational hierarchy within relevant institutions  and 
geographical scale. Figure 2.8 illustrates  the various  interviewees of the study. They 
are organised in relation to the institution or ‘field’ they were working in at the time 
when the interview took place —i.e. Ministry of Interior (MI), Other ministries (OM), 
Civil society (CS), Academia and Practitioners (AP), or Local people (LP)—, or at the 
time of the Chaitén disaster’s occurrence —i.e. 2008-2013. Likewise, the interviewees 
were stratified in relation to the ‘geographical scale’ —i.e. national, regional, and local
— by which their institutions/organisations  are organised. Interviewees’ identities 
were codified —e.g. MI12 corresponds to the interviewee Nº12 of the Ministry of 
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Interior— for ethical considerations. Ethical considerations  are addressed at the end 
of this section. The figure below shows an imbalance between regional and the rest 
of interviewees, however this can be justified because during the snowball stratified 
sampling, the names of informants and organisations involved in post-disaster 
Chaitén emerged spontaneously during the process. Indeed, this  may be also an 
indication of the relatively marginal role that the regional government played during 
the process, something that will be addressed in Chapter Five.
Figure 2.8. Research participants arranged by organisation and geographical scale
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Focus groups were not used extensively in the study: there were only two focus 
groups  in total, both in Chaitén. As  these are similar to group interviews where the 
value builds  on the interaction within the group, on topics  supplied by a researcher/
moderator (Morgan, 1997), they were used mainly as  supplementary sources  about 
potential unsafe conditions  and the relation between the community and the state. 
The approach during the focus  groups was similar to the one described above for 
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interpersonal interviews, although it considered pre-planning and recruiting, as well 
as  moderating as essential elements  for the correct development of the activity 
(Morgan and Scannell, 1998).
A complete list of participants in both interviews and focus groups  can be found in 
Appendix 1, where information about them regarding gender, affiliation or group, 
position, and date of interaction is provided. Likewise, a sample of the preparation 
and execution of guided interviews and of one focus group  arranged in Chaitén is 
available in Appendices 3 and 4.
Field observations
A second technique used in this study was participant and non-participant 
observations. According to Leedy and Ormrod (2010), the qualitative researcher 
may make observations either as a relative ‘outsider’ or non-participant and, 
especially in the case of an ethnography, as a participant observer. Observations in 
qualitative research are intentionally unstructured and ‘free-flowing’, owing to the 
flexibility of taking advantage of unforeseen data sources  as they surface (Leedy and 
Ormrod, 2010). Yin (2003) asserted that both participant and non-participant 
observations are valuable sources because of their closeness to ‘reality’, as  they 
allow the researcher to gather data in real-time, but also because observations are 
contextual, covering the context of observed events. According to Yin, 
“observational evidence is useful in providing additional information [...] for 
understanding either the context and the phenomenon being studied”  (Yin, 2003, p.
93). For the above-mentioned reasons, and because I have had previous  experience 
using this technique, I selected ‘observations’ as  a complementary source of 
evidence.
In the study, non-participant observations occurred within some group  discussions 
and team meetings in Santiago between two or more participants  when another 
researcher, assistant or mediator led the interaction. These observations  included 
spontaneous home meetings and sidewalk interactions in Chaitén too. These took 
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place in the North and South sectors  in Chaitén and in surrounding areas. For Yin 
(2003), participant observations  occur when the researcher is  identified as such and/
or when the researcher happens to be a part of the organisation or group being 
studied. During the fieldwork in Santiago, I participated as  ‘Visiting Researcher’ in 
two research centres on disasters in Chile: in the CIVDES at the Universidad of Chile 
between March and August 2013, and in the CIGIDEN at the Pontificia Universidad 
Católica de Chile in December 2014. In both periods, I had the chance of observing 
diverse academic discussions and comments  on policies, governmental efforts, and 
initiatives  on DRM and DRR in Chile. Both direct and participant observations were 
registered in the form of written notes  and pictures  (these were properly indicated in 
Chapter Five). As recommended by Yin (2003), pictures  were taken at several 
fieldwork locations as  they help to convey important case characteristics  to outside 
observers, to capture information that later may be useful for analysis, or can be 
used to represent insights  on some specific contextual situations  (see for example 
figures 5.23 in page 232 and 5.26 in page 239, Chapter Five).
Document analysis
A third research method and data source used in this study relates  to the analysis  of 
documents  or document analysis. For Bowen (2009), document analysis  can involve 
skimming (superficial examination), reading (thorough examination), and 
interpretation of texts  both printed or electronic. The process  is  iterative and can 
combine elements of ‘content’ and ‘thematic’ analysis. Content analysis  is  the 
process of organising information into categories  that can be useful to address  the 
research questions, while thematic analysis  is  a form of pattern recognition within 
the data, with emerging themes becoming the categories  for analysis  (Bowen, 
2009). In this  study, however, I have tried to exclude the quantification typical of 
conventional mass  media content analysis due to most of the documents utilised in 
the study having different ‘content structure’: this  study included reports, media 
releases, newspaper interviews, historical books, websites, laws, legal documents, 
among many other types  of documents. According to Corbin and Strauss (2014), 
quantitative document analysis is  recommended when the content structure of the 
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sample is  either equal or similar —e.g. books, press releases, or tweets  from Twitter. 
In cases like this  study where documents have very different content structures, 
document analysis  can entail a first-pass  document review, in which relevant 
passages  of text or other data —e.g. pictures— are identified and then analysed 
(Bowen, 2009). In this regard, I first did a document sampling regarding the Chaitén 
disaster between 2008  and 2014 that encompassed documents from different 
organisations, institutions, and media. Of course, the document sampling was 
guided and accordingly stratified in accordance with the analytical framework 
defined previously —i.e. the PAR model. Thus, contents  that pointed to certain ‘root 
causes’ were categorised differently from those that pointed to ‘unsafe conditions’ in 
Chaitén. Then, this sample expanded and contracted insofar as  new data from 
interviews and field observations emerged.
Although most of the documents used in this  study are properly referenced in text 
and the bibliography, a categorised list of studied documents is provided here:
• International reports: may be issued by private and non-private international 
organisations;
• Governmental reports: may be issued by ministerial departments and offices, it 
can include national reports, regional and municipal accountability reports, 
among others;
• Consulting or private reports: may be issued by consulting firms, companies, 
and universities, or from a combination of them —e.g. PUC et al. (2009);
• Laws: issued by the Congress of Chile or the Government of Chile and can 
include Supreme Decrees, Force-of-law Decrees, Bills, among others;
• Media archives: may be issued by public or private organisations, and may 
include text, audio, images, and/or videos;
• Press releases: generally issued by governmental bodies in written or recorded 
communication;
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• Newspaper articles: issued by newspaper private companies both physically or 
electronically, including national, regional, and local newspapers;
• Scientific articles: issued by academic publishers.
The rationale for document analysis  lies in its role in methodological and data 
triangulation, and the immense value of documents  for investigating events in the 
past (Bowen, 2009). This  is  especially true for a historical analysis of the 
geographical scale formations in Chile and its relation to the model of DRM and 
DRR, thus, document analysis was used as the predominant research method.
The data collected from documents  were continuously contrasted with other 
sources  including key informants  and field observations. To achieve greater validity 
for the data collected, triangulation was always  pursued. Triangulation has been 
broadly defined (Denzin, 2009) as  the combination of methodologies and/or 
sources  in the study of the same phenomenon. The triangulation metaphor is 
borrowed from a navigation and military strategy that uses multiple reference points 
to locate an object’s  exact position (Jick, 1979). Thus, qualitative studies  can improve 
accuracy of their judgements by collecting different kinds of data, and using 
different technique and methods  (Jick, 1979). In this study, I decided to rely on the 
combination of different methods  of data collection as well as the use of quantitative 
and qualitative data to provide more reliability and accuracy of findings.
Ethical considerations
Because of ethical considerations  for primary research in the case of interviewing, 
few interactions were recorded either using audio or video. This  decision was  made 
considering the pros and cons  of recording and transcribing interviews (Nelson, 
2012): recording devices introduce different dynamics into the social encounter of 
the interview, and transcription can be a very time-consuming process, especially 
when the interviews  are conducted in a language other than the one selected for the 
study. I was also looking to “encourage openness and the establishment of trusting 
relationships with the interviewer” (Diamond and Allcorn, 2009, p.185). The Chaitén 
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disaster had an important political impact for both government officials  —e.g. the 
forced resignation of the regional governor or intendente  in 2009— and left-wing 
parties in rule as they lost the elections  against a right-wing coalition in 2009. These 
reasons, I assumed, may explain why several government officials asked me 
beforehand not to record the interviews. In addition to this, the requirements  of the 
UCL Graduate School Research Fund (which partially funded the fieldworks)  and the 
UCL Research Ethics  Committee requested that I ensure confidentiality of human 
participants  during fieldworks. Finally, I decided that all interviewees  were protected 
by confidentiality and anonymity. In order to facilitate reading and understanding, 
fictitious names  were used for the interviewees while gender, institutional affiliation, 
position and date of interaction is provided.
Of those recorded interactions, most of them were transcribed or partially 
transcribed. All sources  quoted in the thesis are from those transcripts. In addition to 
the aforementioned transcriptions, most of the interviews  were registered in 
summary form as written notes  (see an example in Appendices  3 and 4). These notes 
were also transcribed and expanded upon immediately after each interview.
2.2.4 History as a ‘proxy’ to approach geographical scales in Chile 
As  in statistics, proxy variables or indicators are often used as  an indirect measure or 
sign that approximates the phenomenon and its  characteristics  in the absence of a 
direct indicator (Miller, 2007). One of the study’s objectives is  to understand how the 
progression of disaster vulnerability may unfold through geographical scales, 
considering these as  social constructions, that is, that scales are not necessarily a 
preordained framework or ontologically given categories  for ordering the world —
local, regional, national and global. They are instead “a contingent outcome of the 
tensions that exist between structural forces and the practices of human 
agents” (Marston, 2000, p.220). Then, the idea of a multi-scale analysis  required me 
to deepen the history of certain socio-spatial and structural processes that can 
explain as well as describe the current state territorial organisation of Chile, in terms 
of its spatial, political, economic, and social organisation. 
71
The study of geographical scales in Chile  will be the focus  of Chapter Four as a 
‘proxy’ as it aims  to inform the analysis  of causal factors and processes of disaster 
vulnerability in Chaitén through the history of the territorial structure of the Chilean 
state. This seeks  to assist the analysis of key characteristics  of the state model of 
DRM or any other institution potentially involved in the progression of vulnerability, 
being either de- or centralised, top-down or bottom-up, pro- or reactive, and so 
forth.
In this  regard, Brenner (2009a; 2009b) and Marston (2000) recognised that 
‘institutional forms’ have proven to be an invaluable analytical element to 
conceptualise geographical scales. For instance, ‘education’ —as  a social 
phenomenon— is  institutionalised at different levels and configured at different 
geographical scales, from the national to the local: Ministry of Education, Regional 
departments or sub-agencies, schools and universities  at urban levels, and so forth. 
Likewise, the geographical organisation of institutional processes on education may 
include national policies and laws, regional regulatory frameworks, and municipal 
ordinances. Although I only investigated the social construction of scales in Chile 
from a historical perspective based on document analysis  (see section 4.2), the main 
objective was to link some general processes of scalar formation with the 
geographical distribution and hierarchical organisation of the DRM in Chile, thus 
enabling a multi-scalar arrangement of the ‘root causes’, ‘dynamic pressures’, and 
‘unsafe conditions’ within the progression of vulnerability for Chaitén. Chapter Four 
illustrates  the territorial structure of the Chilean state since its independence from 
the Spanish empire in 1810 until its contemporary form.
2.3 Introducing the study’s analytical approaches
The main analytical framework utilised in this  study is  the PAR model. However, this 
needs to be considered in light of three other approaches which mediate the 
process of analysis too: social constructionism, complexity, and cause-effect. 
Although the analytical framework is  addressed in Chapter Three, I briefly delineate 
each of these approaches as follows. 
72
The overall analytical approach is  situated between social constructionist 
perspectives  on disasters, vulnerability, and scales. A social constructionist approach 
posits  that society and individual experience, including perception, is always 
historically, culturally, and linguistically mediated (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). This 
means that the perceived ‘reality’, including the one emerging from disasters  and 
vulnerability in their different scalar materialisation, is  never a direct reflection of 
physical conditions  ‘out there’. Rather, ‘reality’ must be understood as a specific 
reading of such material conditions (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Thus, the analysis 
of the epistemological debate on disasters  and scales  —addressed in Chapter Three
— is conditioned by this ontological stance (Echeverría, 2006).
In addition, a social constructionist and multi-scalar approach to the progression of 
vulnerability inherently relates to the problem of complexity, “in the sense that a 
great many independent agents  are interacting with each other in a great many 
ways” (Waldrop, 1993, p.11). The countless  number of socio-economic and political, 
ecological and cultural processes  and circumstances that may intervene in the 
process of vulnerability characterises the complexity of interactions between society 
and nature as  well as the unpredictability of causal chains  in disasters (Hilhorst, 
2006). Thus, a necessary task has been to somehow delimit complexity to a 
manageable dimension for grounded research, such as  the present one. This  has 
been achieved through the use of the PAR model as a cause-effect framework. 
In a similar fashion, disasters have been historically interpreted in terms of cause-
effect (Etkin, 2014): ancient cultures used to explain disasters  as  divine punishment, 
and in the modern era people have explained disasters as ‘natural’ events. With the 
rise of constructionist approaches in disaster studies  (Cardona, 2006), recent models 
of disasters are based on the idea that societies have the ability and capacity to 
determine their experiences, and to view such events  within their locus  of control 
(Etkin, 2014). This  positivism, and the cause-effect approach, are strongly linked to 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries  paradigms of rational thinkers  such as 
Newton and Descartes, and can even be traced back to Plato (Etkin, 2014). As 
73
Hilhorst (2006) and Etkin (2014) asserted, classical rational and positivist notions of 
disasters have given rise to more constructionist approaches as  a result of the 
development of political ecology theories and chaos theory. The complex and 
chaotic inherent nature of disasters and vulnerability, “although bounded, can be 
highly unpredictable and can exhibit surprising emerging properties. This has led to 
a shift from management approaches that are deterministic to ones  that are 
adaptive and that recognise limitations to the degree to which humans can control 
parts of their environment” (Etkin, 2014, p.202). Although the approach adopted in 
the study aligns  with the cause-effect approach described above, it contests  that 
single causes  give rise to simple effects. Rather, this  study refers to ‘cause-effect’ in 
the sense of complexity, that is, as  ‘cascades’: as  cumulative and non-linear 
sequential processes that may trigger complex effects  such as  disasters  (Wisner et 
al., 2004).
The PAR model, as a key analytical dimension, helped to tame such complexities  for 
several reasons: first, it is  built on a cause-effect perspective (Wisner et al., 2004) and 
complexity is  delimited to structural factors  within a social realm. Second, the 
progression of vulnerability that is adopted in the PAR model inherently describes  a 
scalar organisation and distribution of causal factors of risks and disasters  —e.g. 
global widespread processes  linked to local unsafe conditions. Third, as a very 
common tool in disaster studies, it adjusts very well when applied to case-based 
research, and there are several interesting case studies  that can provide supporting 
material for comparing methodologies and analyses  (see examples in Dahlberg et 
al., 2017; Wisner et al., 2004).
2.4 Limitations of the study
The most obvious methodological challenge was the generalisation of the study’s 
findings. Although several methodological measures were taken in order to improve 
accuracy, such as triangulation, I was aware that this study is difficult to replicate as 
most of the analytical process  was interpretative, and therefore, subjective (Yin, 
2003). Likewise, although great emphasis has been placed on reliability and 
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accuracy by securing different and diverse data sources, I was also aware that the 
analysis  and interpretation of data, as well as the delineation of findings, is 
unavoidably subject to the author’s  history, views, values and beliefs (Creswell, 1994; 
Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). Nevertheless, because I was  conscious about my position 
within the study I did my best in trying to reduce bias by means of convergence of 
different qualitative methods, and by peer-review wherever possible. 
In addition, the Chaitén disaster produced several political impacts within President 
Bachelet’s  administration in 2009, and possibly affected the subsequent presidential 
elections that year. So the interviews, in 2013, may have been charged with political 
tensions because Bachelet was participating in her second presidential campaign, 
which she won in November 2013. This may, then, have obscured the interviewees’ 
perceptions about the circumstances  and processes which they were describing. 
Alongside this, such perceptions  may have also been affected by the relation of the 
interviewees with their employers: the fact that many of the interviewees were 
government employees at the time of the interviews may perhaps have affected 
their narratives.
Moreover, I acknowledge that the scope of the findings may be reduced due to the 
limited universe of interviewees as  well as  its  composition. Because the research 
encompasses  three differentiated territorial and administrative levels  —i.e. national, 
regional, and local—, a larger number of interviewees  may have produced a finer 
analysis  of the case. Likewise, the composition and distribution of the interviewees 
within these three distinctive levels  could be better balanced in terms  of scale and 
gender (see Figure 2.8).
Another limitation relates to the fact that the study is framed within a Structural 
Paradigm or a political economy perspective (Wisner et al., 2004, Gunewardena and 
Schulle, 2008), which limits its scope and potentials to structural factors  in society, 
leaving aside relations  equally important for disasters such as  environmental and 
socio-ecological ones —e.g. political ecology.
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There are also other more practical limitations  that relate to the methods utilised: in-
depth and guided interviews, participant and non-participant observations, and 
document analysis. For instance, despite the strengths  of interviewing mentioned 
earlier there are also weaknesses: a potential bias due to poorly constructed 
questions; response bias; bias  due to poor recall; and ‘reflexibility’, as the 
interviewees can state what the interviewer wants  to hear (Yin, 2003). The limitation 
of observations is also present: ‘selectivity’ unless  broad coverage; and ‘reflexibility’ 
as  subjects may proceed differently because they are being observed (Yin, 2003). 
Document analysis  also has  disadvantages that limit the study: ‘insufficient details’  as 
documents  are for some purpose other than research, and in some cases for a 
specific audience, consequently their level of details may be narrowed, insufficient, 
and biased (Bowen, 2009). Throughout the thesis, I indicate and warn the reader 
about such methodological and practical limitations, as well as  the scope of this 
work.
 In conclusion, I would like to reiterate that despite such limitations, there has  
been a considerable contribution to knowledge, especially on how to advance 
policy responses to disasters in Chile, its governance systems and decision-making 
in relation to DRM. These empirical contributions, as well as  other methodological 
and epistemological implications, are detailed in the conclusions  of the thesis  in 
Chapter Six.
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Chapter THREE: The social and multi-scalar 
progression of vulnerability
Theoretical background and analytical framework
Introduction
Not long ago, before the 1950s, disasters were mainly seen by people as ‘Acts of 
God’, as divine punishment to humankind for their evil ways  (Etkin, 2014), and yet 
today the idea of disasters being matters of fate persist in some cultures  despite the 
overwhelming evidence to the contrary (Burton, 2014; IFRC, 2014). This  paradigm is 
acknowledged by several scholars (Boano and Lund, 2011; Wijkman and 
Timberlake, 1984) as the starting point for the interpretation of disasters  and risks. 
The first historical shift that abandoned the idea of disasters as  ‘Acts  of God’ came 
with the advent of Enlightenment, rationality, and modern scientific thinking in the 
eighteenth century. Disasters and risk were seen as ‘Acts of Nature’ (Wijkman and 
Timberlake, 1984). Since then, natural extreme events  such as  earthquakes, 
tsunamis, and floods  were synonymous  with disasters (Etkin, 2014; Hewitt, 1983). 
The second and last historical shift in interpreting disasters is  brought forth by the 
social sciences and the idea of disasters as  social constructions  (Cardona, 2006; 
Wisner et al., 2004). Wijkman and Timberlake (1984) referred to disasters  as  ‘Acts of 
Men and Women’ to interpret disasters  as  results  of conflicting socio-economic, 
political, and cultural processes  which, when translated into vulnerability, are 
‘triggered’ by a given natural extreme event. This  interpretation is  the very starting 
point of this work. In the following sections, I present the theoretical background 
and the epistemological debate that uphold the thesis and its analytical framework.
Alongside the behavioural, mutuality, and structural paradigms introduced in 
Chapter One (page 29), I initiate this  chapter by describing the social constructionist 
approach —nested in the Structural Paradigm which focuses on the role of structural 
factors  in society, such as  social relations and structures of domination (Bankoff et 
al., 2006)— in order to offer a conceptual and epistemological starting point for the 
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analytical framework of the thesis offered at the end of this  chapter. The first section 
briefly addresses  the history of interpretations of disasters and risks, which I believe 
is  important for an interpretative perspective of the present and perhaps providing 
insights into how to refine our interpretations in the future.
After situating the constellation of disaster studies and the significance of the 
vulnerability approach (sections  3.1 and 3.2), the text proceeds in explaining and 
discussing the disaster Pressure and Release (PAR) model from a multi-scalar 
perspective. This is  important because the PAR model is used both as  a 
methodological and analytical tool: a compass that guided the methodology as  well 
as  the analysis  of material collected in the fieldworks. At the end of section 3.3, I 
explain how ‘geographical scales’ are conceived as  social constructions and how this 
perspective may contribute to a better understanding of the progression of 
vulnerability. Following mainly Brenner (2009a), Swyngedouw (1992) and Lefebvre 
(1991 [1974]), I refer to ‘geographical scales’ as differentiated spaces  that are 
hierarchically related and organised for and within a form of territorial coherence. As 
in a vertical axis  along which elements of interest are ranked or units  of analysis are 
placed, like on a ruler (Fekete et al., 2010), a given single geographical scale —e.g. 
urban— should never be conceived and analysed in isolation (Brenner, 2001). 
Rather, they must be interrogated vis-à-vis its  upwards, downwards, and transversal 
linkages within its scalar configuration (Brenner, 2009a).
With this  perspective in mind, section 3.4 proposes  understanding ‘policy responses 
to disasters’ and ‘the model of disaster risk management and reduction in Chile’ 
within a specific ‘disaster governance’ (Tierney, 2012). This  approach was useful as it 
allowed me to grasp comprehensively the various aspects  and forces that took place 
during the progression of vulnerability in Chaitén such as for example on decision-
making. Then, the final section offers  a synopsis  of the analytical elements discussed 
throughout this chapter.
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3.1 Interpreting disasters and risks
Today, a disaster is commonly defined as “a serious  disruption of the functioning of 
a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic or 
environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected 
community or society to cope using its own resources” (UNISDR, 2009a, p.9). 
International conventions, reports (IFRC, 2014; UNISDR, 2005; 2015b) and social 
science literature (Pelling, 2003b; Quarantelli, 1998; Wisner et al., 2004) often 
remark that disasters and disaster risk are a result of the interaction of a hazard —e.g. 
earthquake, hurricane, etc.— and the vulnerability of an element or system exposed 
(Birkmann, 2013), where disaster risk is  “the potential disaster losses, in lives, health 
status, livelihoods, assets  and services, which could occur to a particular community 
or society in a specified future time period” (UNISDR, 2009a, p.10). This  way of 
thinking is reflected in the conceptual equation: 
hazard × vulnerability  =  risk  →  disaster
However, today’s interpretations have not emerged from thin air. Boano and Lund 
(2011) have highlighted this historical transition of disaster interpretations from 
disasters as ‘Acts of Nature’ to becoming ‘Acts of Men and Women’ by describing 
how techno-centric perspectives  are being substituted for a social constructionist 
approach. The techno-centric approach builds on interpreting disasters  as ‘natural’ 
events, and therefore focuses  on reducing disasters  by means  of physical research —
e.g. geology, volcanology, engineering, among others— and investment in large-
scale mitigatory infrastructures. Contrarily, the social constructionist approach is 
based on interpreting disasters as  ‘Acts of Men and Women’, and therefore focuses 
on reducing disasters by means  of tackling the social causes  of vulnerabilities and 
risks.
This shift materialised during the 1980s (Quarantelli, 1987a) after the evident failure 
of techno-centric approaches and the increasing number of global disasters 
(Pelling, 2003b) which occurred despite the increase of ‘technical’ research, and the 
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investment on mitigatory measures worldwide (Hewitt, 1983). According to 
Quarantelli (1998), the failure of techno-centric approaches  in addressing the 
problem of disasters  lies in their misunderstanding of the multi-dimensional 
complexity of disasters.
In 1987, Quarantelli described that the word ‘disaster’  was introduced to the English 
language from French (disastre), which, in turn, was  constructed from a derivation of 
two Latin words (dis, astro)  —meaning something like “formed on a 
star” (Quarantelli, 1987b, p.8).5  Thus, the origins  of the word ‘disaster’ reflect the 
paradigm of time and a starting point in the interpretation of disasters, where such 
extreme natural events  were interpreted as God’s divine retribution for human 
failings  (White  et al., 2001). Subsequently, with the advent of rational thinking in the 
eighteenth century, ‘disasters as  acts of God’ were substituted by ‘disasters  as acts  of 
Nature’ (Etkin, 2014). Finally, as  Quarantelli6  documented (1998), these ‘common 
sense views’ were then challenged by social science approaches. For Dombrowsky, 
Carr (1932) was “the first in the field to try to understand disasters in terms of social 
action” (1998, p.24). Carr wrote in 1932:
“Not every windstorm, earth-tremor, or rush of water is a catastrophe. A 
catastrophe is known by its works; that is to say, by the occurrence of disaster.  So 
long as the ship rides out the storm, so long as the city resists the earth-shocks, so 
long as the levees hold, there is no  disaster. It is the collapse of the cultural 
protections that constitutes the disaster proper”.
(Carr, 1932, p.211)
Several decades later, authors such as  Quarantelli (1977; 1998), Hewitt (1983), and 
Dynes (1970), as well as  others, systematised and organised important social science 
contributions  in the field of disaster studies. The flowering of social science research 
on disasters  occurred during the 1990s and continues  until today. As evidence of 
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5 The English language has significance for disaster interpretation because studies have importantly 
been deepened and expanded throughout the twentieth century and the early twenty-first century, 
where English has become the primary language to communicate, disseminate, and present disasters  
studies’ results and to discuss perspectives.
6 Enrico Quarantelli died on April 3, 2017, at the age of 92.
such blooming, influential research groups or ‘think tanks’ emerged such as the 
Disaster Research Center at the University of Delaware on the ‘sociology of disasters’ 
in the 1960s, the Network of Social Studies  in the Prevention of Disasters  in Latin 
America (LA RED) in the 1990s, Radical Interpretations  of Disasters and Radical 
Solution (RADIX) in the 2000s, and more recently, the Integrated Research on 
Disaster Risk (IRDR) in China, among others.
From another angle and more recently, Bankoff and his  colleagues (2006) outlined 
the epistemological debate on the production of disasters  and risks  around three 
mainstream paradigms: the Behavioural Paradigm (BP), Structural Paradigm (SP), 
and Mutuality Paradigm (MP). The BP and ST paradigms, Hilhorst said (2006), are 
often presented within disaster studies  as two rival paradigms. The BP used to 
dominate disaster studies in the 1950s promoting a techno-centred interest in 
geophysical processes  underlying disaster and risks with the conviction that 
monitoring and predicting hazards, as  well as people’s behaviour to develop early 
warning mechanisms, could be enough to avoid disasters and risks. The same shift 
in disaster interpretations pointed out by Boano and Lund (2011) was made by 
Hilhorst in 2006: 
“Towards the 1980s, anthropologists, sociologists and geographers 
increasingly began to challenge the technocratic, hazard-centred approach to 
disaster. [...] Kenneth Hewitt (1983) postulated that disasters were not primarily the 
outcome of geographical processes. Especially in developing countries, structural 
factors such as increasing poverty and related social processes accounted for 
people and societies’ vulnerability to disaster”.
(Hilhorst, 2006, p.38)
The idea of vulnerability touched at the heart of understanding disaster. Whereas 
disasters used to be practically a synonym for natural hazards, they were now 
understood as the interaction between hazard and vulnerability. This was the origin 
of the SP, and it was graphically expressed in the popular conceptual equation: 
hazard × vulnerability = risk → disaster by Blaikie et al. (1994). According to Hilhorst 
(2006), the solution proposed in the SP paradigm would be the transformation of 
social and political structures  that breed poverty and the social dynamics  that serve 
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to perpetuate it. Although BP and SP are still in use, a new paradigm in disaster 
studies  grew in the 1990s, giving increased attention to environmental processes 
and human-induced climate change. The MP emphasises the mutuality of hazard 
and vulnerability due to complex interactions between the environment and society. 
While SP looks at society to explain people’s  vulnerability to disaster, MP looks at the 
mutual constitution of society and environment. From this  view, “people are not just 
vulnerable to hazards, but hazards  are increasingly the result of human 
activity” (Hilhorst, 2006, p.38), being particularly clear in the cases  of the 
meteorological and hydrological processes  producing high winds and floods. 
Nevertheless, despite its  relevance within MP, it is  relatively easy to lose focus when 
natural and social sub-systems are combined in a more complex system of 
environmental and social relations (Hilhorst, 2006). For that reason, and because the 
interests of this  thesis centre around a ‘post-disaster’ case study and on a ‘rapid 
onset natural hazard’ in particular —i.e. volcanic hazard in Chaitén—, I believe that MP 
does not adjust to the study as the SP does as a starting point. The objective of this 
thesis is to re-problematise the social production of vulnerability, risks, and disasters.
3.2 Situating disaster vulnerability and its significance
3.2.1 Disaster and risk as social constructions
Disasters and risks can be framed within a social constructionist perspective as  the 
factors  that shape them can always  be connected to socio-economic, political, 
cultural processes. The social construction of disaster challenges  the dominant 
‘behavioural’ view, but the perspective is itself not new. A brief analysis of disaster 
studies  may contribute to illustrate innovative applications  of social science disaster 
research that take into account economic, political and cultural dimensions 
altogether. Some contributions can be considered as ‘social constructionist 
readings’ in disaster studies. Authors such as Quarantelli (1998), Dombrowky 
(1998), Hewitt (1983), Pelling (2003b), Wisner et al. (2004), and Cardona (2006), but 
surely many others, asserted that disasters are, in the ultimate analysis, ‘social 
constructions’.
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In the book Natural  Disaster: Acts of God or Acts of Man?, the authors Wijkman and 
Timberlake (1984) adopted a critical stance against the traditional-dominant views 
of that time —hazard-oriented and techno-centric approaches—, and specifically 
about disaster response and post-disaster processes. According to Wijkman and 
Timberlake (1984), disasters are more related to social and political circumstances 
than to natural ones, and they encouraged institutions to review their mode of 
action.
“Most of the scientific effort and money devoted to natural disasters has been 
spent on studying the climatological and geological triggers –over which humans 
have very little control– rather than on studying the wide range of human actions –
over which humans do have some control– which bring more disasters upon people 
every year. Contemporary natural disasters research has become ‘the single 
greatest impediment to improvement in both understanding of natural calamities 
and the strategies for alleviate them”.
(Wijkman and Timberlake, 1984, pp.11-13)
Quarantelli (1998)  collaborated with several authors  from different social science 
schools in his book What is a disaster? Perspectives on the question  to confront 
hazard-oriented and social science perspectives on disasters. Among the 
discussions, one issue raised was: “if workers  in the area [of disasters] do not even 
agree on whether a ‘disaster’ is fundamentally a social construction or a physical 
happening, clearly the field has intellectual problems” (Quarantelli, 1998, p.3). What 
Quarantelli is describing here is the dichotomy of perspectives  on disaster among 
naturalist and constructionist stances, geography and sociology schools, hazard-
oriented and social sciences approaches, behavioural and structural, and so forth. 
With that, Quarantelli sought to promote refining concepts  and ideas  about disaster 
and risk with all perspectives agreeing, and thus providing an intellectual basis  for 
its development (Quarantelli, 1998).
Certainly, there has  been an intellectual shift towards the idea of disasters as  social 
constructions in recent times. Quarantelli described one of these challenges as 
follows:
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“I might note that even formulation by sociologist and other social scientists 
that appear to be fully social constructs,  but which use geographical space and/or 
chronological time as dimensions or factors in defining “disaster”, in my view, are 
not using fully social construction concepts [...] they should use social space and 
social time features”.
(Quarantelli, 1998, p.3)
I took Quarantelli’s advice and legacy seriously because if we agree with the idea of 
disaster and risk as  socially constructed phenomena, then we should describe such 
phenomena from, and analyse them with, social science perspectives  and 
techniques. For that reason, I decided to look at ‘geographical scales’ as  social 
constructions too. I will come back to this in section 3.3.3.
3.2.2 The rise of the social production of disaster vulnerability
The origins of the social concept of ‘disaster vulnerability’ or ‘vulnerability to 
disasters’ can be traced back to the 1970s (Bosher, 2007). In 1976, Phil O'Keefe, Ken 
Westgate and Ben Wisner published a paper Taking the 'naturalness' out of natural 
disasters which introduced the idea that disaster risk may be at the interface 
between an extreme physical event and a vulnerable human population, and 
furthermore that disasters are irremediable consequences of an unbalanced relation 
between natural hazards and vulnerability shaped by socio-economic, political, and 
cultural factors  (O'Keefe et al., 1976). Although disaster researchers  between the 
1970s  and 1980s (Burton, 1974; Erikson, 1976; Hewitt, 1983; O'Keefe et al., 1976; 
Quarantelli, 1977; 1978; Wijkman and Timberlake, 1984) emphasised more and 
more the role of vulnerability within the causation of disaster, it was not until the 
1990s  when vulnerability to disasters was  systematically proposed (Birkmann, 
2006a). As  a consequence of that process, several models were developed to 
unpack vulnerability, such as the disaster PAR model suggested earlier by Blaikie et 
al. (1994) —refined later by Wisner et al. (2004)— and the Hazards of Place Model of 
Vulnerability proposed by Cutter (1996), among many others (Birkmann, 2006b).
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For many theorists (Bankoff et al., 2006; Sen, 1981; Wisner et al., 2004), what makes 
people vulnerable to disasters  is  a straightforward question about poverty, 
depletion, and marginalisation. Although Sen (1981) never researched disasters  as 
such, he pioneered the introduction of an early conceptualisation of vulnerability by 
observing the occurrences  of famines  in India. Sen demonstrated that acts such as 
hunger, sickness, and deaths are set apart from the ‘nature’ of famines; on the 
contrary, responsibility for famine rests  squarely with society. Perhaps motivated by 
Sen’s  observations, there was  a ‘flourishing’ regarding the subject as several works 
on vulnerability to disasters were published thereafter (Hewitt, 1983; Quarantelli, 
1987b). Some examples about how the conceptualisation of vulnerability evolved 
from general conventions  such as the United Nations  Disaster Relief Organization 
(UNDRO) and in the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) (UNISDR 2005) are 
presented as follows:
“Vulnerability is  the degree of loss to a given element at risk, or set of such 
elements, resulting from the occurrence of a natural phenomenon of a given 
magnitude and expressed on a  scale from 0 (=no damage) to 1 (=total  loss). [...]  The 
factors that influence vulnerability include: demographics, the age and resilience of 
the built environment, technology, social differentiation and diversity, regional and 
global economies, and political arrangements”. 
(UNDRO, 1979, p.5 and 8)
The above definition can be framed within the techno-centric ‘dominant view’ of the 
time because it tends to reduce the role of ‘vulnerability’ of the causes  of disasters  to 
‘the potential for loss’, without referring to the characteristics  and circumstances of a 
community. This  also portrays  the mainstream rationale behind the international 
community about how to effectively reduce disasters  and vulnerability. There is a 
clear positivist stance in understanding and means to reduce vulnerability by the 
quantification of variables that may affect vulnerability, but not necessarily pointing 
out what produces them. Such positivist rationale can be exemplified by the 7th 
principle of the Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World in 1994:7
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7 The Yokohama Strategy was the earliest global plan of action to address disaster risks and reduction 
as part of the UN International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (UN-IDNDR).
“Vulnerability can be reduced by the application of proper design and 
patterns of development focused on target groups, by appropriate education and 
training of the whole community”.
(UN-IDNDR, 1994, p.8)
Alternatively, in the 1990s, a series  of researchers  critically explored other 
dimensions of vulnerability from different angles  and disciplines. The geographer 
Diana Liverman (1990), for instance, explored the political economy aspects  of 
environmental and climate change in the late 1980s. In her approximations, 
Liverman realised that the production of vulnerability to disasters  could occur within 
political, social, and economic spaces in interaction with environmental spaces. As 
Liverman explained:
“[The field of disaster research] distinguishes between vulnerability as a 
biophysical condition and vulnerability as defined by political, social and economic 
conditions of society. [...]  Vulnerability is defined both in geographic space (where 
vulnerable people and places are located)  and in social space (who in that place is 
vulnerable)”.
 (Liverman, 1990, p.32)
Following this, two geographers, Susan Cutter in the US and Terry Cannon in the 
UK, deepened Liverman’s observations by refining the distinction between space 
and place, and by placing emphasis on the ‘interaction’ of the socio-economic, 
political, and cultural processes within a given community and its  environment. For 
Cutter and Cannon, vulnerability is:
“The likelihood that an individual or group will be exposed to and adversely 
affected by a  hazard. It is the interaction of the hazards of place (risk and mitigation) 
with the social profile of communities”.
(Cutter, 1993, p.522)
“A measure of the degree and type of exposure to risk generated by different 
societies in relation to  hazards. […] Vulnerability is a characteristic of individuals  and 
groups of people who inhabit a given natural, social and economic space, within 
which they are differentiated according to their varying position in society into more 
or less vulnerable individuals and groups”.
(Cannon, 1994, p.16 and 19)
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The above two observations  were not isolated at that time but they represented out-
of-the-box attempts  to apprehend the complex web of physical, and especially non-
physical world where vulnerability plays  a principal role. Although for Cutter (1993) 
vulnerability is  a ‘likelihood’ and for Cannon (1994) a ‘measure’, both definitions 
agree in the significance of the social factors that determine it, identifying disaster 
vulnerability with both internal (characteristics) and external factors  (circumstances  in 
society and nature). The latter could be linked with the initial and yet relevant 
interpretations  of vulnerability given by the climate change researchers. With the 
rise of the climate change debate in both national and international political 
spheres, the concept of vulnerability was interrogated differently. Although the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) emblematic report of 2001 is 
clearly oriented at vulnerability to climate change, it introduces the idea of ‘adaptive 
capacity’ and ‘exposure’ within the conceptualisation of vulnerability:
“Vulnerability is defined as the extent to  which a natural  or social system is 
susceptible to sustaining damage from climate change. Vulnerability is a function of 
the sensitivity of a system to changes in climate (the degree to  which a system will 
respond to a given change in climate, including beneficial and harmful effects), 
adaptive capacity (the degree to which adjustments in practices, processes, or 
structures can moderate or offset the potential  for damage or take advantage of 
opportunities created by a given change in climate), and the degree of exposure of 
the system to climatic hazards”. 
(IPCC, 2001, p.89)
IPCC, like Cutter (1993) and Cannon (1994), highlighted internal (sensitivity and 
adaptive capacity) and external factors  (exposure) as  constitutive elements  of 
vulnerability. However, in thinking about how structural factors shape vulnerability, 
‘exposure’ represents  the inventory of elements in an area in which hazardous events 
may occur (UNISDR, 2004): if people or physical elements were not located in 
‘dangerous’ settings, no problem of disasters and disaster risk would exist (Cardona 
et al., 2012). I recognise that ‘exposure’ and ‘vulnerability’ are related, but are distinct 
concepts:
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“Exposure is a necessary, but not sufficient, determinant of risk [and disasters]. 
It is possible to be exposed but not vulnerable, for example by living in a  floodplain 
but having sufficient means to  modify building structure and behaviour to mitigate 
potential loss. However, to be vulnerable to an extreme event, it is necessary to also 
be exposed”.
(Cardona et al., 2012, p.69)
In this sense, I intentionally focus on the conceptual equation ‘hazard × vulnerability 
= risk → disaster’ as  in Wisner et al. (2004), thus considering that ‘exposure’ and 
‘vulnerability’ are combined by means  of a set of complex social, economic, 
political, and cultural relations (Hewitt, 1983).
In 2012, the IPCC produced the Special  Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme 
Events and Disasters to Advance Climate  Change Adaptation (SREX), edited by Field 
et al. (2012), in which vulnerability is  defined as an ‘internal’ factor but also as  a 
‘result’ of a wide range of physical and non-physical conditions and processes. This 
definition is  based on an entire decade of documentation, research, and 
discussions:
“Vulnerability is defined in this report as the propensity or predisposition to 
be adversely affected. Such predisposition constitutes an internal characteristic of 
the affected element. [...]  Vulnerability is a  result of diverse historical, social, 
economic, political, cultural, institutional, natural resource, and environmental 
conditions and processes”.
(Field et al., 2012, p.44)
Clearly, there has been an evolution of the concept of vulnerability. In fact, Field et 
al. (2012) touched upon a fundamental and yet problematic aspect of disaster 
vulnerability: being an ‘internal’  factor that depends largely on ‘external’ social and 
environmental conditions to become ‘real’. Now that ‘external’ social and 
environmental processes are clearly important to understand vulnerability, the 
connection between these two spheres —social and environmental— becomes a 
central concern too. This  connection is not always evident and clear for all hazards 
and cases. I think there is  a fundamental difference on how the relation society-
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nature operates in producing intensive risks  in cases  of rapid-onset extreme events 
such volcanic eruptions and earthquakes. In these cases, I believe that social 
processes need to be examined independently from the impacts that society can 
exert over environmental processes. Individual and community choices on living in 
extreme environmental places such as in volcano slopes, when these have not been 
mediated by social marginalisation and pressures, requires  close attention. The case 
of Chaitén, however, is  distinct from the latter as the volcano was completely 
unknown by people and institutions until the day of the eruption in 2008.
In 2005, the United Nations  International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) 
adopts the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), a global plan to explain, describe 
and detail the work that is required from all different sectors and actors to reduce 
disaster losses (UNISDR, 2005). In the HFA’s definition of vulnerability, it is  a bit less 
clear on vulnerability’s  duality. However, the reference to structural and non-
structural factors  that define vulnerability, both internally and externally, is  there. For 
UNISDR, vulnerability represents:
“The conditions determined by physical, social, economic, and environmental 
factors or processes, which increase the susceptibility of a  community to  the impact 
of hazards”.
(UNISDR, 2005, p.1)
International efforts to define vulnerability in a holistic manner have not been 
exempt from criticism, especially regarding the inclusion and attention paid to the 
social structural factors  that shape vulnerability. The HFA and successor reports refer 
to them as ‘underlying factors’ or ‘underlying drivers’ (UNISDR, 2009b; 2011), in a 
certain way, diminishing their importance in the production of risks and causation of 
disasters. Wisner has fiercely criticised the ‘real’ inclusion of these structural factors 
within UNISDR works:
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“We have to convince UNISDR and, especially, UNISDR's financial supporters 
(some of whom are quite skeptical about UNISDR's performance) that [the Sendai 
Framework]  has got to include these root causes and dynamic pressures among the 
currently bland and superficial list of “underlying risk factors” in HFA”.
(Ben Wisner, Mailing list communication RADIX, 24 September 2013)
Although there is  a general recognition that the socio-economic, political, and 
cultural factors  are determinants  in shaping vulnerability, such factors  are generally 
minimised or simply taken out of risk assessments (Fekete  et al., 2010). By the end of 
2014, the HFA’s description of vulnerability remains invariable as it was used during 
the entire process of the Post-2015 Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR, 
2014b), and has even persisted as  such in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction 2015-2030 (SFDRR) signed in March 2015 (UNISDR, 2015b). The lack of 
advances to render root causes  of vulnerability visible, as  was  strived for in previous 
decades, may displace its taxonomy to a less  relevant position. As  Cannon (2000) 
advised, the challenge of analysing a highly complex and dynamic phenomenon like 
‘vulnerability’, alongside with its  ‘depolitisation’ and assessments  often in inadequate 
ways, would have swept the concept of vulnerability under the rug with other 
buzzwords  like ‘sustainability’ and thereby run the risk of the term becoming 
meaningless. In this sense, by re-problematising the social production of 
vulnerability and risks, this thesis seeks to render the relevance of societal/structural 
factors  visible by looking at how models  of managing risks  and disasters  may 
contribute, counterintuitively, to (re)produce vulnerability, especially to make such 
factors  visible to policy and decision makers as these play a critical role within the 
governance of disaster risks.
The next section situates the significance of the underlying causes  of vulnerability 
and risks by illustrating how different approaches conceptualise ‘vulnerability to 
disasters’ in the form of ‘biophysical’ and ‘social’ vulnerability. These perspectives 
aim to support the analytical framework (outlined in section 3.5) as  well as justify the 
selection of the analytical PAR model.
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3.2.3 Vulnerability approaches
Birkmann (2006b) compiled different conceptual frameworks and definitions of 
vulnerability. In his analysis, Birkmann highlighted the need for a paradigm change, 
from the quantitative analysis of hazards to a combined qualitative/quantitative 
identification, ranking and assessment of vulnerabilities. One influential call for this 
paradigm change came from Susan Cutter (1993; 1996; Cutter et al., 2003). Cutter 
interrogated vulnerability in relation to environmental factors. The first distinction 
Cutter (1996, p.530) makes is  that there is  an inherent “individual vulnerability” as 
the potential for, or sensitivity to, losses or harm. “Social vulnerability”, on the 
contrary, refers  to the susceptibility of social groups to potential losses from extreme 
natural events. Cutter (1993) also asserted that another vulnerability emerges  in the 
interaction of human-beings with environmental conditions  which in turn “affects  the 
resilience of the environment to respond to hazards” and alters  the adaptation of 
communities  to such changing conditions (Cutter, 1996, p.530). Cutter called this 
‘biophysical vulnerability’. In an attempt to integrate both approaches, Cutter (1996) 
developed the Hazards of Place Model of Vulnerability (see Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1. The Hazards of Place Model of Vulnerability
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Source: Cutter (1996), adapted by the author (2017)
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In the Figure 3.1, Cutter emphasised vulnerability as the interaction of biophysical 
hazards  and social responses within a specific geographical space. Cutter’s  model 
described that vulnerability always takes place in a specific spatial area or that it 
always has a specific geographical domain. In her own words:
“The various elements that constitute vulnerability interact to  produce the 
vulnerability of specific places and the people who live there. This vulnerability can 
change over time based on changes in the risks, mitigation and contexts within 
which environmental hazards occur”.
(Cutter, 1996, p.533)
Although the ‘place vulnerability’ model may be advantageous  to interrogate the 
way in which physical and social factors of vulnerability interact to create an ‘overall’ 
vulnerability, this model does not focus  on its ‘underlying causes’ or root causes: 
neither is suitable for the organisation of the production of vulnerability within a 
multi-scalar perspective. Cutter et al. (2000) recognised the significance of the 
economic, political, and cultural factors in society that shape disaster vulnerability, 
however she relied on the use of quantitative demographic indicators  at local levels 
such as ‘No. of non-white residents’ and others  to represent ‘differential access to 
resources’ or ‘susceptibility to hazards due to physical weakness’. This  approach may 
be beneficial for advancing the understanding on the complex interrelated physical 
and social factors at local levels, and perhaps to produce policy recommendations 
using quantitative data, but not necessarily useful for investigating the ‘progression’ 
of vulnerability from its origins  to its  materialisation in the form of unsafe conditions, 
and from a multi-scalar perspective as is intended in the case of Chaitén.
Alongside the debate on vulnerability to natural hazards initiated in the 1980s  and 
the recognition that vulnerability plays a determinant role in the causation of 
disasters, vulnerability has  also been approached in other ways. Beyond the social 
and environmental vulnerability discussed above, another set of studies  have 
approached the concept of vulnerability within boundaries  of physical or ‘natural’ 
sciences, and economics. For instance, during the 1980s  and 1990s, researchers  and 
92
institutions such as Heyman et al. (1991)  Gabor and Palenda (1982), and UNDRO 
(1979) focused on exposure and ‘physical vulnerability’  by studying the rapid outset 
of extreme events, their frequency, magnitude, impact, and duration. This group of 
studies  also focused on the analysis of specific hazardous events —e.g. floods, 
volcano eruptions, earthquakes, and so forth—, their spatial distribution in relation to 
the population, and their potential for losses. In economics, institutions such as  the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have promoted the study of 
‘financial and economic vulnerability’  (GFDRR, 2012; Ghesquiere and Mahul, 2014; 
IMF, 2008; OECD  et al., 2012; The World Bank, 2014) at different analysis units  —
states and urban levels—, thereby connecting them to poverty, climate change, and 
disaster risk (Laframboise and Loko, 2012). More recently, the Asian Disaster 
Preparedness Center (ADPC) has referred to ‘cultural vulnerability’ to assess the 
exposure subjected to cultural values and norms, and the potential loss  of cultural 
assets such as monuments and temples (ADPC, 2014).
This brief outline of different trajectories of enquiry in vulnerability studies may 
reflect the intricate process of conceptualising vulnerability. However, what emerges 
among these attempts is the ultimate recognition that vulnerability is a complex 
dynamic process  focused on the social, ‘multi-dimensional and differential’ —as  it 
varies across space and among and within social groups—, and ‘scale dependent’ —
as  it depends on time, space and units of analysis such as  individual, household, 
region or city (Vogel and O'Brien, 2004)— aspects. Hence, its  assessment should not 
be reduced to merely ‘physical’ factors, but also to structural social, economic, 
political, and cultural ones (IFRC, 2014).
This perspective was captured by the well-known definition given by Wisner and his 
colleagues  (2004), and perhaps one of the most widespread definitions  of 
vulnerability in recent years. The book by Wisner et al. (2004) At risk: Natural 
hazards, people’s vulnerability and disasters, in which vulnerability becomes a central 
concern, is  commonly referenced in reports such as the IPCC’s SREX (Field et al., 
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2012)  and UNISDR’s  Global Assessments  Reports  (GARs)  (2009b; 2011; 2013; 
2015a). This is also the definition adopted for the thesis:
“The characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence 
their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a 
natural hazard (an extreme natural event or process). It involves a  combination of 
factors that determine the degree to which someone’s life, livelihood, property and 
other assets are put at risk by a discrete and identifiable event (or series or ‘cascade’ 
of such events) in nature and in society”.
(Wisner et al., 2004, p.11; own emphasis)
This  perspective offered by Wisner and his  colleagues (2004) talks about 
‘internal’ (characteristics) as  well as  ‘external’ factors  (situations). But beyond this 
definition they explored, with much more intensity, the structural factors  in economy 
and politics  rather than the society-nature relation. Although this can be a matter of 
critique (Turner, Kasperson et al., 2003), Wisner et al. (2004) made great effort in 
dissecting disaster vulnerability from a social constructionist and political economy 
perspective. The next section further discusses  it by stressing the social relations  that 
produce vulnerability.
3.2.4 Structural factors and the social production of vulnerability
Cardona (2006) argued that risk is  a socially constructed phenomenon based on the 
idea that social, economic, political, and cultural factors  in conjunction with 
environmental problems act over time to produce and reproduce vulnerability in the 
form of unsafe conditions. However, vulnerability to disasters, as  a process, does not 
reside exclusively within physically unsafe conditions (both geophysical and 
locational), but also exists  in the various  social, economic, political, and cultural 
processes that contribute as  ‘underlying causes’ to its materialisation (Chardon, 
1998; 2004; Chardon and Gonzalez, 2002). Wisner et al. (2004) contested the 
overemphasis on the ‘naturalness’ of disasters arguing that societal factors  are 
constitutive elements in the production of vulnerability and disaster risks:
94
“When disasters happen, people and media interpretation tend to focus on 
their “naturalness”, as  in the phrase “natural disaster”. The natural hazards that 
trigger a disaster tend to appear overwhelming. [...]  But crucially, humans are not 
equally able to access the resources and opportunities; nor are they equally 
exposed to  the hazards. Whether or not people have enough land to farm, or 
adequate access to water, or a  decent home, are determined by social factors 
(including economic and political processes). And these social processes also have 
a very significant role in determining who  is most at risk from hazards: where 
people live and work, and in what kind of buildings, their level of hazard 
protection, preparedness, information, wealth and health have nothing to do with 
nature as such, but are attributes of society”.
(Wisner et al., 2004, p.6)
From this  perspective, Wisner et al. (2004) modelled the political economy of 
disaster by underlining the importance of ‘social relations’ and ‘structures of 
domination’ within societies as  they are the context where ‘normal life’ takes  place, 
as  well as  being the place where vulnerability is  produced. ‘Social relations’ and 
‘structures  of domination’ are two concepts  introduced by Wisner et al. (2004) as 
part of the PAR model. According to the authors, the model is  a political economy 
exploration of people’s capacity to deal with the impact of hazards in terms of the 
level of access they have (or do not have) to the resources  needed for their 
livelihoods  before and after a hazard’s  impact. On the one hand, social relation 
“encompasses the flows  of goods, money and surplus  between different actors, for 
example, merchants, urban renters, capitalist producers of food, rural and urban 
households  involved in various relations  of production and endowed with a 
particular range and quality of access to resources” (Wisner et al., 2004, p.93). On 
the other hand, structures of domination “refer to the politics  of relations  between 
people at different levels. [...]  These relations shape, and are shaped by, existing 
rights, obligations  and expectations that exist within the household and which affect 
the allocation of work and rewards” (Wisner et al., 2004, p.94). Thus, both ‘social 
relations’ and ‘structures of domination’ may prove to be useful in exploring the 
context where ‘root causes’  and ‘dynamic pressures’ are produced and vulnerability 
advances until its  materialisation. In this thesis, I explored these relations  in the 
context of Chile and its  possible effects  on the model of disaster risk management: 
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the processes of political and economic centralisation, and its repercussions  in the 
processes of policy responses  to disasters  and decision-making in the case of post-
disaster Chaitén (see Figure 2.5 in page 53, Chapter Two).
The next section examines  the PAR model in greater detail. This  is  deemed 
necessary as  the model represents a suitable framework to interpret the process of 
production of vulnerability from a social constructionist and structural approach, and 
it enables  the integration with a multi-scalar perspective adopted in this study. For 
this  reason, the next section aims to integrate the recently described perspectives  of 
vulnerability with the PAR model, as well as  to introduce a multi-scalar perspective to 
interpret such a model and therewith the causation of disasters.
3.3 The PAR model and a scalar perspective
3.3.1 The PAR model explained
The disaster PAR model was  first developed by Blaikie et al. in 1994 and refined later 
by Wisner et al. in 2004. Based on the conceptual equation ‘hazard × vulnerability = 
risk → disaster’, the PAR model seeks to explain vulnerability to disasters  and its 
progression. By assuming natural rapid-onset extreme events as  something that 
society has  little control over, the PAR model presents  vulnerability as a 
phenomenon strictly developed by means of social factors. The model innovates 
disaster studies  and disaster sociology by ‘unpacking’ the concept of vulnerability to 
disasters, and then conceptualising ‘the progression of vulnerability’. The 
representation of the model (see Figure 3.2) proposes that vulnerability’s 
progression is  organised through differentiated stages: from its  ‘root causes’ and 
‘dynamic pressures’ to ‘unsafe conditions’. This  idea advances  disaster studies by 
suggesting that in order to prevent disasters  and promote effective disaster risk 
reduction strategies, vulnerability must be necessarily reduced, and its ‘root causes’ 
addressed. This  also implies that the reduction of vulnerability should then be at the 
core of policy goals  for disaster risk management (DRM) and disaster risk reduction 
(DRR) —though without neglecting the likelihood of natural hazards  occurring, their 
magnitude, as  well as  their intensity in specific social, cultural, economic and 
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political contexts  (Aragón-Durand, 2007; Wisner et al., 2004). Additionally, structural 
factors  in society —e.g. ‘social relations’ and ‘structures of domination’— need to be 
revisited and addressed within effective disaster risk discussions  at all levels, 
including but not restricted to policy and decision-making mechanisms, inclusion of 
civil society and grass  root organisations, gender relations, models of territorial 
organisation, among others (Wisner et al., 2004). A close examination of these 
structural factors  could explain why and how men and women become affected by 
and are vulnerable to specific hazards. For instance, Aragón-Durand (2007) used a 
socio-historical analysis of disasters  to underline the importance of taking into 
consideration particular social actors and institutions  in hazard generation and flood 
vulnerability over time in Mexico City’s south-eastern peri-urban interface. He 
asserted that chronic flooding in that area is the result of a complex interaction 
between inadequate urbanisation policies, permanent ecological deterioration and 
ground subsidence, poor sanitation and short-term policy responses to past and 
present disasters.
In Figure 3.2, this  progression is organised by means of tracing the nature of ‘root 
causes’ of vulnerability and disasters: the way in which vulnerability’s  origins  can be 
traced from local ‘unsafe conditions’ such as living in disaster-prone areas, through 
economic and social ‘dynamic pressures’ such as  corruption, all the way to the ‘root 
causes’ such as economic models, ideologies, and the like. For Wisner et al. (2004), 
vulnerability is  socially, economically and politically rooted and, when combined 
with physical processes  such as  earthquakes and volcanic hazards, it may produce 
risk, and when confronted with the occurrence of an extreme event, disasters. In the 
words of the authors:
“[The PAR  model]  is introduced as an analytical tool for showing how disasters 
occur when natural hazards affect vulnerable people. Their vulnerability is rooted in 
social processes and underlying causes which may ultimately be quite remote from 
the disaster event itself. The basis  for the PAR idea is that a disaster is the 
intersection of two opposing forces: those processes generating vulnerability on 
one side, and the natural hazard event (or sometimes a slowly unfolding natural 
process) on the other”.
(Wisner et al., 2004, p.50; own emphasis)
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Figure 3.2. The disaster Pressure and Release (PAR) model
Source: Wisner et al. (2004), adapted by the author (2017)
In the PAR model, vulnerability is  explained through three arrays of linkages: root 
causes, dynamic pressures, and unsafe conditions. The most distant of these 
linkages  are the ‘root causes’. Root causes are understood as “an interrelated set of 
widespread and general processes  within a society and the world economy” (Wisner 
et al., 2004, p.52): examples  may include political regimes or economic crises, 
unforeseen effects  of long-term public policies, among others. Root causes are thus 
the social, economic, cultural, historical, political, and ideological processes 
embedded into and structured from society, and are importantly linked with the 
function of the state, and reflect the exercise and distribution of power in a society. 
According to Wisner et al. (2004, p.53), “people who are economically marginal —
such as  urban squatters— or who live in an environmentally ‘marginal’  ecosystem —
flood-prone urban locations— are also of marginal importance to those who hold 
economic and political power”.
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Besides the root causes, ‘dynamic pressures’ are understood as processes and 
actions  that translate the effects  of root causes both temporally and spatially into 
particular and place-specific ‘unsafe conditions’. These may include, for instance, 
structural adjustment policies  implemented during a specific period —e.g. 
decentralisation policies—, rapid urbanisation on the outskirts  of cities, and rural-
urban migration in response to the economic and social inequalities inherent in root 
causes. Likewise, unsafe conditions are understood here as  “the specific forms in 
which the vulnerability of a population is  expressed in time and space in conjunction 
with a hazard” (Wisner et al., 2004, p.55). In this sense, men and women with limited 
opportunities  may find themselves ‘forced’ to live in hazardous locations with 
insufficient protection by the state and institutions, thereby being unable to afford 
safe buildings or conversely having entitlements that are nonetheless prone to rapid 
and severe disruption. ‘Unsafe conditions’ are also determined by the initial level of 
people’s  well-being and their access to tangible —e.g. cash, shelter, food stocks, 
agricultural equipment— and intangible resources  such as  networks of support, 
knowledge on survival, and sources  of assistance, morale, and the ability to function 
in a crisis (Cannon, 2000; Wisner et al., 2004).
Although I have explained that the PAR model offers an advantageous analytical 
perspective to look at vulnerability, it is  also, however, subject to a number of 
inadequacies. This deep  interrogation on the societal/structural factors of 
vulnerability may obscure another important and equally determinant relation within 
disaster causation: the environment. The environment also forms  part of the social 
framework that can and often does shape hazards  and risks  (Turner, Matson, et al., 
2003). There is much evidence in the use of natural resources  for economic 
activities, and the environmental problems and hazards associated with them. We 
know that certain hazards are intertwined with societal systems affecting livelihoods 
and assets  such as  land distribution and ownership after floods (Wisner et al., 2004). 
Nevertheless, the environmental-human relation in the case of post-disaster Chaitén 
does not seem to be present compared to the social factors —policy responses and 
the model of governing disasters and risks— which better explain the vulnerability in 
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Chaitén. This  overemphasis on the structural factors  of vulnerability is also present in 
the ‘rivalry’ between the SP and MP mentioned earlier, and of course is present in 
the limitations of the thesis. From this  perspective, in my opinion, the PAR model 
sacrifices  amplitude but gain in focus  in untangling the social causes of disaster 
vulnerability. And by using this model in the case of Chaitén, the thesis  yields  a 
holistic understanding in empirical terms, as it concentrates the analysis of policy 
responses to disasters and the model of DRM in Chile.
Thus, the conceptualisation of vulnerability proposed in the PAR model implicitly 
expands the idea of vulnerability towards processes and circumstances —root 
causes, dynamic pressures, and unsafe conditions, named in the model— that are 
both temporally and spatially remote from the affected area. This ‘distancing’ of the 
causes of vulnerability and disaster risks  lies  at the centre of this  thesis’ inquiry and 
specifically: How have policy responses to disasters influenced the progression of 
disaster vulnerability, at different scales, in post-disaster Chaitén? The next section, 
trying to answer this  question, articulates how a multi-scalar perspective may 
contribute to a better understanding of such progression.
3.3.2 The multi-scalar progression of vulnerability
The idea that disaster risk and vulnerability may be progressively accumulated by 
socio-economic and political factors  within minor geographical areas —e.g. city, 
community, and other sub-regional or sub-national levels— is  implicit within the 
analysis  of the PAR model. The PAR model represents  causality and progressiveness 
when it conceptualises  vulnerability: ‘unsafe conditions’ are caused by ‘dynamic 
pressures’ which, in turn, are produced by ‘root causes’. Through all these phases, 
vulnerability is  produced, reproduced or perpetuated by the social ‘system’ at 
different levels. It can be interpreted then that ‘root causes’ are nested in major 
geographical scales  such as  global or national, while ‘dynamic pressures’ operate 
between major and minor scales, and ‘unsafe conditions’ are materialised at urban 
and local scales. Wisner et al. (2004) suggested that ‘unsafe conditions’ are the most 
evident expressions  of vulnerability: these may include a poorly built environment, 
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and lack of response mechanisms and coping capacities, among other conditions. 
On the one hand, unsafe conditions  are often the easiest to identify and assess 
because they are somehow ‘materialised’ and observable. While on the other hand, 
it is  more difficult to establish strong or evident connections between vulnerable 
conditions  and ‘dynamic pressures’ because the latter represent widespread 
processes such as  structural adjustment policies  implemented during a certain 
period, rapid urbanisation, rural-urban migration, poverty, lack of building codes  or 
poor construction supervision, and corruption (Wisner et al., 2004). These 
widespread processes, either acting as  root causes or dynamic pressures, seem to 
be nested and organised at global, national and regional scales, as  these often 
interrelate and exist in extra-national and national scales (Pelling, 2003a).
For Wisner et al. (2004), root causes and dynamic pressures can be ‘distant’ from an 
affected area in three different senses:
“[Root causes and dynamic pressures]  are distant in one, two or all of the 
following senses: spatially distant (arising in a distant centre of economic or political 
power), temporally distant (in past history), and finally, distant in the sense of being 
so profoundly bound up with cultural assumptions, ideology, beliefs and social 
relations in the actual lived experience of the people concerned that they are 
‘invisible’ and ‘taken for granted’”.
(Wisner et al., 2004, p.52)
Considering this, I suggest that the root causes  and dynamic pressures that have 
produced and materialised vulnerability in Chaitén are distant from the city in, at 
least, two senses: spatially and temporally. Although the case of post-disaster 
Chaitén will be described and analysed in greater detail during the case study in 
Chapter Four and Chapter Five, I assumed that the PAR model frames the question 
of the progression of vulnerability in post-disaster Chaitén within a ‘scale question’, 
that is  to say, how do policy responses  to disasters  unfold the progression of 
disaster vulnerability through differentiated scales? I propose that this question may 
be answered by examining how policy responses and decision-making in the post-
disaster context of Chaitén were organised at different geographical scales —i.e. 
nationally, regionally, and locally— to ultimately enable the materialisation of 
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vulnerability in the form of ‘unsafe conditions’. This  is  done all whilst considering that 
‘root causes’, ‘dynamic pressures’, and ‘unsafe conditions’ are embedded into an 
already existent scalar structure of territorial governance for the case of Chile. The 
methodological approach to address this  scalar structure in Chile is  clarified in the 
following section.
Coming back to the PAR model, it may be said that the model implicitly describes 
the progression of vulnerability as  a multi-scalar phenomenon: ‘unsafe conditions’ 
often are evident at local or urban scales, ‘root causes’ and ‘dynamic pressures’  are 
articulated within processes that operate at major geographical scales: regional, 
national, and global. A strategy to interpret the progression of vulnerability with a 
multi-scalar perspective lies  in a subsidiary question: How are policy responses and 
governance of DRM and DRR in Chile organised and distributed from national to 
local level? This question adopts the idea that causes and drivers of disaster 
vulnerability in a post-disaster context —e.g. policy responses and decision-making— 
are organised in a geographical and scalar manner (Brenner, 2009a), from major to 
minor geographical scales. Hence, by understanding the scalar organisation of 
specific causes and drivers, I think it is possible to organise the progression of 
vulnerability using a multi-scalar perspective. But perhaps more importantly, the 
question is  how these scalar relations were established and how these relations 
affect the model of DRM and policy responses  to disasters for the case of Chaitén. 
These questions  reveal another central aspect of this  thesis  that is useful to complete 
the analytical framework: geographical scales need to be understood as historically 
and socially mediated process (Marston, 2000).
The concept of geographical scales from a social constructionist approach, similar to 
understanding the progression of vulnerability and risks, is  a central element of this 
work. At the end of section 3.2.1 in this chapter (page 83-84), I quoted Quarantelli to 
point out the significance of using social science perspectives and techniques  in 
researching vulnerability as social phenomenon, including definitions of space and 
scales. The following section introduces  the reader to the social construction of 
scales.
102
3.3.3 The social construction of scales
In approaching the ‘progression of vulnerability’ from a perspective of scales, it 
becomes  crucial to understand how a geographical scale is  produced and how its 
configuration —the relation between differentiated scales: e.g. global, national, 
regional, and local— may facilitate such progression from major to minor scales. I 
initiate this  section by situating the idea of ‘geographical scales’ within a social 
constructionist approach.
Discussed primarily by geographers  and physicists, ‘geographical scale’ has 
traditionally been conceived as  fixed spatial units  where social, economic, political 
and even environmental dynamics  simply unfold (Brenner, 2009a). Geographical 
scales were understood just “as a fixed, bounded, self-enclosed and pregiven 
[spatial] containers” (Brenner, 2001, p.592). Soja (1989, p.149) noted that the 
“question of scale” and its social production remained “understudied” and was 
“generally subordinate to analyses of spatial practices positioned within fixed 
geographical scales: the local, the urban, the regional, the national, and/or the 
global”  (Brenner, 1998, p.460). This  traditional view was adopted during 
contemporary transformations such as  the massive geographical changes  entailed 
by globalisation: the global labour market restructuring in the 1970s (Castells, 1989; 
Sassen, 1991), the crisis of the nation-state’s  territoriality (Appadurai, 1996; 
Liubimau, 2011), and the reterritorialisation process of cities and states  during the 
1990s  and 2000s  (Brenner, 1999). Such transformations demonstrated that certain 
social phenomena unfold not only at one single spatial scale —e.g. urban ‘or’  global— 
but also at multiple geographical scales simultaneously —e.g. urban, regional ‘and’ 
global. Brenner (1998, p.463) referred to these phenomena as  “multi-scalar 
processes”. Accordingly, Brenner proposed a fundamental change in understanding 
geographical scales, saying that these should not be grasped individually, but 
instead as a result of multi-scalar processes and therefore as  interconnected and 
interdependent spatial entities:
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“Scales can only be grasped relationally. Scales cannot be construed 
adequately as  fixed units  within a system of nested territorial  containers defined by 
absolute geographic size (a ‘Russian dolls’ model of scale). The institutional 
configuration, function(s), histories, and dynamics of any one geographical scale 
can only be grasped relationally, in terms of its upwards, downwards, and 
transversal links to  other geographical scales... [...]  From this point of view, it is 
analytically imprecise to speak of scale in singular terms as, for instance, in 
discourses about ‘the’  urban, ‘the’  regional, ‘the’ national, or ‘the’  global. Such 
substantialist formulations misleadingly imply that individual scales contain a 
coherence in and of themselves, and thus bypass the essential task of analyzing 
their relational co-constitution in and through multiscalar structuration processes”.
(Brenner, 2009a, p.72; own emphasis)
In relation to the above, Doreen Massey’s famous  (1994, p.63)  question, “in what 
sense are ‘regional’ problems regional problems?” and the well-known concept 
“glocalization” developed by Swyngedouw (1992) both prove themselves useful 
when applied to illustrate Brenner’s idea (2009a). The idea here is that when we 
analyse the progression of vulnerability through different geographical scales, these 
need to be grasped ‘relationally’ as  well as  the causes and drivers  that compose the 
‘vulnerability process’: “the values, ideas, behaviours, and actions  that have led to 
characteristics such as fragility, weakness, exposure, and susceptibility and that 
could perpetuate or absolve these issues” (Kelman et al., 2016, p.136). In the same 
line, I argue with this  thesis that disaster vulnerability and its production should no 
longer only be associated with local factors but rather always with a multiplicity of 
actors  and processes acting at different and interrelated scales. Then, root causes, 
dynamic pressures, and unsafe conditions  can be organised in vertical and 
horizontal arrangements.
The idea of geographical scales  as  social constructions, in addition to Brenner’s 
observations, has  emerged from and has  been supported by other critical thinkers8 
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8 This concept is devised within the critical theory. Critical theory here refers to the neo-Marxist 
reflexion —critical thinking methods— of the Frankfurt School developed in the late 1930s . In contrast 
to ‘traditional’ theory which aims to the solely understanding or explaining of society, critical theory 
can be understood as a social theory associated with the critique and change of society as a whole 
(Horkheimer, 1937).
such as Swyngedouw (1992), Smith (1984; 1993), and Knox (1995). For them, 
geographical scales, as  social space, were undoubtedly socially constructed as 
social processes need space to delineate their practice and struggle (Lefebvre 1991 
[1974]). In that process, geographical configurations  emerge, that is, “a set of 
interacting and nested scales (the ‘gestalt of scale’)”  (Swyngedouw, 1997, p.169), 
often composed of local, urban, regional, national, international, and global spaces. 
The resulting scalar configuration is  temporary and in perpetual transformation over 
time, depending on the extension and contraction of the socio-spatial struggle itself 
(Marston, 2000; Swyngedouw, 1997). As reflected by Swyngedouw (1992, p.60), 
“geographical scale is  both the realm and the outcome of the social struggle over 
control over space”. Accordingly, Brenner (2001) concluded, geographical scales  are 
“malleable” and “historically changeable”  as their production is  subordinated to 
socio-political contestation in history (Brenner, 2001, p.599). One only need look at 
for instance how geo-political boundaries  have been transformed throughout 
human history, or how ‘global’ and ‘national’ scales  have contracted since the rise of 
ever faster transport networks and communication technologies  (Castells, 1996). 
This historical perspective is  interesting and particularly useful for this  thesis. Then, a 
historical analysis  of processes  that are presumably connected with the production 
of disaster vulnerability in Chaitén, are required to better understand how root 
causes, dynamic pressures, and unsafe conditions are arranged within the scalar 
configuration in Chile.
To initiate a scalar analysis, Brenner argued that geographical scales are better 
grasped as “differentiated spaces” often by size but, more importantly, scales as the 
result of a “vertical differentiation” (Brenner, 2009a, p. 71). Thus, what makes sense to 
one geographical scale category —e.g. urban— is  its relation with other categories  —
e.g. regional, national, global. In other words, the socio-spatial analysis of urban, 
regional or national social phenomena should not be dissociated from a scalar 
differentiation analysis —“the hierarchical ordering or spatial hierarchisation of social 
formations” (Brenner, 2009a, p. 71). The inter-scalar or multi-scalar relationships 
between those classical spatial-scale categories  —the global, the national, the 
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regional and the urban— should always be analytically considered. In that sense, this 
thesis  is  an attempt to consider these ‘multi-scalar relations’ in the progression of 
vulnerability. Crucial aspects of the socio-spatial analysis of scales such as  ‘historical 
changes’ and ‘hierarchical differentiations’ should then be incorporated into the 
analysis  of vulnerability and risks, as they allow for a deeper comprehension of the 
underlying factors  that produce, reproduce, and perpetuate risks. I consider that this 
view is  particularly advantageous  when combined with the PAR model, as  specific 
processes or circumstances —such as the model of DRM and policy responses  to 
disasters in Chaitén— can be explored differentially and relationally.
Brenner proposed three analytical elements  or ‘propositions’  to interpret scales from 
a social constructionist approach:
• Scales result from vertical differentiation
• Scales ‘exist’ because social processes are scaled
• Scales can only be grasped relationally
In the section below, these three elements  are explained and connected with the 
PAR model and the analytical framework. They have been useful for interpreting the 
scalar relations that already exist within Chile in regard to the model of disaster and 
risk management, and policy responses.
Scales result from vertical differentiation
According to Brenner (2009a), the differentiation of social relations by scales occurs 
due to the ‘vertical ordering’ or spatial hierarchisation of social formations. Besides 
the ‘horizontal’  or territorial differentiation of social practices across  space, there is 
also a ‘vertical’ differentiation in which social relations are hierarchically organised 
among global, extra-national, national, regional, metropolitan, and/or local levels. 
Although Brenner (2009a, p.71)  asserted that the “spatialities” of scale, its physical 
manifestations, cannot be understood only in terms  of this “verticality” or 
hierarchical relation, he strongly claimed that this feature is the “differentia specifica” 
of scalar configurations.
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Regarding this  thesis, one research purpose was  to understand how policy 
responses to disasters  and governance of DRM and DRR are organised at different 
geographical scales  in Chile and why. This  question looks at the ‘scalar 
differentiation’ in Chile in terms of how social relations and practices  in the country 
have historically configured its territory. The resulting scalar configuration of the 
state, addressed in Chapter Four, will support the multi-scalar analysis of the causes 
and drivers of vulnerability in Chaitén.
Scales ‘exist’ because social processes are scaled
Brenner (2009a) pointed out that geographical scales  exist because social processes 
themselves  are scaled. Although the terms such as  local, urban, regional, and so 
forth are used to demarcate apparently territorial “islands  of social relations”, they 
obfuscate the relational nature of social processes and the tangled multi-scalar 
networks  through which the latter is constituted (Brenner, 2009a, p.69). The 
processes that shape geographical scales are socially based, and result from socio-
economic, socio-environmental, political and cultural forces. Such processes are 
geographically scaled, that is, spatially organised, hierarchically differentiated, and 
historically changeable (Brenner, 1998; 1999; 2001). In the context of Chile, the 
process through which the country reached its current, yet ‘transitory’, scalar 
configuration is  analysed from the history of the state territorial organisation, 
particularly through processes of administrative de- and centralisation. The historical 
processes of political and economic centralisation of Chile (see section 4.2 in 
Chapter Four) were interesting to the scalar analysis  of the Chilean model of disaster 
risk management, as they helped to explain why the model is top-down and reactive 
oriented.
Scales can only be grasped relationally
According to Brenner (2000; 2009a), social relations  are spatially demarcated 
through the creation of specific institutional configurations  —e.g. regional 
governments  and municipal councils. The resultant spatial ‘unit’ —e.g. urban, nation, 
local— of the social relations indicates the function and dynamic of a given 
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geographical scale but it can be only grasped relationally, that is: “in terms of its 
upwards, downwards, and transversal links to other geographical scales situated 
within the broader multi-scalar configuration in which it is  embedded” (Brenner, 
2009a, p.72). Single scales do not contain a coherence in and of themselves, so the 
processes of co-constitution in and through multi-scalar structuration processes  with 
a historical perspective should always be considered in socio-spatial analysis of 
scales (Brenner, 2009a).
Furthermore, the relevance of a given geographical scale may differ qualitatively 
from the others  depending on the aspects of the social processes which are being 
investigated —such as  in the case of vulnerability. However, there will be always  inter- 
and multi-scalar relations between all of these geographical scales. Each spatially-
based social phenomenon and its  scalar differentiation should be understood 
differently, and incidentally, “each scale needs to be understood in terms of its 
relation to other scales” (Mahon and Keil, 2009, p.8).
Hence, summing up Brenner’s  propositions, geographical scales  are social 
constructions because the process that constitutes  them is  intrinsically intertwined 
with social ones: politically, economically, culturally, and the history that comes with 
it. Geographical scales  are temporal crystallisations of ‘vertical differentiation’ of 
social relations  and struggles. Then, a more precise analysis  of scales  will require us 
to look at the scales relationally, in terms  of its upwards, downwards, and transversal 
linkages with other scales.
The following section offers  some insights  to address the processes  of policy 
responses to disasters and model of DRM and DRR in Chile from the perspective of 
disaster governance and vulnerability. 
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3.4 Disaster governance, policy responses and vulnerability
During the multi-scalar analysis  of the case of post-disaster Chaitén, through the PAR 
model, I inevitably encountered governance structures  that participated in the 
production of vulnerability in Chaitén. The model of managing disasters and 
reducing risks in Chile and policy responses are undoubtedly framed within ‘disaster 
governance’.
With the concept of disaster governance, I refer to the complex set of interrelated 
regulatory frameworks and norms, organisations, institutions, actors, and practices 
within the disaster cycle —i.e. disaster response, recovery, reconstruction, mitigation, 
and preparedness— that are organised at multiple social and geographical scales to 
anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural or human-made 
hazard (Gall et al., 2014; Tierney, 2012). Disaster governance encompasses a 
multiplicity of organisational and institutional actors  from formal governments, 
private companies, and civil society bodies, to informal organisations such as 
networks and elites. The relationships between sets of rules, actors, and 
organisations  can be configured in horizontal and vertical governance 
arrangements. For Renn (2008), the horizontal arrangements capture the relevant set 
of actors, rules, and organisations within a defined spatial or functional segment, 
such as the actors within a community, city, or nation. Instead, vertical arrangements 
consider the hierarchical relations among the elements  of a given segment, as well 
as  the peculiarities of such linkages. Disaster governance may have an important 
influence on the production and prevention of the growth of vulnerability, and 
ultimately for the reduction of disaster risks (UNDP, 2015). Whilst disaster 
governance on the one hand refers to the complexity of multiple elements that are 
relevant within the never-ending disaster cycle, socio-ecological and political 
economy perspectives tell us that such a ‘web’ of disaster governance can explain 
both the production and reduction of vulnerability, risks, and disasters on the other.
This perspective of disaster governance is  utilised in Chapter Four to analyse and 
organise, in a multi-scalar manner, some specific drivers of disaster vulnerability in 
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Chile —e.g. how the National Emergency Office (ONEMI), for instance, is 
hierarchically organised.
As  I elaborated earlier, disaster governance has implications for the progression of 
vulnerability. For instance, when viewing the historical evolution of the state 
territorial organisation and governance of Chile —i.e. from federalist to centralising 
models  (Montecinos, 2005)— we can observe how this, as  a ‘root cause’ process, has 
enabled and facilitated the centralisation of decision-making within the domains of 
DRM and DRR. I utilise the idea of disaster governance to comprehend and to offer 
some coherence within the multiplicity of actors, rules, and processes  related to 
DRM on different geographical scales for the case of post-disaster Chaitén.
Another concept used during the analysis of the case study is ‘policy responses  to 
disasters’. Although there is a wide range of possible definitions, I prefer to use the 
idea of Ward et al. (2016) which considers policy response as “a dialogue between 
policy makers, who devise targets  and programmes, and policy implementers, who 
respond by putting these plans into action” (Ward et al., 2016, p.46). That ‘dialogue’ 
occurred in the case of Chaitén starting from the volcanic eruption when emergency 
response and recovery mechanisms  were activated by the government, until 
end-2014 when most strategies  and mechanisms were gradually halted. Four 
fundamental processes are considered policy responses in the Chaitén disaster: 
evacuation, recovery and compensation, relocation, and reconstruction. Policy 
responses to the Chaitén disaster involved actors at major levels such as the 
Congress  and the national government, but also policy implementers such as the 
Municipality of Chaitén and the ONEMI, among others. Although during the analysis 
of the case study, I do not analyse the total disaster governance in Chile (for obvious 
reasons), I do look at the model of DRM and DRR and specific policy responses and 
decision-making.
The concepts  of ‘disaster risk management’ and ‘disaster risk reduction’ are of 
central concern in this thesis  too. Although there are various definitions  in the 
technical literature (see for instance in UNISDR, 2009a), DRR is  broadly understood 
to mean “the development and application of policies, strategies and practices to 
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reduce vulnerabilities and disaster risks  throughout society” (Twigg, 2015, p.6). DRM 
is  often used in the same context, referring to a systematic process of using 
“administrative directives, organisations, and operational skills and capacities to 
implement strategies, policies  and improved coping capacities in order to lessen the 
adverse impacts of hazards  and the possibility of disaster” (UNISDR, 2009a, p.10). 
DRM is more focused on the operationalisation of initiatives  to achieve DRR goals, 
but there is some overlap between the two terms  and in practice they are 
sometimes used quite loosely or flexibly, with very similar meanings  (Twigg, 2015). In 
Figure 3.3, and throughout the thesis, the term ‘model of DRM and DRR’ refers  to a 
system of related concepts and processes that represent a particular mode of 
dealing with the reduction and management of risks  and disasters. It describes a 
very broad-based approach to the causes  of disasters and dealing with their 
consequences. The idea of ‘model’ is  applied in the broader sense to represent 
governance, policy, strategic, institutional, operational configurations  within a 
national system, including in particular, but not restricted to policy responses to 
disaster and decision-making. In the figure below it is possible to observe the DRM 
and DRR model developed by the ONEMI (2016), which is  based on the ‘disaster 
cycle’, a conceptual model that is  still used by many emergency management and 
civil protection organisations (Twigg, 2015).
Figure 3.3. The general model of DRM in Chile with the ONEMI
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This is a linear-cyclical operational model, dividing the cycle into phases —before, 
during and after disaster—, each of which requires different forms of intervention —
mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. The formulation is  quite popular 
perhaps  because it is  easy to grasp and use for DRM actors  to allocate tasks and 
resources. However, it does not capture the complexity of disasters. As we have 
discussed in previous sections, root causes  and dynamic pressures of risks  and 
disasters can be distant and entangled in a complex web of actors and processes at 
different scales, and in history. Thus, the DRM cycle does  not capture such 
complexity, rather just compartmentalises it. DRM models, which are largely derived 
from business and organisational management thinking (Oliver-Smith and Hoffman, 
1999), provide a useful perspective on how to approach disasters  and reduce risks 
in a constantly repeating process of hazard and risk identification, analysis  and 
mitigation that incorporates feedback and learning, however, this  also can lead to 
fragmented efforts to reduce risks and disasters (Twigg 2015).
3.5 Analytical framework
All the previous parts  of this chapter were discursively presenting the analytical 
elements of the study. The purpose of this  section is to sum up the analytical 
framework by outlining the principal analytical elements discussed so far.
The figure below offers  a map of the literature review that includes  authors, groups 
of researchers  and ‘think tanks’, and methodological elements that inform the 
analytical framework. It is  important to note here that not all the literature I reviewed 
is  necessarily included in this chapter due to matters  of space and scope, and to 
make the argument more fluid for the readers. Nevertheless, some extra authors  are 
presented in the figure below as a matter of ‘accountability’ as  their contributions 
informed and influenced certain elements and ideas within the framework.
In Figure 3.4, there are two relevant bodies of knowledge selected for the study —
i.e. disasters  (dark blue) and scale (light blue) literature—, and how these combine 
within the proposed ‘multi-scalar progression of vulnerability’ —at the centre in red. 
Case-based elements are also included in the figure, in grey.
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The linkages  between the elements  represent direct (solid line) or partial (dashed 
line) influences  that inform particular or various analytical elements. For instance, I 
suggest that ‘critical theory’ (top centre) may have influenced the ‘political economy’ 
perspective within disaster studies —which in turn influences the rationale behind the 
‘PAR model’— through authors such as  Wisner et al. (2004) and the group RADIX. 
Also shown is  how the ‘PAR model’ has  contributed to the development of the 
concept of ‘vulnerability’ within the so-called ‘theory of disasters’ (elements in blue 
colour). Figure 3.4 also tries  to illustrate what I think is  the development of the ‘scale 
question’ within the global-city literature (light blue) alongside influential authors —
e.g. Brenner, Smith, and Swyngedouw—, and it illustrates  how the ‘scale question’ is 
positioned in relation to the ‘PAR model’ as a ‘scalar perspective’. Thus, the centre of 
the diagram is the ‘multi-scalar progression of vulnerability’ which is the main 
contribution to the study of disaster vulnerability and vis-à-vis  Chile. This receives 
inputs from the ‘PAR model’ and a ‘scalar perspective’ on the one hand, and from 
the model of governing disasters and risks on the other.
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In sum, the analytical framework is  comprised of several fundamental elements. 
Starting from the most elemental, this study is  grounded within the SP, that is, a 
perspective that looks  at the structural factors  —i.e. economic, political, cultural— in 
society such as  ‘social relations’ and ‘structures  of domination’ as constitutive 
elements of disasters and risks  (Bankoff et al., 2006; Wisner et al., 2004). SP 
advocates for tackling underlying (social) causes  of disaster vulnerability as 
fundamental ways to effectively reduce disaster risks. This  departing point is 
fundamental to position the argument —as well as  the limitations— of the thesis. A 
second analytical element is the idea that disasters  and risks  are social 
constructions. Here disasters  and risks  are seen more and more as  the result of an 
imbalance between social and environmental factors, where vulnerability plays  a 
major and determinant role. This  is precisely one of the crucial analytical elements 
within the framework (in red): the social production of disaster vulnerability. The 
latter has led to the discussion of other fundamental questions around the role of 
politics, economy, governance, and culture in the production and prevention of 
growth of vulnerability. Within this set of questions, the PAR model has been 
advantageous  to examine the relations between societal causal factors of 
vulnerability and the occurrence of disasters: the progression of vulnerability, root 
causes, dynamic pressures, and unsafe conditions. This  perspective is 
complemented later with a scalar perspective —grounded in the global-city theory— 
which allows  for organising causes  and drivers  of vulnerability in relation to the 
scalar configuration of the Chilean state. Such scalar configuration is investigated in 
the case of Chile but in particular to the case of post-disaster Chaitén. The model of 
DRM and DRR, and policy responses to disasters —but also disaster governance— are 
examined in both directions, from their praxis in the post-disaster in Chaitén, to their 
histories and processes that have constituted them.
Overall, the framework aims  to present the theoretical and methodological context 
where the thesis builds  on, assisting and informing the research process. This 
analytical framework also aims to assist and inform the principal objective of the 
thesis: re-problematise the progression of disaster vulnerability and risk from a 
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scalar perspective by examining how the social construction of disasters and policy 
responses to them are articulated at different inter– and hierarchically connected 
scales. The next two chapters  are dedicated to analyse the context of Chile in 
relation to the DRM and DRR models, including policy responses to disasters, and 
the case of post-disaster Chaitén in particular.
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Chapter FOUR: The disaster policy context in Chile
Contextualising Chile
Introduction
This chapter and the following Chapter Five explore and analyse the case study. 
Because the research process  moves between the national and local scale of post-
disaster Chaitén, I consider it fundamental that the context of Chile is  considered 
first, as  it works  to contextualise the policy responses and decisions made by 
national, regional and local governments during and after the Chaitén disaster. 
Hence, this chapter seeks to introduce the historic, institutional and territorial 
context of Chile, along with its  models of disaster risk management (DRM) and 
disaster risk reduction (DRR), policy responses  to disasters, and disaster 
governance. This is  done mainly through the analysis of documentary sources. 
Figure 4.1 below explains that the case study is  addressed from two different entry 
points. This chapter offers an historical perspective, so representing the first entry 
point. The idea here is  to advance historical views  on disasters  in Chile and the 
territorial structure of the state, comparing this  with the current model of DRM and 
DRR, including their relationships and implications.
Figure 4.1. Rationale for the chapter case study’s entry point
First entry point Second entry pointCASE STUDY
Chapter Four Chapter Five
Historical perspectives 
on Chilean disasters 
and the state territorial 
organisation of Chile
Processes of de- and 
centralisation 
Economic model, 
uneven development, 
inequality
Institutional forms for 
DRM and DRR:
 laws, regulations, 
ITPs, state agencies, etc.
The case of 
post-disaster 
Chaitén
In the previous chapters, I introduced the theoretical background of the thesis, the 
literature review and the methodology of research, before finally outlining the 
analytical framework. The latter defined the studied phenomenon —i.e. disaster 
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vulnerability— from a social constructionist approach, and it introduced the Pressure 
and Release (PAR) model to underpin the re-problematisation of the progression of 
vulnerability and risk from a scalar perspective. Such a perspective requires us  to 
look at how social relations in a given society are articulated, organised and 
distributed in different geographical spaces, particularly those that can be 
connected to the production and progression of vulnerability. In this  chapter, such 
relations are investigated to contextualise Chile, as they are seen as fundamental in 
understanding post-disaster Chaitén. The model of DRM and DRR —that is, a 
particular mode of dealing with the reduction and management of risks  and 
disasters— is  examined in two constitutive directions: the praxis of policy responses 
to disasters  in Chaitén, and the different processes that produced it. The latter 
compel us to look back at certain events in the past that may have produced or 
influenced the model of governing disasters. This  is  the departing point of this  part 
of the study.
4.1 A brief history of Chilean disasters
In this section I review existing narratives  on the history of Chilean disasters in order 
to propose an initial understanding of the constitution and development of the 
Chilean disaster management approach.
 The history of Chilean disasters  is  often positively highlighted by politicians, 
researchers, journalists  and historians  (El Mercurio, 2015; Pardo, 2017). After the 8.8 
magnitude earthquake occurred in the Maule Region in 2010, the most disastrous 
event in the recent history of the country, the media and politicians  underlined the 
performance of institutions and society in terms of their resistance to the force of 
nature and their capacity to resist and recover from disasters  (American Red Cross 
Multidisciplinary Team et al., 2011; Galilea, 2013; Kaufmann, 2010; López Tagle and 
Santana Nazarit, 2011; MAE Center et al., 2010). Despite this, the evidence of 
important deficiencies in terms of the disaster management that created an uneven 
distribution of disaster impacts in Chile is  often ignored: nor are the root causes of 
such deficiencies questioned by the media and politicians. Some deficiencies are 
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noted in relation to: inadequate coordination of emergency and recovery response 
(Navia, 2010), especially in effected remote localities  (MAE Center et al., 2010); the 
weak and late response of the government to the tsunami alarm in 2010 —a decision 
that cost the lives of 156 men and women (Kaufmann, 2010)— and; the resilience of 
transport and communication systems  —“the earthquake caused a blackout that 
affected 93 per cent of the entire population and lasted for several days in some 
locations” (MAE Center et al., 2010, p.4).
According to Kaufmann (2010) and KnowledgeWharton (2010), these deficiencies  in 
preparedness  reveal other profound issues or root causes. For instance, the MAE 
Center et al. (2010) assert that pre-existing conditions such as regional-economy 
disparities  and political tensions between regions in Chile, stressed by the uneven 
concentration of population, power and resources, have contributed to the uneven 
impact of disasters, especially affecting the poor but significantly those who are 
more isolated and disconnected from centres of power. Other researchers  such as 
Pulgar Pinaud (2014a) and Vidal and Romero (2010) have also underlined the role 
that socio-economic and political contexts  in Chile play in shaping vulnerability to 
disasters. Pulgar Pinaud (2014a), for instance, asserts that neoliberal policies, such as 
land deregulation during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, have create 
important social and spatial inequalities that may explain the uneven distribution of 
disaster impacts.
This uneven distribution of impacts  contrasts with the widespread idea that 
highlights  the heroism of people and the resilience of institutions. In the following 
section, I base the analysis  on a series  of historical documents to contest this ‘typical’ 
or mainstream view of disasters in Chile, which emphasises  their ‘naturalness’ and 
their impacts. Here I suggest a departing point to understand how positivist 
perspectives  on disasters may tend to blur the relevance of socio-economic, political 
and cultural pre-conditions that precede them, and which are crucial to comprehend 
the social cause of disasters.
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4.1.1 The dominant view of the history of Chilean disasters: earthquakes
A diverse range of extreme natural events  have affected Chile, however, 
earthquakes  are probably the most remarkable. Most of the historical records 
(CREDEN, 2016) highlight earthquakes  as  they somehow represent ‘milestones’  in 
the history of Chile.
Many Chileans still have fresh memories  of the Great Maule earthquake of February 
27, 2010, and some of them remember where they were when great earthquakes 
occurred in 1960 (Valdivia)  and 1985 (Central Chile). Elderly Chileans may still 
remember the 1939 earthquake in Chillán. Earthquakes  and disasters  have been 
recurrent throughout Chilean history. 
Located in the so-called Pacific Ring of Fire, Chile is  one of the most seismic regions 
in the world (EM-DAT, 2017). Chile sees  the convergence of the Nazca plate and the 
South American continental plate, causing periodic earthquakes of varying 
magnitudes  that sometimes trigger significant disasters. Thus, earthquakes and 
disasters have become part of the collective identity of Chileans  (Ugarte and 
Salgado, 2014), being registered in popular culture through the oral tradition prior 
to the Spanish conquest in the sixteenth century (BNC, 2014).
According to Foerster (1995), prior to the Spanish Empire colonisation, indigenous 
peoples  wove a network of symbolic and religious interpretations  about 
earthquakes  and disasters. In the Mapuche culture —the largest in the country— 
earthquakes  and disasters were perceived as  manifestations of a cosmic imbalance 
that must be recovered by offerings to gods and rites to the spirits  of ancestors. As 
such, during the first decades of the conquest, the Spaniards may have felt the 
devastating effects  of seismic activity itself in the region. In May 1647, the largest 
earthquake in colonial chronicles occurred, highlighting that the city of Santiago was 
reduced to rubble while it deepened an important economic crisis  initiated in 
previous years  (Amunátegui, 1882). A similar observation was documented during 
the 1751 earthquake in Concepción, the capital city of the Bio-Bio Region. This 
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disaster even prompted the relocation of the city. Records from the National Library 
of Chile (BNC 2014) also suggest that people mainly attributed earthquakes  to 
someone’s will and disasters as divine punishments.
In the early twentieth century, one of the most disastrous earthquakes in the new 
Republican era occurred. Grossi (1907) documented the destruction of the city of 
Valparaiso and thousands of human losses. Similar negative effects  were registered 
for the disasters  of Atacama’s  earthquake in 1922 and the earthquake in Talca in 
1928  (BNC, 2014). The Talca disaster urged authorities  and worker unions  to 
implement disaster management and risk reduction measures: the first standards  for 
anti-seismic construction of buildings and for the identification of disaster prone 
areas (Presidencia de la Republica de Chile, 1936).
In 1939, yet another earthquake struck which affected the city of Chillán and the 
entire surrounding region. It caused about 30,000 deaths and provoked the 
destruction of almost the entire city (Reyes Coca, 1999). As a result, the central 
government created an institutional body under Law Nº6.434 called Corporation for 
Reconstruction, Relief and Production Development, which supported the 
government in planning and executing reconstruction projects throughout the 
country while promoting industrial development in all regions. These two objectives 
were combined because, by the 1940s, Chile was going through a process  of 
industrialisation (Montecinos, 2005).
In most of the historical records kept by the Chilean government and the media 
following the 1960 Valdivia disaster,9 attention was placed on the impacts and the 
costs  of reconstruction, reinforcing the idea of the Chilean people’s resistance 
against the forces  of nature. Valdivia suffered one of the most devastating episodes 
in Chilean history. According to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS, 2014), the May 
22, 1960, registered ‘the largest earthquake in the world’  with a moment magnitude 
recording of 9.5 (Mw), causing extensive devastation in the provinces of Cautín, 
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9 A list of media records consulted for this disaster is in Appendix 5.
Valdivia, Osorno, Llanquihue and Chiloé. This was accompanied by a tsunami that 
caused a series of waves that swept away coastal cities. According to government 
records (BNC, 2014), figures  estimated a death toll of 1,655, a further 3,000 injured, 
two million homeless, and US$550 million in damage, causing further social impact 
and high costs in damage to neighbouring countries (see Table 4.1).
Table 4.1. Impacts in neighbouring countries of the 1960 Great Valdivia earthquake
Location Economic loss Human loss
Hawaii US$ 75 million 61 deaths
Japan US$ 50 million 138 deaths
Philippines No information available 32 deaths + missing people
US West Coast US$ 500,000 No deaths registered
Compiled by the author (2017), based on La Nación (May 28, 1960) and USGS (2014)
According to newspaper records and press  releases  of the time, this  earthquake 
sank some areas to such an extent that they ended up being completely submerged 
(see Figures  4.2 and 4.3): it caused several landslides, and it initiated the eruption of 
the Puyehue volcano on May 23 the same year, which sent ash and steam as high as 
6,000 metres in the sky for several weeks (BNC, 2014).
Figure 4.2. Areas flooded by the 1960 Chilean tsunami in Maullín (near to Valdivia)
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Figure 4.3. Ships and factories destroyed by the 1960 Great Valdivia earthquake
Source: Castedo (2000, p.74)
La Nación newspaper headlines the words of Pierre Lehmann —in charge of the 
reconstruction at the time—: “The battle of Riñihue is occurring on four fronts, and it 
is  almost a victory”, in reference to floods that were occurring in Riñihue in the 
Valdivia province. Pierre Lehmann asserts: “Engineers  and workers  are fighting to 
reduce the impacts  of floods  [...] their fight is  against nature and time” (La Nación, 
June 10, 1960, p.1; see Figure 4.4). On June 22, 1960, the headline of the 
newspaper El Correo de Valdivia was: “The Image of Valdivia is painful and 
depressing [...] Despite the efforts  made by people and the government, it looks like 
this  time nature has  really struck us hard”. These assertions and headlines  reflect the 
general idea in Chile that disasters  and their impacts  were about a ‘fight’ and 
‘struggle’ against nature’s will (Gould et al., 2016).
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Figure 4.4. La Nación’s headline, June 10, 1960
Source: La Nación, June 10, 1960 (other newspapers reviewed are listed in Appendix 5)
In an interview in May 1960, President Jorge Alessandri referred to the Valdivia 
disaster and spoke to the affected population:
“The president of the nation visits the south [...]  he highlights the wholeness 
of Chilean people that faced the event and their capacity to resist [...]  Earthquakes 
do not distinguish between men and women, adults and children [...]  Nobody 
doubts that the temper of Southern men will  be able to resist future disasters and to 
recover from this”.
(La Nación, May 24, 1960)
This reaffirms  the narrative of politicians on disasters  as  a ‘struggle’ against nature, 
where our only hope resides in the individual and collective capacity to react and 
resist. A quick revision of the government’s press  releases after the 1960 Valdivia 
earthquake confirm the general reference to a ‘force of nature’ and men’s strength 
to resist such events (see Appendix 5).
More recently, the disaster triggered by the 2010 Maule earthquake is  of particular 
interest because its  magnitude, its level of destruction, and its  economic and human 
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costs  (Han, 2010; Navia, 2010; Volk, 2010). A few hours after the earthquake, 
President Bachelet was quoted as saying:
“We are facing a massive catastrophe which has caused damage that will 
require an enormous effort by both the public and private sectors, one of the 
largest [efforts]  in the history of the country. […] Once again our ability to deal with 
adversity and get back on our feet [is  tested]. And we are examining every way to 
restore all the basic services in the country”.
(Bachelet, 2010, translated by Gould et al., 2016)
Bachelet addressed the nation, pointing out that the disaster was tragic and serious 
but at the same time limited and manageable. According to Gould et al. (2016), this 
and other statements rely on a formulation already familiar to Chileans: “the state as 
possessing the human, economic, and technical resources to overcome great 
challenges, including national/natural disasters” (Gould et al., 2016, p.100). This 
reaffirms  the narrative of politicians  and the elite about the mainstream view in the 
Chilean history of disaster, which restricts the causes of disasters to natural factors.
In her May 21 Speech of 2015, Bachelet remembered the 2008  Chaitén volcanic 
eruption to point out the success of the different institutions  in coping with such 
extreme events: “Chaitén is a successful case where all institutions  worked together 
to protect the population” (Presidential May 21 Speech, May 2015). This  perspective 
is  mainly supported by the fact that no fatalities were registered during the 
eruption. However, this  neglects  determinant aspects of risk and disaster, such as 
the role of the economy and politics  that influence people’s capacity to resist and 
recover from disasters (Wisner et al., 2004). Once more, political rhetoric and 
historical records emphasise the number of deaths and other material impacts such 
as  destroyed houses. Rarely is  attention paid to the socio-economic and political 
pre-conditions that situated men and women in disaster prone areas or make them 
more vulnerable to disasters in the first place.
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4.1.2 History of disasters triggered by other extreme events
Disasters in Chile are not only triggered by earthquakes, but also by other extreme 
natural events. For instance, some authors  (Smink, 2011) suggest that volcanic 
eruptions have an important role in the history of Chilean disasters because of their 
social and economic impacts. It is  well known that there are an estimated 2,000 
volcanoes  in Chile —the second highest number after Indonesia (Casertano, 1963)— 
of which 100 are considered active volcanoes and only 50 are being regularly 
monitored (OVDAS, 2014). Recent disasters  related to volcanic activity are the 
Villarrica and Lonquimay volcanic eruptions  in 1984 and 1989 respectively, and the 
Hudson eruption in 1991 that incurred important economic costs  in agriculture and 
in the livestock industry (Berezin, 2012). In 2011, the Puyehue volcanic eruption 
provoked the displacement of more than 4,000 people in Los Ríos  Region, 
significant air traffic disruption, and economic costs  for the local industry (Abumohor 
and Díaz, 2011). But perhaps  the most emblematic case is  the eruption of the 
Chaitén volcano in 2008  that caused the displacement of more than 8,000 men and 
women, made 4,000 people homeless, and incurred around US$ 70 million in 
economic costs  (Presidencia de la República de Chile and Narváez, 2009). In this 
case, great emphasis was  given to the ‘effectiveness’ of the evacuation procedures 
because there were no fatalities  during the emergency (Galilea, 2013). 
Nevertheless, unforeseen effects of policy responses and decisions made during the 
subsequent years may have triggered the return of people to the city in spite of 
volcanic risk. This issue will be addressed in greater detail in Chapter Five.
Likewise, other disasters  in recent Chilean history were triggered neither by 
earthquakes  nor by volcanic eruptions. Once more, however, emphasis has been put 
on the impacts  and the suffering of people, neglecting almost completely the 
importance of the social, economic and political pre-conditions that surrounded 
such disasters. One example is the Great Fire of Valparaiso that occurred between 
April 12 and 16, 2014. According to the ONEMI (2014a), the fires  caused 15 deaths, 
injured more than 500 people, destroyed 2,900 dwellings and made more than 
12,500 people homeless. There is not yet any public information from the ONEMI, 
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the main state institution on disasters, pointing out the underlying causes and 
drivers of such a disaster, despite researchers  having already pointed to land market 
deregulation and urban segregation (Pino, 2015; Pino and Hormazabal, 2016).
According to the ONEMI (2014b) and the United Nations  International Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction (UNISDR, 2014a), floods and storms have also been recurrent in 
the recent history of Chilean disasters, often leaving people displaced and homeless 
and incurring important economic losses. Perhaps the most important disaster 
related to flash floods and mudflows  in Chile’s recent history occurred between 
March 23 and 25, 2015, in northern Chile. ONEMI and the media highlighted that 
flooding caused at least 34 deaths  and made 30,000 people homeless 
(Cooperativa, 2015; ONEMI, 2015).
In general, politicians, researchers and the media have considered Chilean disaster 
management performance —the actions of people, civil society, institutions and 
authorities— as ‘positive’ (American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team et al., 2011; 
Kaufmann, 2010; López Tagle and Santana Nazarit, 2011; MAE Center et al., 2010). 
This interpretation is  strongly linked to the low number of casualties. However, more 
and more researchers are pointing out the social costs of reconstruction and the 
failure of emergency and recovery strategies as  disasters’ levels  of impact in terms of 
economic and social costs  have significantly increased (Gobierno de Chile, 2014). 
Such literature calls  for a more active ex-ante role of institutions in handling disasters 
(González-Muzzio, 2013; Pulgar Pinaud, 2014a, 2014b; Romero and Albornoz, 2013; 
Romero et al., 1999; Vidal and Romero, 2010), aiming to address  potential causes 
and drivers  of risks focusing on preparedness and mitigation rather than 
concentrating only on post-ante emergency response, relief and compensation.
From a multiplicity of official sources, governmental reports, media archives and 
historiography, I elaborated a list of disasters triggered by ‘natural’  hazards in Chile 
(see Table 4.2), collecting the main aspects  referenced within each document in 
order to visualise a ‘pattern’  of the official narrative on the history of Chilean 
disasters.
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Table 4.2. Disasters related to extreme natural events in Chile (1562-2016)
Year Event Area Aspects highlighted
1562 Earthquake Concepción 8.0-magnitude earthquake estimated. Changes in geography, houses destroyed and fatalities (Quezada, 1999).
1570 Earthquake Concepción The first documented earthquake in Chile. Destruction of houses and economic losses (Palacios Roa, 2016).
1575 Earthquake Valdivia The force of nature (Mariño de Lobera, 1960).
1647 Earthquake Santiago Central Chile is devastated and this provoked an intense economic crisis (BNC, 2014).
1657 Earthquake Concepción The force of nature and reference to God (BNC, 2014).
1730 Earthquake Santiago and Valparaíso The force of nature and reference to God (Quezada, 1999).
1737 Earthquake Concepción Economic losses and damage to the built environment (Quezada, 1999).
1751 Earthquake Concepción The force of nature and reference to God (Quezada, 1999).
1819 Earthquake Copiapó Economic losses (BNC, 2014).
1822 Earthquake Santiago and Valparaíso
The force of nature and human losses. 200 deaths estimated 
(Fuentes et al., 1823).
1835 Earthquake Concepción The force of nature (BNC, 2014).
1837 Earthquake Valdivia The force of nature (BNC, 2014).
1868 Earthquake and tsunami Arica The force of nature and economic losses (BNC, 2014).
1877 Earthquake Santiago The force of nature (BNC, 2014).
1906 Earthquake Valparaíso Earthquake destroyed the port of Valparaíso and gave rise to commercial problems (Grossi, 1907); almost 20,000 deaths.
1922 Earthquake and tsunami Atacama The force of nature and economic losses (BNC, 2014).
1928 Earthquake Talca
Earthquake destroyed around 75 per cent of the city. This 
event gave rise to the General Law of Construction and 
Urbanisation in 1931 (Presidencia de la República de Chile, 
1936).
1939 Earthquake Chillán CORFO created to coordinate reconstruction and economic recovery (CORFO, 2014).
1960 Earthquake and tsunami Valdivia
Southern Chile devastated, important economic and human 
losses. The most disastrous event in Chile’s history (USGS, 
2014).
1965 Floods Atacama and Los Lagos 600 deaths and 375,000 affected people (Rojas et al., 2014). 
1965 Earthquake La Ligua
The 7.4-magnitude earthquake and its associated disaster 
promoted the creation of the ONEMI in 1974 (ONEMI, 
2014b).
1971 Earthquake Central Chile
Earthquake heavily affected Illapel, Los Vilos, Salamanca, 
Combarbalá, and La Ligua. It generated the creation of the 
Chilean Standard for Seismic Design of Buildings (NCh433) 
in 1973 (BNC, 2014).
1980 Mudflows Santiago 3 deaths and US$ 500,000 in losses (SERNAGEOMIN, 2017).
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Year Event Area Aspects highlighted
1982 Storm and floods Santiago Floods and homeless people (BNC, 2014).
1984 Volcanic eruption Villarrica Displaced people (ONEMI, 2014b).
1985 Earthquake Central Chile About 1 million affected people (ONEMI, 2014b).
1986 Storm O’Higgins Homeless people (BNC, 2014).
1987 Mudflows Santiago 41 deaths and US$ 12 million in losses (SERNAGEOMIN, 2017).
1989 Volcanic eruption Lonquimay Displaced people (BNC, 2014).
1991 Volcanic eruption Aysén
Hudson volcano eruption affected livestock industry and 
agriculture (OVDAS, 2014).
1991 Mudflows Antofagasta 110 deaths and US$ 80 million in losses (SERNAGEOMIN, 2017).
1993 Volcanic eruption
Northern 
Chile
Láscar volcano eruption caused air traffic disruption in Chile, 
Argentina and Brazil, and affected the livestock and 
agriculture industry (OVDAS, 2014).
1993 Storm and mudflows Santiago
26 deaths; housing units and infrastructure destroyed for a 
total of US$ 5 million (SERNAGEOMIN, 2017).
1997 Storm Central Chile Economic losses (BNC, 2014).
2002 Storm Santiago Economic losses (BNC, 2014).
2005 Earthquake Tarapacá Displacements and destruction of heritage buildings (ONEMI, 2014b).
2006 Storm Biobio Economic losses (BNC, 2014).
2007 Earthquake Aysén Negative economic effects in the region (ONEMI, 2014b).
2008 Volcanic eruption Chaitén
About 8,000 displaced people –and homeless— and 75 per 
cent of the city destroyed (Ugarte and Salgado, 2014).
2008 Storm Araucanía Economic losses (BNC, 2014).
2010 Earthquake and tsunami
Maule and 
Central Chile
8.8-magnitude scale earthquake triggered the displacement 
of 2 million people, more than 500 deaths and around US$ 
30 billion in losses (EM-DAT, 2017).
2011 Storm Coquimbo Economic losses (ONEMI, 2014b).
2011 Volcanic eruption Puyehue Economic losses (ONEMI, 2014b).
2012 Storm Atacama Economic losses (BNC, 2014).
2014 Earthquake Iquique Disaster left 1 million displaced people, 2,500 housing units destroyed and 8 deaths (ONEMI, 2014c).
2014 Fires Valparaíso This disaster left 15 deaths and more than 12,500 homeless people (ONEMI, 2014a).
2015 Floods and mudflows
Northern 
Chile At least 34 deaths and 30,000 homeless (ONEMI, 2015).
2016 Floods Santiago Affected and displaced people. Problems with planning (T13 Noticias, 2016).
Compiled by the author (2017)
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Table 4.2 traces 48  events  related to earthquakes, tsunamis, storms, volcanic 
eruptions, fires, floods and mudflows. A simple frequency distribution shows us that 
disasters triggered by earthquakes (55.3 per cent of the total disasters) are far more 
represented in the list than any other event, even the second and third most 
frequent disasters combined, being storms (19.1 per cent) and volcanic eruptions 
(12.8  per cent). Of course, not all disasters  in the history of Chile are represented 
here: nor are all those related to extensive risk or those disasters  associated with 
cumulative impacts, such as droughts, air pollution and landslides. However, this 
table attempts  to illustrate the clear relevance of a specific way of portraying 
disasters —that is, in terms of their human and economic losses. In other words, this 
way of constructing the history of Chilean disasters  overlooks  and hinders study of 
the causes, pressures and conditions  that make men and women and assets 
vulnerable in the first place.10
4.1.3 Other issues in the mainstream view of the history 
Section 4.1.1 showed how, after certain disasters in Chile, some institutions and 
regulations were created precisely to deal with disaster impacts. This  reflects that, in 
a certain way, the model of disaster and risk management has  been conceived to be 
reactive: oriented to solve disaster impacts, focusing almost exclusively on life 
saving, emergency response, rehabilitation and relief.11  This  orientation, however, 
has had immediate and positive impacts  on the development of the Chilean history 
of disasters, such as the reduction of human losses.
As  the 2016 CREDEN report asserts, the development and effects of the ONEMI in 
the 1970s can be seen as evidence that the creation of institutional mechanisms 
plays an important role in disaster risk reduction (Thiruppugazh, 2014). According to 
EM-DAT (2017), for instance, the top five deadliest disasters in Chile’s  history are 
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10 In 2016, the central government published a report that displays a timeline of disasters in the history 
of Chile (CREDEN, 2016, p.36-37). Similar to Table 4.2., such a timetable corroborates the 
observation made here (see Appendix 6).
11 The model of DRM and DRR will be reviewed in greater detail in section 4.4.
found before the 1970s  (highlighted in grey in Table 4.3), the same decade that the 
ONEMI was created, and thus indicate the materialisation and institutionalisation of 
the major Chilean state’s effort in DRM and DRR.
Table 4.3. Top 10 disasters in Chile between 1900 and 2015 sorted by human losses
Event Location Magnitude Date Human losses
Earthquake Chillán 7.8 Mw 1939 ~5,500–30,000
Earthquake Valparaiso 8.2 Mw 1906 ~20,000
Earthquake and Tsunami Valdivia 9.5 Mw 1960 ~2,000–6,000
Earthquake and Tsunami Vallenar 8.5 Mw 1922 ~1,000–2,000
Floods Atacama and Los Lagos N/A 1965 ~600
Earthquake and Tsunami Maule 8.8 Mw 2010 562
Earthquake La Ligua 7.4 Mw 1965 ~400–500
Earthquake Talca 7.6 Mw 1928 ~220–290
Mudflows Antofagasta N/A 1991 ~110–141
Mudflows Atacama N/A 2015 ~87–178
Compiled by the author (2017), based on CREDEN (2016), EM-DAT (2017) and Rojas et al. (2014)
Mw = Moment magnitude scale
As  Table 4.3 shows, the ONEMI certainly had an important effect on reducing the 
human cost of disasters. But this does  not necessarily mean that disasters have 
stopped affecting Chile’s  path to development in other important and costly ways. 
For instance, as Table 4.4 shows, the number of affected people stemming from 
natural extreme events has increased since the creation of the ONEMI to the point 
where seven of the ten most ‘important’ disasters  occurred after 1965 (highlighted 
in grey).
131
Table 4.4. Top disasters in Chile (1900-2015) sorted by affected people and costs
No. of affected people Disaster/Year Year/Disaster Economic costs in US$ M
2,671,556 Earthquake 2010 2010 Earthquake 30,000,000
2,348,973 Earthquake 1971 1985 Earthquake 1,500,000
2,003,000 Earthquake 1960 2015 Mudflows 1,500,000
1,482,275 Earthquake 1985 2013 Heatwave 1,000,000
513,387 Earthquake 2014 1939 Earthquake 920,000
375,000 Flood 1965 1960 Earthquake 550,000
242,345 Storm 1984 1953 Earthquake 500,000
221,842 Flood 2002 1999 Fires 280,000
139,667 Flood 2000 1971 Earthquake 236,400
120,000 Mudflows 2015 1963 Earthquake 235,000
Compiled by the author (2017), based on EM-DAT (2017) and SERNAGEOMIN (2017)
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 seem to suggest that Chile has performed well in reducing 
human losses in disasters  —as is also true for the case of Chaitén— but not necessarily 
as  well in reducing their social and economic impacts. The most important disasters 
in Chile, in terms  of economic costs, occurred after the creation of the ONEMI in 
1974. 
This shift from the human to the social and economic costs  of disasters could be 
related to the natural population growth or economic development, as suggested 
by UNESCO et al. (2012). However, this change questions the holisticness of a 
model of managing risks and reducing disasters. By holisticness, I refer to the 
comprehensiveness of the model, its  treatment in reducing risks  holistically, looking 
at the underlying causes as well as  the unsafe conditions that give rise to 
vulnerability. Perhaps the case of 2010 Maule earthquake, which was  low in terms of 
deaths but high in economic losses, can help us to visualise this issue.
According to the government and other records (EM-DAT, 2017; Gobierno de 
Chile, 2014), in 2010 there were 2.6 million affected and displaced people, and 
373,784 housing units  destroyed or partially destroyed as a consequence of the 
earthquake. This caused enormous social and economic impact in the months and 
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years after 2010: men and women in affected areas and communities organised 
themselves in different ways to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the 
government’s  strategies  and plans for reconstruction and recovery (Pulgar Pinaud, 
2014a, 2014b). Furthermore, reactive and top-down approaches  to recovery and 
reconstruction utilised by the government apparently created conditions  that 
exacerbated the underlying causes  of vulnerability, reproducing it and perpetuating 
risks in the long term (Imilan et al., 2015). In a way, post-disaster Chaitén fully 
represents a neat example of how a recovery and reconstruction plan does  not 
consider local participation, aspirations and demands, and people’s  ‘positive’ 
efforts, and so opens up  the possibility of the emergence of sources  of vulnerability 
and risk.
When the recent history of Chilean disasters is  investigated through governmental 
documents  and media archives, there are very few allusions to, and often disjointed 
information about, the conditions preceding disasters —that is, the socio-economic, 
political and cultural processes that place people at risk and make them more 
vulnerable to disasters  in the first place, such as  living in disaster-prone areas, their 
level of education, access to health and other urban services, poverty and the like. 
The attention and efforts, then, have tended to focus on the effects  of disasters in 
lieu of to their root causes.
This dangerous  missing and ignored element of Chilean disaster history is, for me, a 
cyclical aspect. Reducing response, relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction to 
technical solutions  and the provision of basic needs  means neglecting how post-
disaster strategies  can contribute significantly to reduce future vulnerability and 
exposure to disasters. Whilst investment in disaster risk management may help to 
reduce deaths during extreme events, the social and economic costs  associated with 
disasters can also, over time, erode societal structures, affecting people’s ability to 
resist, cope with and recover from future disasters (UNISDR, 2011).
This brief review of the history of Chilean disasters  therefore aims to point out that 
the dominant narrative is  characterised by a strong emphasis on post-disaster 
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impacts and losses, while the vulnerable pre-conditions of people, along with the 
socio-economic and political circumstances that facilitate their production, are often 
neglected. I think that these dominant views, over time, may have created —from a 
hermeneutical point of view— a reactive or post-event oriented model of DRM in 
Chile. Furthermore, I consider that a managerial model that mainly focuses  on 
emergency response and relief, without a long-term view seeking to avoid 
reproducing the existing vulnerabilities  and risks —or producing new ones— is 
somehow missing the opportunity to effectively reduce disaster risks. 
The upcoming sections address  another aspect of the history of Chilean disasters: 
the development of DRM and DRR models  and their related institutional forms. 
However, such analysis need to be conducted bearing in mind that we are 
constructing a multi-scalar perspective to look at the progression of vulnerability in 
the case of Chaitén. This requires us  to go back to the history of the state territorial 
organisation through which the DRM institutional forms —such as  the ONEMI— can 
be better interpreted from a scalar viewpoint.
4.2 The ‘logic’ of the state territorial organisation of Chile
By making sense of the state territorial organisation of Chile and its territorial/scalar 
configuration, this  section aims to lay the groundwork for interpreting the 
progression of vulnerability as a multi-scalar process in the case of Chaitén. I 
propose here that the state territorial organisation has  had, and has  today, an 
important influence on the way DRM and DRR are conceived and executed, and 
therefore also influences decision-making, policy responses  to disasters and disaster 
governance. In the two following sections  I address the territorial structure of Chile, 
tracing its evolution from the origins  of the nation state in the nineteenth century to 
the present.
4.2.1 The origins of the territorial structure of the state
As  argued by Brenner (2001, p.599), the social production of scale is subordinated 
to socio-political contestation and is therefore “historically changeable” and 
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malleable. In reconstructing a scalar geography of Chile, a historical review of its 
state territorial organisation becomes  indispensable. By state territorial 
organisation, I refer to the structure of the nation-state power and its  apparatuses 
and how these are spatially organised at different scales (Brenner, 1997, 1998). This 
encompasses  the hierarchical organisation and the spatial distributions  of state 
power in terms  of governance, economy and politics (Lopez-Basaguren and Leire 
Escajedo, 2013; Brenner, 1997). In global-city literature, the scalar forms of state 
territorial organisations  have been studied since the 1980s, arguing that such forms 
may vary over time, depending on the mode of production —especially under 
capitalism— and the social relations and struggles that are originated within 
(Brenner, 1997). In this  section, I focus  on the two main scalar forms of territorial 
organisation in the history of Chile, centralised and federalist models, but 
particularly on the processes  of centralisation and decentralisation as distinctive 
forces in shaping the current territorial structure of the country.
The analysis starts with the Chilean process  of decolonisation from the Spanish 
Empire that took place between 1808  and 1824 (Silva, 1995). According to 
Montecinos (2005), specific social, economic and political circumstances which 
precipitated the emancipation can help to explain the current “territorial centrality” 
of the Chilean state (Montecinos, 2005, p.440). These circumstances include poor 
colonial administration, trade monopoly, postponement of Creoles, absolutism and 
tyranny of colonial authority under both the Bourbon and the Hapsburg model. 
Equally important are the philosophical influences from the Enlightenment among 
Creole authorities, the French Revolution, and the Independence of the United 
States.
After 1810, similar to other Spanish colonies, Chile developed a process of 
decolonisation from the Spanish Empire and, with this, started the creation of the 
nation-state (in the sense suggested by Appadurai, 1996). The initial composition of 
the Chilean state was designed by the Government Junta of Chile or Primera  Junta 
de Gobierno (Collier and Sater, 1996). The Junta, due to the imminent war against 
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the Spanish Empire, established wide political and military powers  for the Head of 
the State, the Director Supremo or Supreme Director. The state project was 
concluded by issuing its first constitution in 1818, which maintained broad 
designated power to the Head of the State but also considered the separation of the 
state powers  —i.e. the Supreme Director (executive), the Senate (legislative) and the 
Supreme Court (judicial)— and at least three provincias or regions: Coquimbo, 
Concepción and Santiago, the latter being the capital. According to Montecinos 
(2005), during this initial phase, the Supreme Director Bernardo O’Higgins  governed 
following the previously established centralised patterns  of the Spanish Empire. The 
state power was thus centralised in its  capital Santiago de Chile and in the figure of 
Director Supremo.
In 1823 a new constitution was issued. In its Chapter XIX, municipalities  received 
their first recognition as minor spatial entities  which were subject to the orders  of the 
Departmental Councillors  (Silva, 1995). Councillors had to be appointed by the 
executive branch or the Supreme Director. This constitution was  the first to refer to 
different aspects of the territorial structure of the state. For instance, that the State of 
Chile is  declared ‘unitary and indivisible’ —so provinces or regions and municipalities 
cannot be considered as being part of the state— and its  sovereignty resides in the 
‘nation’ (Congreso Nacional Constituyente, 1823).
In early 1826, the so-called ‘federal laws’ were drafted by José Miguel Infante, a 
Chilean politician and admirer of the US federal system. These laws sought to 
transform the figure of the Supreme Director into the President of the Republic and 
delegate more autonomy to the provinces  (Silva, 1995). However, the constitutional 
law was never written because José Manuel Infante lost the presidential elections 
that year (Donoso, 1963). This constitutional attempt resulted in a precedent for 
future struggles to restructure the state territoriality. Its proposals included the 
division of the territory into eight provinces (Coquimbo, Aconcagua, Santiago, 
Colchagua, Maule, Concepción, Valdivia and Chiloé) and that all authorities, 
including governors and parish priests, would be subject to a popular vote. 
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According to Montecinos (2005), this federalist attempt was  produced as a result of 
the claims for autonomy by the provinces  of Coquimbo and Concepción in 
opposition to the centralism dictated by Santiago.
Between at least one coup d'état and several other constitutional arrangements, the 
State of Chile “settled down” and came to form the construction of a “strong and 
centralised” country by 1833 (Montecinos, 2005, p.449). Villas or municipalities were 
acknowledged as minor administrative-spatial units, and the nation as  the centrality 
from which order emanates. Each municipality must have an Alcalde or Mayor and 
each province an Intendente or Governor, both directly selected by the executive 
branch whose power resides in the Head of the State, the President of the Republic. 
The constitution of 1833 was in rule until 1925, a period of almost 100 years. 
According to Villalobos (1987), the ‘doctrinal content’ of the constitution 
encompassed the fundamental basis of a centralised institutional regime: national 
sovereignty, representative regime, division of state powers, governmental 
accountability and individual rights. Thus, this  constitution established that the 
nation and its  territoriality were to be exclusively delegated by national authorities, 
in this  way centralising the administration of the state into the executive branch 
located in Santiago (Gran Convención de Chile, 1833).
In the period between the 1833 and 1924, nevertheless, territorial reconfigurations 
were not abandoned. The parliamentary system was introduced in 1891 which, in 
the following years, produced several constitutional reforms, including important 
autonomic measures  such as municipal participatory budgeting and voter 
assemblies in provinces. However, by 1924, a military Pronuncimiento —a military 
rebellion, but different from a coup d'état12— ended any, and the hitherto achieved, 
parliamentary attempts  in Chile. In its place, the presidential system was re-
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12 In a typical coup d'état, a rebel faction which controls some critical element of the armed forces 
seizes control of the state by a sudden movement, organised and executed in stealth; in a 
pronunciamiento, a group of military officers publicly declare their opposition only to the current 
government —that is, to the current chief executive and cabinet— who may be legally elected civilians 
or the result of a previous coup (Luttwak, 1969).
established by the Junta government. The first significant reform of the restored 
order was  the dissolution of all municipal representatives  and the designation of 
regional intendentes in their place (Salazar and Pinto, 1999).
After 1925, the centralised organisation of the territory was thus initiated by a 
doctrine based on the assumption that the success of municipalities and provinces 
was only possible through their alignment with national plans  (Montecinos, 2005). 
The goal was to ‘discipline’ the municipalities  under a national development plan 
that was  promoted by President Ibáñez (Salazar and Pinto, 1999). The period 
between 1925 and 1973 is  known as a ‘democratic presidential’ era. It is a phase 
marked by the rise of the middle class, great prosperity and sustained increases  in 
living standards, including improvements  in education and health, and the country 
was  undergoing a process  of industrialisation. This period also saw the 
implementation of several political and economic models, such as  the socialist 
model during the Salvador Allende administration, and the Keynesian with President 
Aguirre  Cerda. The latter had an important influence on the state territorial 
organisation of that time. In 1938, the republican-political alliance called Frente 
Popular or Popular Front won the presidency, the leader being the Radical Party 
politician Pedro Aguirre Cerda. President Aguirre Cerda implemented a Keynesian 
style  economic model with strong state intervention in the national economic 
development (Montecinos, 2005).
The result of this ‘developmental’  inspiration was  that the ‘state territorial 
organisation’ adopted new significance as  a strategic tool of the state in order to 
promote economic growth and development in the country. In 1939, the Production 
Development Corporation (CORFO) was founded and thus the state took the helm 
as  the motor of industrial dynamism and national growth. A consequence of 
industrialisation processes  and the obsession with economic development and 
growth was  that the principal cities of Chile —Santiago, Concepción and Valparaíso— 
emerged (Frías, 1960).
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4.2.2 Approaching the current state territorial organisation
In the period from 1925 to 1973, we can find the most direct predecessors to the 
current territorial structure of the Chilean state. Montecinos (2005, p.455) defines 
this  period as  an attempt to reconfigure the state territoriality, and calls  it “the first 
regionalisation”. Remember that the period before 1925 was characterised by 
demands coming from strong regionalist and federalist movements  that were born 
in the provinces and, in most cases, had violent outcomes by means  of revolution or 
armed uprising. These decentralising demands were considered, reflected upon 
and mentioned in a specific article of the constitution:
“The laws will entrust gradually to provincial or municipal agencies the 
authority and administrative powers currently exercised by other authorities, in 
order to proceed with the decentralisation of the national administrative system”.
(Constitución Política de la República de Chile, 1925, Article Nº107)
This article described a process  of ‘administrative decentralisation’ which sought to 
promote economic development (Boisier, 2000). Since 1939, CORFO had 
stimulated a new process of territorial organisation based on the economic 
development of the country. This  new organisation delineated six major productive 
regions: Norte Grande, Norte Chico, Núcleo Central, Concepción and La Frontera, 
Región de Los  Lagos, and Región de Los  Canales. These productive-administrative 
divisions  supposedly aimed to integrate people and human resources within a 
national developmental plan. However, this did not take into account the socio-
spatial fabric of major ancient socio-economic and cultural groups such as  the 
Magallanes  people in the South, the Mapuches  in Central Chile and the Aimaras  in 
the North (Montecinos, 2005). According to Boisier (2000), the new division 
delivered more autonomy to neither Concepción nor Coquimbo —regions  that had 
historically demanded more power— because it was  mainly based on the spatial 
distribution of natural resources. Thus, the principal objective of this ‘first 
regionalisation’ was to encourage the economic development of each region based 
on its geographical and economic characteristics (Boisier, 2001).
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In 1965, the National Planning Office (ODEPLAN) increased regionalisation by 
establishing new regions based on a system of poles  of economic development. 
This time, the territory was divided into eleven regions and one metropolitan area. 
This ‘regionalisation’ was characterised by the designation of central spatial units, 
determined by a city as  a hub that was to connect the rest of the region. Santiago 
and its  metropolitan area were established as  the main centre of national 
development, while the three poles of multi-regional development were 
Antofagasta, Valparaíso and Concepción. A third hierarchical level was  composed by 
another set of sub-poles of regional development which were first politically and 
then economically subordinated to the aforementioned regional poles 
(Montecinos, 2005). By observing such hierarchies, it is  then possible to understand 
better the underlying processes that have produced the current geographical and 
scalar organisation of the Chilean state, as this logic of organisation continued in the 
1970s.
Alongside the arrival of the military dictatorship  in 1973, there was a phenomenon 
that Montecinos (2011) considers paradoxical: instead of increasing the 
centralisation of the country, the dictatorship headed by the General Augusto 
Pinochet gave a strong impetus to the process of regionalisation and administrative 
decentralisation already started in the 1950s. Decree Nº212, from December 17, 
1973, created the National Commission for Administrative Reform, or CONARA 
(Boisier, 2000). CONARA established the current national political-administrative 
division of Chile, consisting of thirteen regions. Thirty-four years  later, a major 
modification to this  spatial division was made in 2007 through the creation of two 
additional regions: Los Ríos Region and the Arica and Parinacota Region (see 
Appendix 7). According to Montecinos  (2005), the military government discourses 
on state territorial organisation in the 1970s was  focused on the geographic and 
economic potentialities  of each region, and argued that this division would promote 
better integration of citizens, national security, socio-economic development and 
better national administration. In other words, the military government continued 
the process of administrative decentralisation initiated since the constitution of 
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1925. Likewise, the development of a national security system intended to achieve 
border security and internal cohesion by inhabiting the territory of ‘unoccupied’ 
spaces  (Boisier, 2000). Although the foundation of Chaitén occurred in 1940 within 
an ‘unoccupied’ region, it was only during the 1970s  that an important influx of 
people and economic progress took place (Delgado et al., 2005). 
In the 1970s, the creation of regions  displaced the power from provincial to regional 
governments, thus  giving them more recognition and resources to implement the 
regional development plans  (Szary, 1997). With this  solution, the national 
government aimed to keep  a united country but without falling into a “utopian 
federalism” while promoting economic development with territorial and political 
harmony (Montecinos, 2005, p.458). However, more than 30 years after the first 
regionalisation, the dialectic of centralisation and decentralisation processes —
federalist and regionalist— is  still considered an unsolved issue in the Chile of today 
(SUBDERE, 2000). According to Boisier (2001), this issue has created an imbalance 
between an administrative decentralisation and one political, where concrete 
redistribution of power to sub-national levels has not occurred. Moreover, Boisier 
(2001) asserts  that administrative decentralisation has  not secured a balanced 
distribution of the economy in the territory. On the contrary, since the 1980s, the 
concentration of wealth, income opportunities, and economic and political power in 
the Santiago Metropolitan Region has increased (Atienza and Aroca, 2012).
In sum, within the history of the Chilean territorial organisation, it is  possible to 
distinguish various  centralisation and decentralisation attempts: however, there are 
two clearly identifiable and distinctive styles of decentralisation: endogenous 
decentralisation and vertical decentralisation. The first is  described as a “bottom-up” 
process (Montecinos, 2005, p.461) with a strong regional-political component based 
on revolutionary attempts of involving a radical change to the model of government 
and constitutional order. These, implemented in some cases, include attempts  to 
federalise the country in 1826, 1851 and 1859. Another endeavour was  the attempt 
to move the country from a highly centralised presidential system to a parliamentary 
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system, in practice for 34 years  between 1891 and 1925. Both attempts  brought no 
radical institutional changes  and policy outcomes; nor were they manifested in 
Chilean social and political life (Boisier, 2001). On the contrary, the failure of these 
attempts became sufficient reason to react and recentralise power in both 1833 and 
1925. 
The second style, described as  a “vertical decentralisation” or top-down (Montecinos 
2005, p.461), is characterised by governments  deciding on a policy of 
decentralisation with an administrative emphasis —a decentralisation of the functions 
of the state aiming to contribute to the process of its  modernisation and economic 
growth in the country. In this period and under this  logic, main government 
institutions and frameworks  for disaster management and risk reduction are 
consolidated, such as  the ONEMI, municipal emergency plans and territorial 
planning instruments  (IPTs). These will be fully addressed in section 4.4. To end this 
historical revision, I will address the current structure of the Chilean territory.
4.2.3 The territorial structure of the state and the government
The current territorial organisation of Chile is  characterised by a vertical 
decentralisation where most of the functions  of the state —the administration of state 
services including civil protection— are territorialised into regional spaces, but these 
functions  still maintain a high subordination to and dependency on national powers 
(Montecinos, 2013). Today, intendentes —or regional governors— and provincial 
governors are directly elected by the President of the Republic, whereas mayors and 
the Municipal Council have been democratically elected since the 1990s (Szary, 
1997).
In trying to capture the centralising character of the territorial state, the political-
administrative divisions  of its territory could be a good example. As displayed in 
Figure 4.5, the division of minor administrative spatial units  is concentrated in 
Central Chile. Since the concentration of minor administrative divisions  is  also the 
result of population density —Central Chile is  inhabited by more than 80 per cent of 
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the total national population (INE, 2002)— infrastructures and services  are also 
concentrated in those geographical areas. As  expected, the reality for DRM and DRR 
is  not any different. According to a study titled Analysis of Disaster Risk in Chile 
(UNESCO et al., 2012), regional disparities in terms  of development of infrastructure 
for transport and communication, economic distribution and production capacities, 
and access to services  and power reveal uneven levels  of disaster risk throughout 
the country with those who live distant from urban centres and Central Chile being 
more at risk. This will be discussed in section 4.3.
Figure 4.5. Administrative division by regions, provinces and municipalities, Chile
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To offer a finer and multi-scalar analysis of the model of the DRM and DRR in Chile in 
the next sections, especially of the ONEMI —a government body and the major state 
effort on civil protection— I further explore the territorial structure of the state by 
explaining the organisation of the government at different territorial levels.
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Administratively speaking, the government of Chile is  organised, in reference to 
Figure 4.5, by institutions whose jurisdiction is limited by the political-administrative 
spatial boundaries: regional government, provincial government, and communal 
government or municipality. Financially speaking, only municipalities are entitled to 
generate revenues through a special municipal tax system which includes  real estate 
tax, vehicle registration and road taxes, as well as street cleaning and maintenance 
taxes (SII, 2016). Financial and spending patterns in DRM and DRR in Chile are 
briefly addressed at the end of section 4.4.3.
Regional government and the Intendente
Regional governments  are public bodies for the management of regions, tasked 
with their social, cultural and economic development. Currently, there are 15 
regional governments  in Chile. They are based in the capital city of the region and 
composed of two bodies: the Intendente, who is directly appointed by the President 
of the Republic and remains  in office as  long as  he or she has the confidence of the 
President; and the Regional Council, a group of councillors that since 2014 have 
been elected by popular vote, being in office for four years  (Ministerio del Interior y 
Seguridad Pública, 2013a).
Nonetheless, according to the Decree with Force of Law (DFL)  Nº19175 of 2005 
(Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Pública, 2005), the governmental power of each 
region rests  solely with the Intendente  as a natural and immediate representative of 
the executive power, and the regional councils merely serve as consultative bodies. 
So, on the one hand, regional councils  have limited power to decide actions in 
respect of key state  functions  such as  civil protection, and in relation to DRM 
functions  and DRR actions, and on the other hand, intendentes depend on the 
executive power to decide and take actions  in respect of civil protection. 
Furthermore, the legal functions of regional governments regarding civil protection 
interweave with those of national authorities  competent in those areas, such as  the 
ONEMI. The territorial planning instrument recently created in 2011, named 
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‘Regional Plan for Territorial Planning’ or PROT,13  aims that regional governments 
implement DRM or DRR measures independently. However, like regional councils, 
PROTs  are merely consultative instruments which give guidance for the 
development of the regions but are not binding plans. During the fieldwork, 
according to an executive of the National Subsecretariat for Regional Development 
and Administration (SUBDERE)14 interviewed in July 2013, “no region has  handed its 
PROT to the SUBDERE yet” (Carlos  Villalobos,15 male, National government director, 
July 2013, interview). It seems that although SUBDERE requested PROTs for each 
region by 2011, there is  a notorious delay or lack of interest from regions in 
harnessing these plans  to provide regions  with more precise and locally pertinent 
DRM and DRR. I think that the potentials  and opportunities  of PROTs  are constrained 
by the facts  that PROTs are not binding, that the resources to prepare and 
implement actions need to be covered by regional funds, and that there is  a lack of 
horizontal decentralisation in terms of decision-making over the functions of the 
state in DRM and DRR. I will return to PROTs when I conduct a closer analysis  of key 
territorial planning instruments (IPTs) in section 4.4.3.
Provincial government and Governor
There are 53 provincial governments in Chile. According to the DFL Nº 19175 
(Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Pública, 2005), provincial governments are 
decentralised figures  of the Intendente within the regional territory, headed by a 
Governor. Provincial governors are responsible for public management and 
administration at the provincial level. Governors  supervise all public services  created 
by law. Similarly, governors may appoint delegates  to exercise governor’s  will and 
powers in one or more locations  in the province. Although governors are trusted by 
intendentes, they are appointed and removed freely by the President of the 
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13 In Spanish, Plan Regional de Ordenamiento Territorial.
14 In Spanish, Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Regional y Administrativo.
15 Fictitious name. As introduced in Chapter Two, for ethical reasons (confidentiality and anonymity), I 
decided that all interviewees’ names would be replaced by fictitious ones, whilst gender, institutional 
affiliation, position and date of interaction is provided.
Republic. A Governor performs his  or her duties in the capital city of their respective 
province, notwithstanding that he or she may exercise them temporarily from 
another city in its  jurisdictional territory, especially in case of disaster or emergency. 
Provincial governors report directly to intendentes, while intendentes report directly 
to the President of the Republic. By ‘reporting’, I mean that such authorities are 
accountable and owe allegiance to a hierarchical political structure. This has 
important implications  for DRM and DRR, because the ONEMI’s  Civil Protection 
Committee (CPC) and Emergency Operation Centre (COE) must always be headed 
by their respective territorial authority: the President of the Republic heads  the 
national COE (in case of disaster) and the Ministry of Interior the national CPC; 
intendentes head regional CPC and COE, governors head provincial CPC and COE, 
and mayors head communal CPC and COE (Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad 
Pública, 2002). As an example of the vertical territorial relationship in terms of civil 
protection, the law that ascertains  the functions of the provincial governments 
declares:
“Provincial governments should take all necessary measures to  face 
emergency or disaster, according to  law, and develop programmes for disaster 
prevention and protection, without prejudice to the powers of the competent 
national authorities”.
(Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Pública, 2005, Chapter II, Letter F)
This means  that the law allows provincial governments to take DRM and DRR action 
yet it restricts those actions  to the domains of national powers. During the fieldwork, 
I observed that civil protection —preparedness and prevention— in Los  Lagos Region 
and Chaitén were mainly commanded by the ONEMI from Santiago, although 
executed later by regional and municipal authorities. A provincial authority 
interviewed in July 2013 confirmed that in terms of DRM and DRR: 
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“We receive instructions from Santiago [ONEMI]  in terms of guidelines, 
procedures, and personnel [...]  the programmes to be prepared, and to ensure 
prevention too”.
(Pablo Benavente, male, Regional government director, July 2013, interview) 
I also interviewed an ONEMI’s delegate working at the Provincial Government of 
Palena, Rosa Miranda, who confirms that provincial government is limited to 
receiving instructions  from ONEMI’s  regional and national authorities in terms  of 
DRM and DRR. Again, as  in the regional governments, I think there is a clear 
hierarchical, vertical, top-down relationship  among the various territorial 
governments  in terms of DRM and DRR. To some extent, this  relationship is 
apparently defined by the law, especially the DFL No. 19175, however, it is also 
backed up by the historical processes  that defined such relations: the retraction of 
decentralising forces  in the past, and the vertical decentralisation (Montecinos, 
2005)  in recent decades. But beyond the origins  of such centralisation, the 
subsequent question is, ‘what’ are the effects  on the model of DRM and DRR in 
Chile? This is something I will try to address from section 4.4 onwards.
Municipalities
In Chile, municipalities are ‘autonomous  public bodies’ responsible for meeting the 
needs of the local community and ensuring their participation in the economic 
progress, social and cultural development of the community (Ministerio del Interior y 
Seguridad Pública, 2005). Unlike intendentes and provincial governors, 
municipalities are ruled by a Mayor and a Municipal Council elected directly for a 
period of four years. Each municipality is  advised by an Economic and Social 
Community Council (CESCO), composed of representatives from principal 
economic activities in the community, NGOs and neighbouring committees. 
Municipalities are responsible for basic education and health services  in the 
community. Other functions, including civil protection, are defined by the Organic 
Constitutional Law on Municipalities. In this  law, there is  only one brief mention of 
DRM and DRR: 
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“Paragraph No.2: Functions and Attributions: [...]  i)  The prevention of risks and 
delivery of relief in case of emergency or disasters”.
(Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Pública, 2006, p.3)
Unfortunately, there is  no further explanation about how this  should happen and 
with what resources, nor a reference to other sets of rules or laws that could give 
more details about the role of municipalities  in managing disasters and reducing 
risks. I consider this  to be another indication of the reduced and limited role 
allocated to minor territorial levels in regard to disaster prevention and risk 
reduction.
Within the Chilean legal system, the ‘urban’ category can be applied at the 
municipal or community level when a settlement of 5,000 or more inhabitants is 
defined (Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Pública, 2006). In that case, a settlement 
would then be bestowed along with the title ‘city’. The urban category has  significant 
and far-reaching implications for civil protection in terms of resources  allocated 
based on the Cost-Benefit Analysis  (CBA) carried out by the ONEMI and the 
territorial governments. According to an ONEMI’s official interviewed in March 
2013, medium and large urban areas are of high interest for the ONEMI, as  they 
combine critical infrastructure and density of people and assets:
“The concentration of assets such as urban infrastructure and population, 
parks, streets is going to influence the result of cost-benefit analysis  made for DRR 
measures [...]  mitigatory measures such as flood protection, or the river courses 
cleaning and maintenance are often subject to this cost-benefit analysis”.
(Rafael Montenegro, male, National government official, March 2013, interview)
By means  of a CBA, it is possible to estimate the best alternatives to optimise the 
use of resources in reducing risks  and disasters  at the local level, however, the 
allocation of resources  to specific DRR strategies  or projects  is not in the hands  of 
municipalities but those of regional governments and the Ministry of Interior, which 
in turn, depend on the President of the Republic (Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad 
Pública, 2002, 2006). Again, we find that although municipalities  could own certain 
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functions  and attributions  in respect to DRM and DRR, in practice, decision-making is 
subordinate to the executive central power.
Now, we move to an often ignored aspect within the historic development of the 
state territorial organisation of Chile, and of relevance for the study of post-disaster 
Chaitén: the uneven development among regions  and territories  in Chile. This 
deserves attention because it may help to explain why there are important 
disparities  among territories  in terms  of risks  and vulnerabilities, as was documented 
by UNESCO et al. (2012) and other literature (Atienza and Aroca, 2012; Cooper and 
Henriquez, 2010; Olavarria-Gambi, 2003; Schurman, 1996).
4.3 Economic model, centralisation and uneven development
Soto and Torche (2004) pointed out that the Chilean per capita gross domestic 
product (GDP)  grew by approximately five per cent annually between 1975 and 
2000, but regions did not benefit equally from this  growth: “poverty declined 
significantly in all regions but regional income inequality remained stagnant” (Soto 
and Torche, 2004, p.401). 
Some researchers assert that this  income inequality and uneven development of the 
country have been the result of neoliberal reforms  (Ferrada Borquez, 2000; 
Solimano, 2012; Soto and Torche, 2004). After the coup d’état on September 11, 
1973 as led by the General Commander Augusto Pinochet against the elected 
government of Salvador Allende, substantial neoliberal reforms were implemented 
(Solimano, 2012) which were consolidated within the Constitution of 1980 (Ferrada 
Borquez, 2000). Such reforms were characterised by an aggressive strategy of 
privatisation and market liberalisation, which included the privatisation of basic 
social services such as  health, education and pensions, trade opening, and 
deregulation (Klein, 2008; Solimano 2012). Although these neoliberal reforms had 
the intention of reinvigorating the Chilean economy, they produced significant 
regional disparities and social inequality (Quitral Rojas, 2009). According to 
Solimano (2012), after 20 years  of left-wing governments  —from 1990 to 2010— the 
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implemented neoliberal reforms  in the past have not been counterbalance or 
neutralised, on the contrary, in some cases, they have been deepened: more trade 
opening, and progressive withdrawal of the state role on pensions  (Solimano, 2012) 
and on emergency response and reconstruction (Pulgar Pinaud, 2014b; Sandoval 
and González-Muzzio, 2015).
Several studies and researchers  (Quitral Rojas, 2009; Soto and Torche, 2004) assert 
that neoliberal reforms have also promoted social, economic and political 
centralisation. This  centralisation —reflected in the city of Santiago, where the wealth 
and one third of the national population is  concentrated— has produced uneven 
development in the rest of Chile. Just in terms  of GDP, the Santiago Metropolitan 
Region (SMR) contributed almost half of the national GDP (see Table 4.5). In terms  of 
population, accessibility to public services and employment, the tendency is 
strikingly similar. Job opportunities, educational quality, access to institutions and a 
wide range of services are concentrated in Santiago as in no other city or region in 
Chile (BNE, 2014; CNA-Chile, 2016).
Table 4.5. Regional GDP participation in percentages of national GDP
Region 1980–82 1990–92 2002–04 2003–06 2007–09
I Tarapacá 3.2 3.0 3.5 3.9 4.0
II Antofagasta 6 6 8 7.5 6.9
III Atacama 2 2 2 1.9 2.0
IV Coquimbo 2 2 2 2.5 2.5
V Valparaíso 11 10 9 8.9 8.7
RM Santiago 47 49 48 46.8 48.2
VI O’Higgins 5 5 5 4.1 4.0
VII Maule 3 4 4 3.9 3.8
VIII Biobío 12 11 10 10.4 10.1
IX La Araucanía 3 3 3 2.6 2.7
X Los Lagos 4 5 5 5.0 4.9
XI Aysén 1 1 1 0.7 0.7
XII Magallanes 2 2 1 1.7 1.4
Total National GDP % 100 100 100 100 100
GDP per capita 5,092 6,487 10,409 11,386 12,222
Compiled by the author (2017), based on Banco Central (1984, 1993, 2007, 2011) and World Bank 
(2016)
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According to Riffo (2007), although most of the national concentration in economic, 
political and demographic terms occurred in the SMR, some regions reached 
economic growth mainly due to the exploitation of raw materials  such as  copper 
(Northern Chile), wood (South-Central Chile), and fishing (Southern Chile). As Table 
4.5 shows, however, this  economic growth has not necessarily translated into a 
reduction in centralisation. In general, the contribution of regions  to the national 
GDP shows  very little variation between 1980 and 2009. Although there are other 
figures that can be used to demonstrate this  view, the point here is  to discuss 
whether the territorial/scalar structure of the state has predisposed the uneven 
development of territories  and, if that is the case, what the repercussions  are of this 
uneven development for the production of vulnerability and risks.
It is equally important to mention here the role of the SUBDERE, being the major 
state effort to counteract centralisation and to balance the development of regions. 
SUBDERE is responsible for coordinating, promoting and evaluating 
decentralisation and regional development. Established in 1984, SUBDERE aims  to 
contribute to municipal and regional development, promoting capacity building 
and giving coherence to the country’s  decentralisation processes. SUBDERE controls 
one of the primary funding sources  for regional and local governments, the National 
Fund for Regional Development, or FNDR (OECD, 2013). Another similar instrument 
managed by SUBDERE is  the Municipal Common Fund, or FCM, a distributive tool 
that aims to equalise income disparities between municipalities throughout the 
country. Despite the intentions of SUBDERE and these mechanisms, Boisier (2000) 
asserts that SUBDERE in general, and the FNDR in particular, have caused more 
centralisation and reinforced inequality. The FNDR used to be a “reinvestment 
budget where five per cent of the regional GDP must be used within each region”; 
however, this  idea was abandoned by the central government because it may 
produce “budgetary rigidity” at the national level (Boisier, 2000, pp.93-94). In other 
words, it would have reduced the capacity and power of the national government to 
control and decide such budgets (Boisier, 2000). Today, most of the orders and 
decisions related to FNDR and FCM are taken from and directed by Santiago, by 
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ministries and inter-ministerial committees which secure the execution of their 
sectorial projects, generally overriding regional priorities and interests  (Pressacco, 
2009). In March 2013, I interviewed an official from the regional government of Los 
Lagos, who referred to this issue:
“FNDR  projects are great instruments for development; the problem is that 
those projects must always be aligned with national priorities, and often regional 
needs are far from those [...] moreover, the decision-making occurs in Santiago, with 
national authorities or a committee of experts that reports to  the same national 
authorities”.
(Javier Martinez, male, Regional government official, March 2013, interview)
 This reflects that regional developmental tools such as  the FNDR are indeed 
aligning regions  to the national development strategy, being national authorities 
who decide both national and regional plans. From this perspective, it seems that 
top-down structure could have some effects  on regional and local civil protection 
plans, as the priorities and needs  of each region and city differ. I explore some 
unforeseen effects  of this  top-down approach in the case of post-disaster Chaitén in 
the next chapter.
Montecinos (2005) and Pressacco (2009) agree that decentralisation processes  are 
rather scarce and some landmarks, such as  the creation of regional councils in 2014, 
and some progress  on fiscal matters  need mentioning. But again, the expected 
decentralisation is  only administrative rather than at the political and economic 
levels. One variable, observed by Atienza and Aroca (2012), places emphasis on the 
fact that the “excessive centralisation” of the SMR has negatively affected the spatial 
inequality in terms of an “uneven distribution of production, employment and 
population throughout the country” (Atienza and Aroca, 2012, p.263). Moreover, 
Atienza and Aroca (2012) and Soto and Torche (2004) agree in asserting that public 
policies  have tended to systematically ignore spatial inequality, which is  an 
illustrative example of the failure of SUBDERE’s objectives in reducing the negative 
impacts of centralisation (Mac-Clure and Calvo, 2013). 
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Likewise, inequality has been systematically associated with neoliberalism, because 
deregulation policies, tax liberalisation and the privatisation of public services  have, 
on the one hand, tended to concentrate economic and political power in few hands 
and elites (Harvey, 2005) and, on the other hand, have exacerbated marginalisation 
and the impoverishment of social groups (Solimano, 2012). Economically powerful 
communities  and regions  in Chile, such as  Santiago, externalise risks onto poorer 
and less powerful populations by establishing an uneven development in a variety 
of ways. For instance, housing and land market liberalisation have limited access  to 
safer areas to the rich, while less powerful groups are restricted to areas  with limited 
access to opportunities  —i.e. jobs, health and education— or access only to disaster-
prone ones (Lees et al., 2015). Furthermore, neoliberal institutional arrangements 
have allowed powerful economic elites  to establish new enrichment sources, such as 
those from reconstruction projects  (Gonzalez-Muzzio and Sandoval, 2014). 
Previously, different researchers  (Collier, 2013; Gunewardena and Schuller, 2008) 
have attempted to connect neoliberalism and disasters. In Chile, some researchers 
(González-Muzzio and Sandoval, 2014; Pulgar Pinaud, 2014a, 2014b) have 
questioned reconstruction processes  that are highly influenced by the growing 
participation of the private sector.
Finally, as presented throughout last two sections, the logic of the state territorial 
organisation of Chile can be properly understood under the rationale of economic 
development and geopolitical interest. The concentration of political power and 
economy, neoliberal policies, and patterns of uneven development among regions 
are apparently intertwined in the case of Chile (Atienza and Aroca, 2012; Boisier, 
2000, 2001; Pressacco, 2009; Riffo, 2007; Soto and Torche, 2004). Therefore, an 
exploration of the potential implications  of such processes —i.e. models  of territorial 
organisation of the state, processes  of centralisation and decentralisation, and 
neoliberal reforms— for the model of DRM and DRR, and therefore for the 
production of vulnerability and risks, becomes  very important. In other words, the 
root causes of disasters  and risks may be found in those macro processes  which 
initiate the path to the materialisation of disaster vulnerability and unsafe conditions.
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Figure 4.6. Potential links between root causes and unsafe conditions in Chaitén
Source: elaborated by the author (2017)
In Figure 4.6, I hypothesise about potential connections  within the progression of 
vulnerability that are not yet evident. These seek to formulate trajectories to be 
explored and elements  that should be further investigated in the case of Chaitén —
for instance, how the territorial structure of the state and its  scalar configuration (its 
centrality) may have affected the scalar organisation of DRM and DRR and why, and 
ultimately, how policy responses  to disasters and the model of disaster risk 
reduction may have facilitated the materialisation of unsafe conditions  in Chaitén. 
The next figure tries  to explain the trajectories I have chosen to take the reader to 
this point. 
Figure 4.7 shows, as  in the introduction, that the case study is  investigated from two 
entry points. The first occurs  within this  chapter, in which I look at the major historical 
processes related to the context of Chile, and from a multi-scalar perspective. The 
second entry point will take place in Chapter Five. Alongside with post-disaster 
Chaitén itself, the idea of this  second entry point is  to investigate the same elements 
discussed in this  chapter but from the bottom up, from the local and particular 
unsafe conditions in Chaitén, connecting the relationships with root causes  and 
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dynamic pressures  on a major scale. Figure 4.7 also shows  the direction where we 
now head. The next section analyses  the Chilean model of governing disasters  and 
risks, considering the mainstream narrative of the history of Chilean disasters and 
the country’s centralised and top-down state territorial organisation.
Figure 4.7. Rationale for the case study’s chapter, entry point and progress
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4.4 The model of managing disasters and reducing risks in Chile
Having reflected on the state territorial organisation of Chile and its  scalar 
configurations, here I examine how the model of DRM and DRR, and other 
institutional forms, is  defined, organised and distributed within such multi-scalar 
territorial organisation. This part of the text aims to discuss  the influence that the 
territorial structure of the state has  on the DRM and DRR models in Chile. This is the 
case as other institutional forms  such as in education —e.g. ministries, regional 
departments, schools and so forth— are often geographically distributed and 
hierarchically organised in accordance with a specific form of state territorial 
organisation (Clark, 2014) —e.g. centralist and federalist. In other words, government 
institutions tend to mirror or reproduce the form of the territorial structure of the 
state.
DRM and DRR institutional forms  such as  the ONEMI are crucial for reducing risks 
and developing DRR within a wide range of other institutions —including those from 
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civil society, the private sector and the population— in order to monitor natural and 
man-made hazards, to reduce exposure and vulnerability, to develop  preparedness 
and to promote resilience (UNISDR, 2013). Thus, the connection between territorial 
organisation, particularly centralisation, and the institutional model of managing 
risks and disasters deserves to be investigated, as  this  connection may have 
implications  for the production and progression of vulnerability, risks  and disaster 
causation.
I start this  examination with what is perhaps  the more relevant institutional form of 
DRM and DRR in Chile, the National Emergency Office (ONEMI) of the Ministry of 
Interior and Public Security. Thereafter, other relevant forms  such as legal 
frameworks and planning instruments will be examined.
4.4.1 The National Plan of Civil Protection and the ONEMI
In Chile, as in other countries, the building, consolidation and updating of regulatory 
and institutional frameworks  on DRM and DRR came about as fallout from large 
disastrous  events. For example, the 1928  Talca earthquake advanced the creation of 
the first Law on Urban Planning and Construction; the 1939 Chillán earthquake 
provided the basis  for earthquake-resistant construction standards called the 
Chilean Standard for Seismic Design of Buildings  Nº429 (NCh429)16 and NCh430; 
the 1960 Valdivia earthquake and tsunami gave rise to the National Emergency 
Office (ONEMI); and the 1985 Central Chile earthquake further strengthened the 
existing standard of earthquake-resistant buildings, as enforced in the NCh433 
code. Recently, the effects of the 2010 Maule earthquake and tsunami initiated the 
reformulation of the ONEMI into a new National System of Civil Protection and 
Emergency Plan, and the creation of a new National Agency of Civil Protection17 
(ONEMI, 2011).
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16 In Spanish, Diseño Sísmico de Edificios: Norma Chilena Oficial Nº429.
17 This plan and the creation of the agency were presented as a bill by the President of the Republic to 
the Congress by late 2011. Even though its status has been declared as an ‘urgent law’ (Senado de la 
República de Chile, 2014), its discussion and approval remain delayed to date (2016–17).
In 2002, Supreme Decree (DS) Nº156 (Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Pública, 
2002)  established the current National Plan of Civil Protection, or Plan Nacional  de 
Protección Civil  (PNPC), which represented the first institutional effort that explicitly 
sought to address  issues of risk reduction holistically, as it considered for first time 
the pre-existing conditions of a disaster such as preparedness and mitigation.
Although initially created only for emergency management in 1974 by DS Nº369 
(Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Pública, 1974), the ONEMI today is the primary 
technical agency of the state responsible for executing the PNPC and coordinating 
the National System of Civil Protection, or Sistema Nacional  de Protección Civil 
(SNPC) (Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Pública, 2002). ONEMI’s  mission is to 
plan, promote, coordinate and implement preventive actions, responses  and 
rehabilitation in the face of collective risk situations, emergencies and disasters 
caused by natural or human action (ONEMI, 2017). ONEMI’s authorities  report to, 
and depend directly on, the Ministry of Interior and Public Security. The first plan was 
called the National Emergency Plan and it was issued in 1977, approved by DS 
Nº155. The current PNPC was approved by DS Nº156 in March 2002, and it dictates 
the norms of the organisational and administrative structure of the SNPC (Ministerio 
del Interior y Seguridad Pública, 2002), including the ONEMI. This plan is intended 
to be multi-sectorial and is dedicated to the development of permanent actions for 
the prevention and treatment of emergencies  and disasters from a cyclical view of 
disaster management (Figure 4.8).
Figure 4.8  shows  that the PNPC sets  the ground rules for how the management of 
the SNPC is  coordinated by the ONEMI. This  diagram also depicts  the importance 
and centrality of the ONEMI within the PNPC and the SNPC, which role has  major 
relevance for this  thesis as  it considers  the ONEMI as  the main public and national 
effort for the reduction of disaster risks and response.
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Figure 4.8. Relations between the PNPC, SNPC and ONEMI, and their functions
Source: elaborated by the author (2017)
As  established by the PNPC (Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Pública, 2002), the 
system of civil protection needs to be applied both nationally and at the regional, 
provincial and municipal levels. It is  managed and coordinated respectively by 
regional and provincial governments  and municipalities  through the ONEMI. Each of 
these governance institutions is  supposed to maintain and adapt its  organisational 
and operational structures to meet the roles  and functions assigned according to 
the PNPC whilst maintaining its aims  and jurisdictional autonomy (Ministerio del 
Interior y Seguridad Pública, 2002).
According to the PNPC guidelines, each territorial administrative level must have a 
Civil Protection Committee, or CPC, comprising national, regional, provincial and 
communal committees. Each CPC must internally elaborate a plan to implement 
prevention, mitigation and preparedness actions in relation to DRM and DRR, 
seeking to reflect the particular realities  of each jurisdictional area. CPCs comprise 
representatives  from the public and private sectors, and their composition varies 
according to the territorial level they represent. In some localities, such as  Chaitén, 
CPCs hardly meet to design or implement DRM and DRR strategies for several 
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among public agents that restricts their availability to participate in meetings  and to 
work on designing and implementing plans.18
Equally important is the financial distribution of the implementation costs  of each 
plan. The PNPC establishes that the cost of executing will be covered by each of the 
ministries, regional and provincial administrations, and municipalities using their 
own resources  (Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Pública, 2002). This  embodies the 
contradiction that, on the one hand, decision-making and authority command are 
centralised at the national level, but, on the other, the funding of projects  or 
strategies  must often come from local sources. This way of organising civil 
protection committees and DRR can create conflicts between national and local 
public authorities as  their demands and interests are not always attended to.19 
Furthermore, this  hierarchical and interventionist approach can have negative results 
for the development of crucial aspects  of DRM such as preparedness and 
prevention (Scolobig et al., 2015), as  they require the real involvement of people 
and local actors —not just consultative.
In addition, despite the declaration of the PNPC regarding preparedness  and 
mitigation, the ONEMI has  tended to focus mainly on emergency management and 
response, perhaps  as  a continuation of its  legacy from its  initial structure in 1974. 
The first indication of this  is the level of attention paid, and the detail of descriptions 
given within DS Nº156, to emergency issues  rather than to prevention and 
preparedness. A quick text analysis  of DS Nº156 will show that the word ‘emergency’ 
is  used twice as often as the phrases  ‘risk reduction’, ‘prevention’ and ‘preparedness’ 
combined (Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Pública, 2002). Other indications of 
this  orientation towards emergencies and response will be explored through the 
analysis of other institutional forms, such as legal frameworks.
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18 During the fieldwork, I observed that Chaitén lacked an updated municipal emergency plan (MEP). 
The current MEP was elaborated in 2010. MEPs should be elaborated by the communal CPC yearly.
19 See again what Javier Martinez, from the Regional government, says on page 152.
During disasters  and emergencies, the ONEMI constitutes temporary Emergency 
Operation Centres, or Centros de Operaciones de Emergencia  (COEs), depending 
on which territorial level a given event has affected. COEs are organised at each 
level of the political-administrative order and they are responsible for coordinating 
decisions and actions within the response, relief and rehabilitation. These centres 
are headed by representatives of territorial governments  that are part of CPCs: the 
President of the Republic and Minister of Interior, the Intendente, the Governor and 
the Mayor respectively. Operationally speaking, CPCs  are constituted before a 
disaster occurs, while COEs operate during emergencies and often during post-
disaster phases. In addition to government authorities, CPCs and COEs must 
integrate actors  from the private sector and civil society depending on their 
expertise and relevance for the DRM and DRR plans. These actors, however, only act 
as  technical advisors within the committees  and centres: thus the decision-making 
hierarchy remains intact (see Figure 4.9). 
Figure 4.9. Structure of the National System of Civil Protection (SNPC) and ONEMI’s role
Source: elaborated by the author (2017), based on ONEMI (2002)
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Figure 4.9 reflects  the top-down hierarchical organisation of the decision-making 
process within the ONEMI and the system of civil protection. In a document 
requested by the Council for Transparency in 2013,20  I found that, officially, the 
command hierarchy within the SNPC and ONEMI is  at first political in nature, then 
administrative, and lastly technical, being the highest level of national authority 
concentrating the power to decide and prioritise DRM and DRR actions.
“The concept of command hierarchy operates according to  the SNPC [...] 
First, a) Command of Authority: rooted in territorial authorities (President of the 
Republic and Minister of the Ministry of Interior, Intendente, Governor, and Mayor). 
b) Command of Coordination: rooted in Directors of Civil Protection and 
Emergency. c)  Technical Command: Linked to  an organisation or sector specialised 
in specific emergency events”.
(Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Pública, 2013b)
From this  document, it seems that the distribution and hierarchical organisation of 
the ONEMI tend to replicate or mirror the verticality of the state territorial 
organisation of Chile. This document, and its fellow constituting the PNPC 
(Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Pública, 2002), are used here to underline the 
systemic top-down orientation of the civil protection system and the ONEMI. The 
question is, nevertheless, about the repercussions  of this  top-down approach for the 
progression of vulnerability. The idea then is  to explore and look at the 
consequences  of this vertical structure. To do so, it is  necessary to turn to the case of 
Chaitén. However, there are other DRM and DRR institutional forms, such as  legal 
frameworks and territorial planning instruments  (IPTs), that can play a role. These are 
examined in order.
4.4.2 Legal frameworks for DRM and DRR
Other relevant elements  of the model of DRM and DRR are the planning instruments 
and legal frameworks —e.g. laws, decrees. These aim to support and guide 
authorities and practitioners during the process of decision-making in emergencies 
and post-disaster phases, but also to control disaster risk reduction. For instance, 
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20 When there are government documents that are not available in the public domain, a citizen can 
request such documents from the Council for Transparency (Portal de Transparencia, 2013).
legal frameworks such as building codes become indispensable in creating better 
hazard management and risk reduction (UNISDR, 2013, 2015a). But what they can 
tell us about the scalar configuration of the model of DRM? To interrogate the wide 
range of documents, I used the document analysis technique described in Chapter 
Two (see pages 68-70). The document sampling was based on representativeness 
among the existing documents, and meaning. For the latter, I used the categories  of 
‘national security’, ‘civil protection’, ‘emergencies’ and ‘disasters’ in the online 
database of the National Congress  Library (BCN, 2017). Finally, I selected 30 legal 
documents  based on their relevance to describe the model of managing disasters 
and reducing risks  in different territorial tiers, and I organised them in three 
categories: 
• Structural legal frameworks: laws or systems of laws (e.g. organic laws) and 
documents that transversally help to describe the legal structure of the model 
of DRM and DRR.
• Regulations/post-disaster laws: legal documents on policy responses to 
disasters. Specific regulations related to emergency situations and states of 
catastrophe.
• Sets of rules/prevention laws: legal documents and sets of rules such as codes 
and standards related to the prevention and reduction of hazards and risks.
In the following tables, I analyse each document by extracting their main aspects in 
the form of observations. I classified them in terms  of their vertical/hierarchical 
position vis-à-vis the territorial structure of the state, and its  orientation within the 
DRM cycle. Table 4.6 analyses different laws  and the Constitution of Chile, which 
define and structure the National System of Civil Protection.
162
Table 4.6. Legal structure of the National System of Civil Protection in Chile
Law Observations Hierarchy Orientation
The Constitution of 
the Republic of 
Chile (Government 
of Chile, 1980).
Article Nº1 establishes that is the duty of the 
state to safeguard the national security and 
protect the population.
Articles Nº39 and Nº40 regulate the State of 
Constitutional Exception* (in German, 
Ausnahmezustand) in the form of the ‘State of 
Catastrophe’ which can be declared by the 
President of the Republic in agreement with the 
National Security Council but only in the case of 
a ‘public calamity’.
National Emergency 
response, 
prevention
DS Nº7912 on the 
Constitutional Law 
of Ministries 
(Ministerio del 
Interior y 
Seguridad Pública, 
1927).
This law assigns to the Ministry of Interior 
everything related to the maintenance of public 
safety, harmony and public order.
National Emergency 
response
Law Nº16282 in 
cases of 
Earthquakes and 
Catastrophes, 
reused from DS 
Nº104 (Ministerio 
de Hacienda, 
1965a).
Article Nº21 establishes that the Ministry of 
Interior is responsible for the planning and 
coordination of all activities related to the 
response during an earthquake or catastrophe. 
In case of catastrophes in a country other than 
Chile, this law also gives authority to the Ministry 
of Interior to gather support and deliver it 
abroad.
National Emergency 
response
DL Nº369 on the 
Constitutional Law 
of ONEMI 
(Ministerio del 
Interior y 
Seguridad Pública, 
1974).
This law creates the ONEMI and its fundamental 
rules. It establishes the objectives of the ONEMI: 
to plan, coordinate and execute actions aimed to 
prevent and alleviate problems stemming from 
earthquakes or catastrophes.
The director of the ONEMI can declare a 
Situation of Emergency (in Spanish, Situación de 
Emergencia), which is different from ‘State of 
Catastrophe’ declared by the Ministry of Interior.
National Emergency 
response, 
prevention
DS Nº509
(Ministerio del 
Interior y 
Seguridad Pública, 
1983)
This law establishes new fundamental rules for 
the ONEMI’s functioning by creating the first 
Regional, Provincial and Communal Committees 
of Emergency as permanent working bodies. 
Likewise, this law creates the Emergency 
Operation Centres (COEs).
National, 
regional, 
provincial, 
communal
Emergency 
response
DS Nº155 on the 
National 
Emergency Plan 
(Ministerio del 
Interior y 
Seguridad Pública, 
1977).
This law approves the creation of the National 
Emergency Plan which establishes the actions 
and tasks to be executed during an emergency. 
This law also encourages intendentes, governors 
and mayors to create their own territorial 
emergency plans. This is the predecessor to 
MEPs (Municipal Emergency Plans).
National, 
regional, 
provincial, 
communal
Emergency 
response, 
preparedness
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Law Observations Hierarchy Orientation
Law Nº19175 
reused from DS 
Nº291 
(MIDEPLAN, 1992).
Constitutional Law for Government and Regional 
Administration. Articles Nº20 and Nº40 grant 
intendentes, governors and mayors the right to 
adopt measures to prevent and deal with 
emergencies and disasters. Likewise, regional 
governments have the right to take measures to 
address emergencies or disasters in accordance 
with the law, and to develop disaster prevention 
and protection programmes without being 
subjected to the powers of the authorised 
national authorities.
Regional, 
provincial, 
communal
Emergency 
response, 
prevention
Law Nº18695 on 
the Constitutional 
Law of 
Municipalities, 
reused from DS 
Nº662 (Ministerio 
del Interior y 
Seguridad Pública, 
2006).
This law allows municipalities to develop and 
execute their own, or in partnership with other 
government institutions, actions for 
preparedness and risk prevention, and to 
provide relief in case of emergency. Article Nº7 
establishes that all these actions must be within 
national and regional frameworks on security 
and emergency plans. 
Communal Preparedness, 
prevention, 
emergency 
response 
Law Nº20444 on 
reconstruction 
(Ministerio de 
Hacienda, 2012a).
This law creates the National Reconstruction 
Fund (FNR) and sets the Incentive Mechanisms of 
Donation in case of Disaster. This establishes tax 
incentive mechanisms for donations to the FNR, 
which can be used in future post-disaster 
contexts.
National Reconstructio
n, recovery
DS Nº38 amends 
DS Nº156 from 
2002 and creates 
Civil Protection 
Committee 
(Ministerio del 
Interior y 
Seguridad Pública, 
2002).
Creates the National, Regional, Provincial and 
Communal Civil Protection Committees (CPCs) 
with the ability to make decisions and take 
actions in the areas affected by the emergency.
Regional, 
provincial, 
communal
Preparedness, 
prevention
Compiled by the author (2017)
* The ‘State of Exception’ is a concept in the legal theory of Giorgio Agamben (2008)
Table 4.7 below displays  specific regulations related to emergency situations  and 
states of catastrophe. This table distinguishes regulations purposed for disaster 
response and relief from those which are oriented towards compensatory measures 
during recovery and reconstruction processes, as well as  those regulations 
regarding budgeting.
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Table 4.7. Other regulations related to DRM and DRR in Chile
Law/set of rules Observations Hierarchy Orientation
DS Nº733 (Ministerio del 
Interior y Seguridad 
Pública, 1982).
This law establishes that the Ministry of 
Agriculture, particularly the National Forest 
Corporation (CONAF), is the responsible 
body for the prevention of and response to 
wildfires.
National Emergency 
response, 
prevention
Decree-law (DL) Nº2222 
on the Navigation Law 
(Ministerio de Defensa, 
1978)
Title Nº9 addresses regulations regarding 
oil spill pollution and other pollutants. The 
General Directorate of Maritime Territory 
and Merchant Marine, Chilean Navy, is 
responsible for the response.
National Emergency 
response
DFL Nº725 on the 
Sanitary Code (MINSAL, 
1968)
Article Nº114 contains regulations and 
instructions for national authorities and 
institutions in case of epidemics or 
emergencies that threaten the health or life 
of the population.
National Emergency 
response
Law Nº16250 on Public 
Security (Ministerio de 
Hacienda, 1965b).
This law establishes that intendentes 
(regional governors) and provincial 
governors can use vehicles and buildings 
owned by the state and semi-state 
institutions during a State of Catastrophe. 
National Emergency 
response
DS Nº294 on the 
Ministry of Public Works 
(MOP, 1985). 
DS Nº294 gives special authority to the 
Ministry of Public Works to appoint direct 
contracts and execute the construction of 
critical infrastructures during emergencies.
National Emergency 
response, 
relief
Related to the delivery of benefits and compensatory measures
D.Nº1 on Housing 
Subsidy, Acquisition and 
Selling, amended from 
DS Nº 174 (MINVU, 
2011). 
Through this law, people affected by a 
catastrophe may apply for housing benefits 
where they could not apply under normal 
circumstances.
National Relief
Law Nº18910 on the 
INDAP (Ministerio de 
Agricultura, 1990).
The National Institute for Agricultural and 
Livestock Development (INDAP) is allowed 
to allocate resources and compensation 
measures to affected producers in case of 
catastrophe, as well as being allowed to 
attend emergencies in rural areas.
National Relief, 
emergency 
response
Law Nº18056 on 
Pensions (Min. del 
Interior y Seguridad 
Pública, 1994).
This law establishes that people affected by 
catastrophes may apply for special social 
pensions.
National Relief
DS Nº150 on 
Employment (Ministerio 
del Trabajo y Previsión 
Social, 1982).
This law establishes that people affected by 
catastrophes are able to receive 
unemployment benefits.
National Relief
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Related to budgeting and allocation of resources during emergencies
The Constitution of the 
Republic of Chile 
(Government of Chile, 
1980).
The President of the Republic has the right 
to release ‘non-authorised payments’ by the 
law (during normal times) in case of 
emergencies as established by the 
constitution.
National Emergency 
response, 
relief
Programme of Transfers 
to Public Sector 
(Ministerio de 
Hacienda, 1965a).
In cases of catastrophe, the General 
Secretary and Administration is allowed to 
directly transfer resources from its own 
budget to other public entities and 
organisations.
National Emergency 
response, 
relief
ONEMI by the Law of 
Government Budget 
(Ministerio de Interior y 
Seguridad Pública, 
2002).
Via the Transfer to Private Sector item, 
ONEMI is allowed to transfer public 
resources to the private sector in cases of 
emergency.
National Emergency 
response, 
relief
Regional and provincial 
governments, by Law 
Nº19175 (Min. del 
Interior y Seguridad 
Pública, 1992).
According to the Goods and Consume 
Services item, regional authorities are 
allowed to (regionally) distribute support to 
combat emergency situations declared 
previously by the President of the Republic. 
Regional Emergency 
response
Local budget by the Law 
of Government Budget 
to Public Sector transfers 
(Ministerio de 
Hacienda, 2014).
Municipalities could channel transfers from 
the budget for the Programme for Urban 
Development and Communal Equipment 
to the private sector in emergency 
situations. These transfers must be 
approved by the Secretary of Regional 
Development and Administration and 
subsequently applied by the Intendente. 
Each year, the municipal budget should 
declare a certain amount of resources to be 
used for DRR, prevention, relief and 
response to emergencies.
Regional, 
communal
Emergency 
response, 
prevention, 
relief
Compiled by the author (2017) 
Finally, Table 4.8  below displays legal frameworks  related to the prevention and 
reduction of impact of threats and hazards. These are differentiated from the 
previous legal frameworks because they consider specific actions  and measures 
aimed to prevent disasters.
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Table 4.8. Legal frameworks on ‘prevention’ related to DRM and DRR in Chile
Law/set of rules Observations Hierarchy Orientation
Law and General 
Ordinance of 
Urbanism and 
Construction, DS 
Nº458 and Nº48 
(MINVU, 1976).
This law establishes the territorial planning 
instruments (IPTs) which require risk assessments. IPTs 
can, depending on the natural hazards, propose (so it 
is not a binding element) unbuildable or restricted 
areas.
National, 
regional, 
communal
Prevention,
mitigation
Chilean Standard for 
Seismic Design of 
Buildings NCh433 
from 1996 (INN, 
1996).
NCh433 establishes minimum requirements for the 
seismic design of buildings and seismic requirements  
to be met by equipment and other secondary 
elements of buildings. It includes recommendations 
for the evaluation of seismic damage and repair. It 
also delimits the national territory by establishing 
differentiated design standards among regions.
National Prevention
DFL Nº1123 on the 
Water Code (MOP, 
1981).
Regulates the use of water channels and user 
organisations of water resources, and establishes the 
standards for construction of waterworks. It entitles 
the Ministry of Public Works to monitor waterworks in 
natural water channels in order to prevent damage of 
defence mechanisms, flooding or increased risk of 
future flooding. It requires the development of 
mitigation works/ mechanisms. It also regulates the 
identification of droughts and the mitigation of their 
impact.
National Prevention,
mitigation
Law Nº19525 by the 
Ministry of Public 
Works (MOP, 1997).
Regulates planning, policy development and the 
construction of rainwater evacuation systems in order 
to allow easy drainage and disposal, preventing the 
damage that floods may cause to people, housing 
and urban infrastructure.
Regional, 
provincial
Prevention,
mitigation
Law Nº19300 on 
Basis for Environment 
(Ministerio Secretaría 
General de la 
Presidencia, 1994).
This law dictates the requirement for certain 
infrastructure and projects derived from territorial 
planning instruments (IPTs) to be subject to a System 
of Environmental Impact Assessment (SEIA). Among 
other aspects, this law requests an Environmental 
Impact Assessment for large projects and it demands 
mitigation measures where danger exists.
National Prevention,
mitigation
Law Nº20417 on the 
Basis of General 
Environmental 
Framework (Min. 
Secretaría General de 
la Presidencia, 2010).
This law ensures new environmental management 
tools for the administration of waste and 
contaminated soil, as well as for the tackling of 
climate change and the promotion and restoration of 
water resources and conservation of ecosystems, 
among other matters.
National Prevention
Compiled by the author (2017)
In order to reflect on legal frameworks from a more advantageous angle, I have 
arranged them in three subcategories  in a Cartesian layout (see Figure 4.10): i) 
Regulations or laws oriented to post-disaster scenarios; ii) Sets of rules  or 
frameworks oriented to preventive actions; and iii)  Structural or organic laws, which 
are those that form sub-national governments and other bodies of rules, such as the 
national constitution.
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Figure 4.10. Map of the legal structure of the DRM and DRR model in Chile
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The elements  displayed in Figure 4.10 comprise the legal structure of DRM and DRR 
in Chile, and are arranged in vertical and horizontal axes. On the one hand, the 
vertical axis  represents the territorial tier or scale on which a given element is 
positioned in terms  of decision-making. For instance, it responds  to questions  such 
as  which authority or institution has priority on decision-making, at what level, or 
who decides? This  axis aims  to reflect the hierarchical and territorial ordering of the 
legal structure of the national model of disaster and risk reduction. On the other 
hand, the horizontal axis distinguishes  the orientation of a given element according 
to its position within the disaster risk management cycle: response, relief, recovery, 
reconstruction, mitigation, prevention and preparedness.
This exercise seeks  to give us  a synoptic perspective on the prevailing arrangement 
or tendency among the frameworks, and therefore on disaster management in 
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general. Figure 4.10 captures  a centralised, top-down and reactive legal system that 
is  centred in the predominant role of the national scale as the locus of administration 
of DRM and DRR. The centralisation of the model of governing disasters and risks 
surfaces when national powerful institutions  concentrate —as they do in Santiago de 
Chile— and do not redistribute power and decision-making downwards  and 
transversally among subnational levels. Centralisation of legal frameworks  and 
decision-making could negatively impact DRM, disaster risks  and vulnerabilities in 
different ways: low capacity at local level may create dependency; ‘un-earmarked’ 
funds —which could be used in other ways for DRR— can be diverted to other areas 
that have a higher political profile; there is  low participatory DRR; and policy 
responses to disasters can result in inadequate actions and unforeseen effects, as 
they do not require paying attention to local realities and needs  (Scott and 
Tarazona, 2011).
Another dimension within the model of DRM and DRR in Chile is the various 
instruments for territorial planning, and implications  for the progression of 
vulnerability and risks.
4.4.3 Territorial planning instruments for DRM and DRR
Other important disaster management institutional forms are the Territorial Planning 
Instruments, or Instrumentos de Planificación Territorial  (IPTs). According to the 
Ministry of Housing and Urbanisation, or MINVU (2015), the national legislation does 
not have an exact definition for IPTs: they are used interchangeably with ‘plan of 
urban development’, ‘plan of territorial ordering’, ‘regional plan of territorial 
planning’, among others  (see the national legislation in MINVU, 1992a). An initial 
definition of IPTs  offered by some official documents (MINVU, 1992a, 2015; UNDP 
and MINVU, 2014) would be that IPTs are documents  that aim to advise the 
prioritisation of actions for the preparation of regional, provincial and municipal 
territorial plans. Likewise, IPTs aim to coordinate territorial planning with other 
authorities at different scales  and engage with the community using participatory 
planning techniques.
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One of the aspects  of IPTs of importance for DRM and DRR is  the identification of 
disaster-prone areas. IPTs  have implicitly suggested since 1976 that local 
governments  identify risk areas in their master plans (MINVU, 1976), but it was not 
until 1992 that DS Nº42 (MINVU, 1992b) began to impose risk assessments, making 
them a requirement. Such assessments  are often assigned to private engineering 
contractors or consulting companies. In order to define and delimit the process  of 
identifying risk areas, DS Nº42 (MINVU, 1992b) guides companies and institutions 
on what assessments should look at according to the following principles:
• Flood or potential flood areas due to the proximity of lakes, rivers, streams, 
creeks, un-channelled streams, ground water or wetlands.
• Avalanche-prone areas, boulders, landslides or accentuated erosion.
• Hazardous areas to be affected by volcanic activity, lava flows or faults.
• Hazardous areas generated by human activity or intervention.
Although disaster risk emerges  as  the result of combining hazards and 
vulnerability,21  the aforementioned principles  reveal that, from a policy framework 
perspective, risk is merely understood as hazards and, in some cases, exposure to 
hazards. In other words, so-called risk assessments  do not make a comprehensive 
evaluation of risks  but only of hazards, bringing to light the still dominant techno-
centric approach that prevails. The problem with this is that governments are not 
using the full potential of risk assessments. Comprehensive risk assessments should 
look at vulnerabilities  and their root causes with the same interest with which identify 
hazards: this may contribute to the production of plans and development paths for 
safer people and safer cities (UNISDR, 2015a, 2015b).
Table 4.9 shows how Chilean legislation has historically focused on the 
encouragement of risk assessments  on master plans and land-use planning 
(MINVU, 1992a), confining the multi-scale complexity of hazards and vulnerability to 
the urban scale. I think that neglecting the analysis of risks on multiple scales 
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21 Hazard × vulnerability = risk → disaster 
simultaneously may limit the opportunity to reduce disaster risks  substantially, as the 
root causes and dynamic pressures  that produce vulnerabilities, and sometimes 
hazards too, are systemic and multi-scale (Wisner et al., 2004).
Table 4.9. Territorial Planning Instruments (IPTs) that encourage risk assessments
IPTs Regional area Urban area Rural area
Regional Plan of Urban Development - - -
Regional Plan of Territorial Planning (PROT) since 2011 ✓ ✓ ✓
Inter-Municipal or Metropolitan Regulatory Plan - ✓ -
Municipal Regulatory Plan - ✓ -
Urban Boundary Plan - - -
Sectional Plan - - -
Compiled by the author (2017)
In this sense, the Regional Plans  of Territorial Planning, or Planes Regionales de 
Ordenamiento Territorial  (PROTs), are a very interesting case. PROTs are the first IPTs 
that address risk assessments  on the regional scale (SUBDERE, 2011a). Even more 
interesting about PROTs, but perhaps  receiving less  attention, is  that they 
incorporate a guide to assess disaster vulnerability. When a regional government 
decides  to initiate its own particular PROT, the SUBDERE —the promoter of regional 
development— delivers  a document named Guidelines on Natural  Risk Assessments 
for Regional  Planning (SUBDERE, 2011b). This aims to orient regional governments 
in the evaluation of risks, including how to assess  disaster vulnerability. However, this 
guide concentrates  only on defining vulnerability assessments for regional critical 
infrastructures such as hospitals. It defines  the identification of vulnerable factors  in 
three areas (SUBDERE, 2011b, p.91):
• Analysis of the context. This refers to the study of the geographical location, 
including topographic, climatologic and other physical conditions.
• Local conditions. This refers to the study of infrastructure, such as buildings 
materials, foundations and the like.
• Functions. This involves an analysis of the services that the institution and 
infrastructure offer, its organisational structure, logistics and the like.
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In the same vein, in July 2013, I interviewed a SUBDERE official who participated in 
the preparation of this  guide. One aspect of the conversation was  revealing about 
the assessment of disaster vulnerability: 
“Vulnerability is  [in the PROTs] considered only in physical terms such as on 
the quality of building materials, proximity to hazards, and lacking of evacuation 
routes”.
(Pablo Gonzalez, male, National government official, July 2013, interview)
Here, Gonzalez and the analysis of the document reveal a fundamental aspect, a 
kind of trend that is  repeated among the institutional forms  reviewed so far: it is  a 
techno-centric approach with a belief that by mastering only the physical 
dimensions of hazards  and vulnerability, disasters and risks  will be reduced. The 
international and historical experience has  demonstrated the opposite (UNISDR, 
2015a), as  a comprehensive social and environmental analysis of hazards  and 
vulnerability is  needed, including the capacities and resiliency of men and women, 
communities  and institutions, as  well as  the political, economic, governance and 
cultural dimensions  of risks at multiple levels, and all this intertwined with the history 
that comes with it (UNISDR, 2015b). Another interesting aspect emerges from the 
way in which vulnerability is conceived in the guide mentioned above, and of 
relevance for the implementation of PROTs: vulnerability and risks  are limited to 
circumstances and conditions  at local levels —neighbourhoods, city. Effectively, when 
I reviewed the section on vulnerability (SUBDERE, 2011b, pp.14-15), only local 
unsafe conditions had to be identified, but not the drivers of such conditions  —
neither the linkages  of such conditions  with dynamic pressures nor the root causes 
that could have generated them in the first place. It is  like all multi-scale relations  are 
missing.
I also interviewed an executive member of the SUBDERE who shed light on a 
fundamental limitation of PROTs:
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“Probably regional governments will commission PROTs to be prepared by 
private consulting companies in order to  comply with the request. Then, I am sure, 
governments will archive the document [PROT]  because there is no way to enforce 
regional governments to take actions in order to  reduce detected vulnerabilities 
and risks [...] we must still work on that —that is, in policy terms”.
(Jorge Mardones, male, National government director, June 2013, interview)
Although SUBDERE assigned PROTs to regional governments in 2011, only a few 
regional governments have prepared their PROTs, at least towards the end of the 
fieldwork in December 2014. This reveals  another limitation of PROTs, as  they are 
not binding planning tools, just advisory ones. This  also applies to most IPTs, except 
the Municipal Regulatory Plan (MINVU, 1992b). Thus, what is  the purpose of 
requesting more comprehensive risk assessments if the actions to reduce or 
mitigate risks  may or may not be implemented? I think this  is  a disincentive for 
regional governments and municipalities, as  is  the top-down approach by which 
these IPTs are requested.
In January 2014, the MINVU and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
launched a document titled the National Strategy of Urban Development (UNDP and 
MINVU, 2014), with the intention that it should become a bill by 2018. This 
document deserves  to be mentioned here because it aims  to redesign IPTs in order 
to integrate them into a national strategy of urban, regional and national 
development. In doing so, the proposal points out “the importance of introducing 
the concept of DRM, DRR, and resilience into IPTs  in a better way” (UNDP and 
MINVU, 2014, p.43). It recognises  that DRM has  to be integrated into development 
as  a critical part of it. More importantly, this  document recognises that the 
integration of DRM and DRR into IPTs  “must consider inter and multi-scalar 
interdependencies among different political-administrative and spatial 
orders”  (UNDP and MINVU, 2014, pp.56-57). In other words, the model of DRM and 
the reduction of vulnerability must be seen from a multi-scalar perspective. This 
somehow corroborates the relevance of the topics addressed in this thesis.
Before continuing with the final section of this  chapter, I would like briefly to offer 
some reflections  on the financing of and spending on DRM and DRR in Chile. I do so 
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because it has been demonstrated that financing and spending patterns within 
disaster risk management are equally important to the effectiveness  of such 
processes (Kellett et al., 2014).
Financing of and spending on DRM and DRR
Unfortunately, comprehensive studies  and analyses of the financing of and spending 
on DRM and DRR in Chile are absent in literature. However, some insights can be 
gained by reviewing the Law of Government Budget to Public Sector, or Ley de 
Presupuestos, for a given period —e.g. 2008-2013— and its expenditure on DRM 
institutions such as the ONEMI. According to this law in 2013 (Ministerio del 
Hacienda, 2013), the total budget to the public sector was US$ 58,964 million, while 
the budget of the ONEMI for the same period reached US$ 19.6 million, which 
represents 0.0071 per cent of the national GDP (World Bank, 2017).
Table 4.10. ONEMI’s annual budget in relation to the national GDP 2008-2013
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
National GDP in US$ M 179,627 171,957 217,538 250,832 265,232 277,079
ONEMI budget in US$ M 7,998 10,194 11,755 9,942 13,464 19,628
% of the national GDP 0.0045% 0.0059% 0.0054% 0.0040% 0.0051% 0.0071%
Compiled by the author (2017), based on Ministerio de Hacienda (2013) and World Bank (2017)
Table 4.10 excludes spending for mitigatory measures implemented by the Ministry 
of Public Works. Therefore, this  can be seen as  an interpretation of DRM spending 
only, and not necessarily representative of DRR actions. Nevertheless, this 
interpretation of DRM spending is  valuable because the ONEMI is  the most 
important state effort in DRM and DRR, and its budget includes spending for the 
promotion of resilience, preparedness  and prevention, as  well as  emergency 
response and relief. Further investigations into this aspect could be particularly 
useful to give us insights into the prioritisation and/or marginalisation of certain 
projects, communities and social groups. This  could lead to a more refined analysis 
of the model of managing disasters  and reducing risks from a multi-scale 
perspective.
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To conclude provisionally, the final section of this  chapter aims to synthesise the key 
elements that have emerged so far and connect them with the analytical framework 
and objective of the thesis.
4.5 Setting the context to analyse post-disaster Chaitén
This chapter began by explaining that it is the first of two parts focusing on the case 
study. The chapter sought to introduce the historic, institutional and territorial scale 
and context of Chile, as  well as  the relations  with its model of disaster risk 
management and reduction. From what has been discussed so far, one can extract 
several insights  that are indispensable to explore the case of post-disaster Chaitén 
from a multi-scalar perspective. Firstly, the ‘cyclical’  facet of DRM has historically 
been an ignored aspect of the Chilean history of disasters. Beyond emergency and 
relief, other processes  such as reconstruction, mitigation and preparedness have not 
been considered with the same level of attention by the dominant views of disasters 
in Chile. Perhaps for this reason the current model of DRM is in question (Imilan  et 
al., 2015), as it mainly concentrates on emergency responses  and the application of 
technological solutions rather than on prevention and on comprehending the social 
causes of risks. Secondly, we reviewed the historical formation of geographical 
scales in Chile in order to prepare a multi-scale analysis of the progression of 
vulnerability for the case of Chaitén. Here, I proposed that the centralised territorial 
structure of the state has had, and continues to have, an important influence on the 
way that the DRM and DRR model is conceived and implemented, and therefore on 
how decision-making, policy responses and disaster governance are conducted. 
Finally, I examined how DRM and DRR, and other institutional forms, are defined, 
organised and distributed within this  multi-scalar structure of territorial organisation 
in Chile. This  illustrated the influence that the territorial structure has  on the mode of 
managing disasters and risks: it is  a highly centralised model, a top-down approach, 
and is  reactive or post-disaster oriented. In Figure 4.10 (page 168)  I described 
relevant legal frameworks for the DRM and DRR and categorised them in terms  of 
their vertical position or hierarchy within the decision-making and territorial 
structure of the state, as well as the orientation of such frameworks within the DRM 
cycle. Figure 4.11 expands the analysis  of the mentioned frameworks to the other 
analysed institutional forms: the ONEMI and territorial planning instruments.
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Figure 4.11. Map of the institutional forms for DRM and DRR in Chile
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The figure above serves to answer the question: how is  the model of DRM and DRR 
in Chile —especially policy responses to disasters— organised at different 
geographical levels, and why? The DRM and DRR can be represented by its 
constituent institutions, legal frameworks and planning tools. As  was discussed 
earlier, the organisation of these components indicates  a concentration of power in 
terms of decision-making which will affect policy responses to disasters, as  well as all 
other aspects of DRM. Concentration at the national scale may ensure that policy 
responses are mainly dictated from the top-down, thus conflicting with local 
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participation and the inclusion of local demands and needs, and therefore with the 
effectiveness  of such responses. In recalling what was discussed in Chapter Three on 
geographical scales, it could be said that the territorial structure of the Chilean state 
apparently corresponds  to a vertical organisation: subnational institutions  such as 
regional and provincial governments, and municipalities, are subsequently and 
schematically subordinated from the national to the local levels. As  presented here, 
this  scalar organisation is a consequence of historical socio-political and economic 
processes, and it has influenced the logic of the current geographical distribution 
and hierarchical organisation of DRM and DRR. In other words, the processes are 
apparently connected. The question now is, what are the effects  of this  centralised, 
top-down and reactive-oriented model on the progression of vulnerability, and how 
does this  take place? This is  something I will try to respond to by utilising the case of 
post-disaster Chaitén.
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Chapter FIVE: The case of post-disaster Chaitén
Unpacking the policy responses
Introduction
This chapter looks at how the progression of vulnerability has taken place in and 
around post-disaster Chaitén, and how the processes and circumstances that 
constructed DRM and DRR practices could reproduce vulnerabilities in the future.
At the beginning of this thesis, I announced that this  chapter represents the second 
phase of the case study. The previous  chapter contextualised the historic conditions 
of the contemporary scalar geography of Chile —characterised by a vertical 
decentralisation— and it reviewed how such scalar configuration was mirrored by the 
model of disaster risk management (DRM) and disaster risk reduction (DRR). This 
means that the mode of managing disasters and risks in Chile is, in certain way, 
centralised, top-down and reactive. This  logic of managing also applies  to policy 
responses to disasters and decision-making. Therefore, this  chapter asks how DRM 
and DRR policy responses to disasters are connected with the unfolding of the 
progression of disaster vulnerability at different levels. To illustrate this inquiry, I 
propose the following scheme as a guiding map to navigate Chaitén’s narrative.
Figure 5.1. Rationale for the second phase of the case study
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Figure 5.1 develops two entry points. One could be called ‘top-down’, as it attempts 
to contextualise and reflect processes  of policy response from more general social 
processes such as  the Chilean state territorial organisation and its  model of DRM. In 
contrast, this  chapter represents  an inductive or ‘bottom-up’ entry point, because it 
tries to reflect the progression of vulnerability from the specificity and locality of 
Chaitén, that is, from processes  of policy response and decision-making to the 
materialisation of unsafe conditions. The rationale described in Figure 5.1 situates 
the Chaitén disaster in the adjacent impacts  and responses. This includes policy 
responses from authorities, governments  and institutions  at different levels  —i.e. 
local, regional and national. From this initial point, I will try to connect such 
responses with the underlying causes  of unsafe conditions  and vulnerability, and so 
trace the progression at multiple levels. The aim is  to address why policy responses 
in Chaitén have not effectively help to reduced vulnerability. For instance, I analyse 
how the process  of evacuation (section 5.2.2, page 198) may have affected people’s 
trust in authorities —an unsafe condition— as the process created several negative 
effects within the community.
Through this, I seek to illustrate the scalar relations  between unsafe conditions, 
dynamic pressures and root causes. I do so by framing it within the Pressure and 
Release (PAR) model. The analysis of such connections will not be limited to the 
emergency responses, but will also include relief, recovery, relocation and the 
reconstruction of Chaitén in the period between 2008  and 2013. Figure 5.2 shows 
the four post-disaster phases that are addressed in this chapter.
Figure 5.2. Analysed period of policy responses in the Chaitén disaster, 2008-2013
2009 2010 20122011 2013
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The next five sections analyse these phases. The first section contextualises Chaitén 
—historically, geographically and economically— and looks at the circumstances of 
the disaster and its  immediate aftermath. The second section concentrates  on the 
early response, including the evacuation. The third section analyses two parallel 
processes: the compensatory strategy and the relocation of Chaitén. It discusses 
tensions between local and national decision-making processes, community 
mobilisation and national politics. The fourth section looks at the latest post-disaster 
phase, the reconstruction. The last section offers  a final analysis  of the progression of 
vulnerability in Chaitén considering the multi-scalar context of Chile and its  model of 
DRM.
5.1 Chaitén, before and after the volcanic eruption: preparing the case
Chaitén is  a remote city port in Los Lagos Region about 1,000km south from 
Santiago. Chaitén was  severely affected by a volcanic eruption in May 2008  at a time 
when roughly 8,000 people lived in the commune. Figure 5.3 summarises the 
principal physical effect of the volcano’s  eruption on the city —that is, the new course 
of the Blanco River. This new course literally divided the city into the North and 
South sectors. Other physical effects of the volcanic mudflows can be appreciated in 
Figure 5.4.
Before presenting in detail the disaster itself and its  immediate aftermath, it is 
opportune to start this section by offering a historical perspective on Chaitén’s 
people, economy and geography in order to contextualise local responses to the 
emergency procedures, and to better comprehend people’s reaction to relocation 
and reconstruction. Specifically, I highlight two fundamental aspects: the sense of 
remoteness  and poor connectivity of Chaitén with respect with the region and the 
country, and the local economy’s dependency on the public sector. These two 
aspects are fundamental because they allow us  to understand the cohesiveness 
among certain groups  of Chaiteninos —as  Chaitén people call themselves— and the 
demands made of the government for more attention.
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Figure 5.3. Chaitén before and after the volcanic eruption
Sources: elaborated by the author (2017); satellite image from IGM (2012) and Google Earth Pro (2016)
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Figure 5.4. Physical impacts of the volcanic mudflows in Chaitén, May 2-4, 2008
Source: Municipalidad de Chaitén (2008)
5.1.1 Introducing Chaitén
Chaitén was  founded in 1959 by President Arturo Alessandri Palma, who wanted to 
populate this region for geopolitical reasons (Delgado et al., 2005),22 reasons which 
still persist among the narratives  of local and national public authorities 
(Gobernación Provincial de Palena, 2015; Municipalidad de Chaitén, 2014a; Turres, 
2014). Because Chaitén is  a port city, it served as the entry point for settlers  and 
merchants inland, a vast region of over 41,000 square metres. Until the opening of 
the Austral Highway (CH-7), or Carretera Austral, in 1988, Chaitén was significantly 
isolated from the rest of the region and the country, with only minor horse-
traversable roads connecting the city with neighbouring villages. Since then, 
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22 According to several interviewees, Chaitén’s location has military and economic importance due to 
its proximity and connection to the Pacific Ocean and its existence as a hub for commerce.
however, the CH-7 has  connected most of the villages, towns and cities in Los  Lagos 
and Aysén regions (see Figure 5.5).
Nevertheless, with the CH-7, the isolation of Chaitén was only partially solved 
because, both before and after the disaster in 2008, Chaitén lacked significant and 
important ways  of communicating between the city and the rest of the region and 
the country. A proof or recognition of the latter is that Chaitén holds the official 
category of ‘Isolated Location’ or Localidad Aislada issued by the Inter-ministerial 
Committee for the Development of Remote and Special Areas  or CIDEZE (GORE Los 
Lagos and Gobierno de Chile, 2012). Being an ‘isolated location’ means, on the one 
hand, the allocation of special state support and resources for the city’s 
development but, on the other hand, this  evidences  the situational remoteness in 
which Chaitén is  embedded. Remoteness  has  several implications. Although 
remoteness  is  often understood in physical and spatial terms, remoteness has 
different effects on people, institutions, the economy and development (UNDESA, 
2014). For instance, remoteness may imply intrinsic vulnerability due to high external 
transport costs, time delays  and high costs  in accessing external goods, and delays 
and reduced quality in information flows, among others (UNDESA, 2014). According 
to Pelling and Uitto (2001), it affects  disaster mitigation capabilities due to limited 
hazard forecasting ability and little insurance cover. Furthermore, it can have 
demographic and economic implications: limited human resources, rapid 
population changes, population concentrated in coastal zones, and diseconomies  of 
scale, leading to high per capita costs for infrastructure and services, dependence 
on external finance, small internal market, and dependence on natural resources, 
among others.
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Figure 5.5. Map of Los Lagos Region
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Prior to the eruption, Chaitén had around 7,200 inhabitants, 4,700 of whom lived in 
the urban area (INE, 2002). Although there is  a clear distinction between urban and 
rural areas, Chaitén city and its  municipal district encompass  a very active 
interchange of urban and rural lives, as was highlighted during the interviews  with 
two community leaders23 who referred to this aspect:
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23 As introduced in Chapter Two, for ethical reasons (confidentiality and anonymity), I decided that all 
interviewees’ names would be replaced by fictitious ones, whilst gender, institutional affiliation, 
position and date of interaction is provided.
“Chaitén is a small commune; people living in the country side visit the Port 
[Chaitén city] regularly, if not daily, for many reasons, but mainly because it is 
accessible and near to everybody”.
(Teodoro Benitez, male, Community leader, March 2013, interview)
“During summer, we organise fairs and other cultural events; all people from 
the commune come [...]  people here know each other [...] living in the countryside 
is  nice, but sooner or later you need to  come to the city because of the kids, bills, 
the bank, etc”. 
(Rosa Carcamo, female, Community leader, March 2013, interview)
 These interviewees  reflect an intense interchange between rural and urban lives, 
but also denote closeness between Chaiteninos. This  closeness  promotes  social 
trust and cohesiveness  (Cooper et al., 2014), as was  evidenced with the group ‘the 
rebels’ or los rebeldes who returned to the city —despite the existing ban— months 
after the disaster. Figure 5.6 reflects some of the activities  that are promoted by 
neighbourhood groups. The first (left) was a community party to celebrate the end 
of the school year, and the second (right) a cycling children’s group activity.
This cohesion is also perceived through the community mobilisation that wanted to 
bridge the North and South sectors  of Chaitén, claiming a united city. The ‘rebels’ 
and the demand for a bridge will be addressed briefly later on, in sections  5.3.2 and 
5.4.3 respectively. Therefore, although this study does  not concentrate on 
community cohesion as  a positive element necessary for disaster recovery (Wisner 
et al., 2004), it is important to understand some of the community responses in 
recovery and reconstruction processes.
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Figure 5.6. Community activities in Chaitén
Source: Leonardo Garcia Godoy (2014)
According to the now dissolved Ministry of Planning (MIDEPLAN),24 the economy of 
Chaitén significantly changed after the opening of the CH-7 (MIDEPLAN, 2003). Prior 
to 1988, Chaitén’s  economy was primarily based on fishing one, with artisanal fishing 
communities and fishing fleets  offshore. Local production supplied seafood 
processing, frozen food and canned food industries  in the region. Although fishing 
activity continued after the opening of the CH-7, it declined totally after the 
volcano’s eruption in 2008. In 2013, during the fieldwork, there was  neither 
recognition nor register of any important fishing activities in Chaitén. To identify the 
main economic activity in Chaitén before and after the volcanic eruption, I 
conducted a frequency distribution of the number of workers per economic activity 
(see Table 5.1). I looked at the number of workers because it was not possible to find 
data on the actual composition of the economy of Chaitén.
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24 In 2011, the government of President Piñera transformed MIDEPLAN into the current Ministry of 
Social Development.
Table 5.1. Number of workers per activity (private sector) in Chaitén and Los Lagos Region 
between 2006 and 2013
Chaitén Los Lagos Region
Activity 2006 2008 2010 2013 2006 2008 2010 2013
Agriculture, livestock, 
forestry 15 10 28 29 28,472 39,714 36,594 30,560
Fishing 0 20 0 1 24,504 27,786 14,749 23,686
Non-metallic 
manufacturing 5 5 13 2 22,943 24,752 18,357 24,155
Metal manufacturing 7 8 6 22 5,617 7,052 7,156 8,897
Construction 87 99 163 148 28,937 36,658 33,130 41,025
Wholesale, retail trade 54 61 72 107 42,186 48,965 38,893 45,646
Hotels and restaurants 50 33 39 122 7,504 8,700 7,489 8,728
Transport, storage, 
communications 2 3 4 0 12,784 16,805 14,329 20,818
Real estate, business 
and rental activities 4 5 9 0 22,329 23,703 21,255 29,570
Other 2 0 17 19 58,534 51,388 59,267 57,719
Total 226 244 351 450 253,810 285,523 251,219 290,804
Compiled by the author (2017), based on BCN (2011, 2015)
Table 5.1 shows that the four principal activities (in grey colour) are the construction 
sector, retail and wholesale, hotels  and restaurants, and finally agriculture and 
livestock. Families in rural areas  of Chaitén continued their businesses  in agriculture 
and livestock after the volcano’s  eruption in 2008 (ODEPA, 2013), despite  the fact 
that most of their animals perished and the animals’ food reserves  were badly 
spoiled (PUC et al., 2009). Accordingly, affected families  and producers received 
compensatory subsidies for their losses (INDAP, 2009). In section 5.3.3 (page 212), I 
will develop more on this  issue, as compensatory policies  represent one of many 
mechanisms  adopted by the national government to alleviate the impacts  of the 
disaster.
Unfortunately, the socio-economic data collected by the National Socio-Economic 
Survey (CASEN) cannot provide information on the population of Chaitén between 
2008  and 2010 as  the Chaiteninos were dispersed across  different Chilean regions. 
The CASEN survey is a key component of public policy in Chile due to it being the 
greatest and most detailed measurement —after the national census— of social and 
economic micro-data (Galasso and Farías, 2014). Presumably, the lack of information 
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on Chaitén during that period may have affected short-term public policies for 
recovery, in addition to long-term decision-making such as on the relocation of 
Chaitén and its  subsequent reconstruction. These policies and decisions  are revised 
later, but draw our attention to this lack of information as a potential dynamic 
pressure.
One area of activity that experienced a significant increase was the construction 
sector. From 2006 to 2013, the number of workers  increased from 87 to 148. 
Another activity which is  an important part of Chaitén’s economy is  tourism, 
although the only indicator of the latter is the number of workers in hotels and 
restaurants (see Table 5.1 above), which actually decreased between 2006 and 
2013: there are no studies or official figures that demonstrate or refute the 
importance of the tourism industry. In this  regard, I interviewed several local 
authorities from the Municipality and the provincial government who referred to the 
economic situation of Chaitén prior to and after the volcanic eruption. 
“Chaitén is  a  subsidised city: one third of the commune’s income is generated 
by the FCM [Common Municipal Fund]  and by projects funded by regional and 
central  governments [...] Half of Chaitén’s workers are employed directly in public 
services, the other half depends, at some point, on the public sector [...] Chaitén is 
nowadays as it used to be in the past [...]  we received a lot of [economic]  support 
from the [national] government”.
(Pedro Delgado, male, Local government director, May 2013, interview)
“We have allocated special resources to families [for businesses] thanks to 
special funds from the [national]  government [...] During 2012 we tried to  generate 
local businesses and to  strengthen some family businesses based on agriculture 
and livestock, but it is difficult; we help them to survive”.
(Veronica Zarate, female, Local government director, March 2013, interview)
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“The provincial government, and also the Municipality, have made efforts to 
attract private investment, mainly for tourism and related services [...]  I do  not know 
why, but the result is few investments and few jobs in all [economic]  sectors  [...]  our 
economy is stuck”.
(Antonio Gomez, male, Local government council member, July 2013, interview)
In the extracts above, two relevant aspects can be observed, the first related to the 
idea that Chaitén relies on the public sector to sustain its economy, the second that 
the economy is paralysed and stuck. The latter is difficult to uphold as the number of 
workers  in Chaitén between 2006 and 2013 increased by about 99.1 per cent (from 
226 to 450), in much higher proportion than the region —14.6 per cent, from 
253,810 to 290,804 in the same period (see Table 5.1, page 188). The supposed 
dependency of Chaitén’s  economy on the public sector is  also difficult to estimate 
using only the number of workers or companies, as there are no figures or indicators 
available to triangulate these data with public-state services  in the city —e.g. 
infrastructure maintenance and municipal services  such as  education and health, 
among others. However, as the municipalities are entitled to generate public 
incomes via local taxes and to receive public funds, looking at the financial situation 
of the Municipality of Chaitén could shed light on such supposed dependency. This 
is  addressed in the next section, as  the municipal economy may help us  better to 
understand the hierarchical and vertical relationship between Chaitén and the state 
during the recovery and reconstruction phases.
5.1.2 A subsidised city?
To gain an initial approximation of the presence of the public sector25 in the city’s 
economy, Figure 5.7 maps all municipal services and provincial offices of ministerial 
services located in Chaitén in September 2013. Although the number and 
distribution of these public buildings  is not an accurate indicator of the role of the 
public sector as  the main source of local income, the figure shows an important 
number of infrastructures: in 2013, there were 20 government offices in Chaitén 
from at least 11 ministries.
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25 This is based on the theory of political architecture (Schumacher, 2012, Chapter 9).
Figure 5.7. Public service buildings in Chaitén in 2013
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The Municipality of Chaitén was the most important in terms of numbers  of 
buildings and workers. The histogram in Figure 5.8  (see also Appendix 8)  shows the 
Municipality producing 349 municipal contracts  in 2013 between permanent and 
fixed-term services. Of these contracts, 192 were permanent contracts, this 
representing 55.0 per cent of the total number of workers in the private sector for 
the same year (see Table 5.1, page 188). This indicates the important role of the 
Municipality —and the public sector— in Chaitén’s economy.
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Figure 5.8. Chaitén municipal personnel by number and type of contract (2009-2015)
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However, the Municipality plays  a crucial role not only in the local economy, but also 
in the recovery, reconstruction and development of the city. It controls  important 
development funds  such as the Common Municipal Fund, or Fondo Común 
Municipal  (FCM), and ‘national transfers’. The FCM is a redistributive mechanism 
encompassing all municipalities  in the country that aims to balance municipal 
budgets from wealthier to poorer communities. Other municipal incomes  are 
directly allocated by national institutions  in order to administer critical services such 
as  health and education. Furthermore, the Municipality can compete for national 
funds to develop  specific urban projects  and programmes via ‘national transfers’. In 
2011, the year when the city’s reconstruction began, the entity accounted for US$ 
4.16 million, of which US$ 1.52 million was  acquired from the FCM and US$ 2.29 via 
national transfers. This  represents  that 91.5 per cent of the municipal budget came 
from national funds (see Figure 5.9 and Appendix 9).
192
Figure 5.9. Chaitén municipal income by domestic and national incomes (2000-2015)
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In addition, this calculation excluded all investments in large infrastructures made 
directly by other ministries, such as the flood barrier by the Ministry of Public Works 
in 2012. Therefore, it seems plausible to think of Chaitén as  a subsidised city, as  its 
principal institution is deeply reliant on national support, and this  is  true both before 
and after the volcanic eruption. Looking beyond the reasons for this, a high 
dependency on external financing could result in higher exposure and vulnerability 
to disasters (Wisner et al., 2004) in the sense that local institutions can become more 
fragile and susceptible to national economic ups and downs, and DRR projects may 
be less  prioritised than projects with higher political profiles  (Pelling, 2003a). This 
economic vertical relationship between the national and the local could also be 
useful in observing the multi-scalar progression of vulnerability, when such 
dependency is seen as a dynamic pressure in times of economic crisis.
5.2 The Chaitén disaster: emergency response
To build the storyline of the progression of vulnerability in Chaitén, I started from the 
days before the volcanic eruption and worked through until the reconstruction, 
concluding in 2013. While constructing the storyline, I have gone back and forward 
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several times to connect the case antecedents with those aspects discussed in 
Chapter Four —the centralised, top-down and reactive model of DRM and DRR.
Based on two technical reports commissioned by the national government in 2009 
and 2010 (CIMM T&S Consultores, 2010; Infracon S.A., 2012) and one qualitative 
study in 2013 (Ugarte and Salgado, 2014), I began my observations  and interviews 
in Chaitén, assuming two vulnerable conditions: the limited access to services and 
the uneven distribution of risks. The first relates  to the difficulties  that men and 
women, especially in the southern sector, have in accessing basic public services 
such as  health, water, sanitation and transportation. The second refers  to the risk of 
exposure to floods and mudflows as a consequence of future volcanic eruptions, 
which is  again distributed unevenly between the North and South sectors  of the city. 
This situation is accentuated by the limited access to services, leaving the South 
sector more at risk (see Figure 5.10).
In Figure 5.10, it can be seen that the North and South sectors  are both populated 
areas, with about 4,000 people living in the North and 500 in the South. More 
importantly, the figure shows the uneven distribution of exposure of the city to 
volcanic mudflows. Evidently, the South sector is more exposed and therefore more 
at risk than the North, where flood barriers  have been in place since 2011. This  is 
accentuated by the fact that the South sector has  limited access to basic services 
such as  water, sanitation, education and health. This uneven distribution of risk and 
the limited access to services are indeed two unsafe conditions materialised locally 
in the city of Chaitén. Certainly, these conditions came about after several processes 
and post-disaster decisions where policy responses played an important role. Thus, 
what are the dynamic pressures and their root causes  that produced these unsafe 
conditions? To elucidate this, we need to examine policy responses and decision-
making from the volcanic eruption onwards.
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Figure 5.10. Map of exposed areas, and labels by national authorities
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5.2.1 Emergency meetings and the ‘dormant’ volcano
On the morning of April 30, 2008, the inhabitants of Chaitén were awoken by 
unusual seismic movements. The same day, regional authorities established a 
Regional Emergency Operation Centre (COE) to monitor the situation. By law, COEs 
are established by the jurisdictional authority —e.g. the Mayor at the municipal level— 
and are to work with other local institutions  and community organisations which 
have the responsibility of evaluating, managing and taking action in a specific 
emergency (Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Pública, 2002). The COE, headed by 
the Intendente of Los Lagos  Region, Sergio Galilea, included local services such as 
carabineros, Navy, health service, fire service, army and some neighbouring 
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organisations. According to several interviewees, since the establishment of the 
regional COE, some issues  have arisen. A local leader and a resident who attended 
such meetings refer to it as follows:
“These meetings were very strange because from the beginning they 
[authorities] said that the tremors were only seismic activity without risks [of 
stronger quakes] [...]  they explained to us about the tectonic movements. But in 
reality they had no idea [...]  because there was an eruption two days later [...]  The 
meetings always started about the movements and tremors, and from the very 
beginning the discussions used to turn into local problems such as connectivity, 
poverty, abandonment and other non-related things”.
(Pablo Carcamo, male, Community leader, March 2013, interview)
“Nobody really knew what was going on [...]  even when the authority tried to 
explain to us with figures and drawings that these movements where tectonic, we 
knew that they were not [...]  many people used to  point to the volcano [...]  in the 
end, people were right”.
(Isabel Jimenez, female, North Chaitén resident, March 2013, interview)
What emerges from the above transcript is a lack of information about the nature of 
the hazard, producing uncertainty and concern among the population, something 
that would later stimulate distrust in authorities: this  will be examined throughout 
this  chapter and in Chapter Six. Community leaders assert that regional authorities 
tried to minimise the importance of tremors prior to the disaster, thus  hindering 
preventive and preparedness  actions. Contemplating risks is  always  difficult, 
especially with a lack of information, but beyond this, it seems  evident that the 
authorities minimised not only scientific evidence but also people’s  claims and 
concerns.
During the first days of the emergency prior to the eruption, SERNAGOMIN26 tried 
to figure out the source of the tremors  by flying over the nearest volcano, 
Michimahuida, 30 kilometres  away from Chaitén (see Figure 5.11). The state service 
failed to identify the Chaitén volcano because there were no data or records  about 
this volcano before then.
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26 The state institution responsible for evaluating natural hazards.
Figure 5.11. Map of the Province of Palena
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This lack of accuracy in identifying the source of the quakes led to confusion among 
the authorities for some time until they decided that more investigations were 
required. After the eruption, the director of the volcanic programme at 
SERNAGEOMIN, Luis  Lara, estimated that the last eruption of the Chaitén volcano 
may had occurred around 400 years  previously; however, months later, reports from 
SERNAGEOMIN confirmed that the latest eruption of the Chaitén volcano may have 
occurred around 9,500 years ago (Covarrubias, 2008). In 2008, the Southern 
Andean Volcano Observatory (OVDAS) had no records on the existence of the 
Chaitén volcano, and therefore there were no related hazard maps, evacuation 
routes  and emergency plans. OVDAS is  the state technical institution part of 
SERNAGEOMIN whose task is to monitor and determine the most dangerous 
volcanoes  in Chile. In the days  after the eruption, SERNAGEOMIN and other 
researchers would call the Chaitén volcano a ‘dormant volcano’ or, in Spanish, 
volcán dormido (Dzierma and Wehrmann, 2012). Another community leader refers 
to this situation:
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“It was a feeling that the authorities and the specialists had no idea, really no 
idea [...]  they were insisting that Michimahuida [the volcano] had erupted, so  we 
were not at risk [...] the next day they discovered that was the Chaitén volcano, here! 
Just ten kilometres [from the city] […] we were lucky we had time to run”.
(Angela Rodriguez, female, Community leader, September 2013, interview) 
In these interview extracts, it is  possible to observe a conflict between residents and 
the authority on evaluating government reactions  in the early days. The initial 
government reaction is  crucial to understanding Chaiteninos’ post-disaster erosion 
of trust of national authorities, which progressed alongside the evacuation, 
recovery, relocation and reconstruction. This  erosion of trust in authorities  is 
considered here an unsafe condition, as  a lack of trust can negatively alter future 
DRM and DRR actions, as  well as  lessening the effects  of compensatory and recovery 
policies  (Cutter et al., 2003). I will corroborate this  with more evidence when 
reviewing the rest of the policy responses to the disaster. This includes the 
compensatory strategy, the relocation of Chaitén and reconstruction.
Another reflection from those first days  is how quickly regional authorities —
especially the Intendente Sergio Galilea— took control over the emergency, which 
tells us  about the verticality of the model of DRM. This is coherent with Mena’s 
observations (2016) about how often disaster emergencies in Chile tend to be 
treated by authorities in the upper levels of government.
The next section reviews how decision-making about the evacuation and the 
constitution of the national COE can be considered powerful examples of the top-
down approach during emergencies in Chile, and how this approach may affect 
vulnerability in the future.
5.2.2 The emergency response and evacuation
According to a consultancy project (PUC et al., 2009), tremors related to the 
eruption of Chaitén volcano started on April 30, 2008, and were perceived by the 
inhabitants in Chaitén, Futaleufu and Palena. These quakes culminated in a violent 
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eruption at 11:38PM on May 1, 2008. The first official statement asserted that the 
eruption belonged to the Michimahuida volcano, continuing the hypothesis 
established by technicians  and authorities since the beginning of the tremors. 
However, overflights the next morning confirmed that the rash of activity 
corresponded to an unknown volcano, which was immediately named ‘Chaitén’. 
Given such circumstances, the national ONEMI office declared an administrative red 
alert, allowing the evacuation of Chaitén and other towns and villages affected by 
ash fall in the Province of Palena. It is not clear if the ONEMI considered the opinion 
of the local/regional COE or bypassed its  authority in this regard, however, most of 
the local authorities interviewed agree that they received the order from the ONEMI 
at national level. A municipal council member and an expert from the national 
ONEMI refer to this situation:
“It was very late at night when we felt the eruption […]  we met the Mayor and 
other authorities at the Municipality […] [the regional] COE was in charge of all 
decisions but there was nothing to consider, the risk was evident; we did not take 
care where the order came from, we just wanted to be evacuated”.
(Mauricio Poblete, male, Local government council member, July 2013, interview)
“The Minister Perez Yoma [Ministry of Interior] decided on the evacuation 
when he saw all  the information [...] reports from the Army, SERNAGEOMIN [...] all 
technical information said Chaitén must be evacuated, so  he declared the 
evacuation”.
(Victor Sanhueza, male, National government official, April 2013, interview)
From these interviews and the consultancy report (PUC et al., 2009), the idea 
emerges that decision-making was, from the very beginning of the emergency, the 
responsibility of the national authorities, either in the figure of the Minister of Interior 
or the ONEMI in Santiago. Beyond the discussion about local capacity to deal with 
the emergency, during the rest of the post-disaster phases, people and local 
authorities claimed more participation in decision-making. Despite the claims, the 
top-down approach persisted throughout the recovery process, and this  had a 
negative impact on people’s trust in authorities. I further argue here that such a top-
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down approach would not have been counteracted or balanced easily by locals’ 
actions, as the nature of the decision-making and political power —reflected in the 
state territorial organisation— was highly centralised. This  will be corroborated later 
in the next section when reviewing some community mobilisation against the central 
government.
In the first 24 hours  after the eruption, more than 4,101 inhabitants  were evacuated, 
mainly by sea routes  aboard Navy and private ships that were in the surroundings 
(Presidencia de la República de Chile and Narváez, 2009). By the second day of 
evacuation, a total of 8,119 people were displaced. Figure 5.12 shows  the 
geographical distribution of the most important destinations for the evacuees.
Figure 5.12. Evacuees’ destinations from Chaitén, May 2-4, 2008
Source: elaborated by the author (2017), based on Presidencia de la República de Chile (2008a)
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One of the most relevant aspects that emerged during the interviews in relation to 
the evacuation process  and the production of vulnerability is something I call the 
‘erosion of trust in authorities’. Disaster literature establishes trust in authorities  as a 
very important aspect of prevention, especially when preparing people in case of 
evacuations  and for developing DRM and DRR strategies  (Cutter et al., 2003). This 
erosion of trust could have been initiated as a result of the false interpretations  of 
the volcanic hazard by specialists and authorities, and exacerbated by the way in 
which the evacuation was conducted. Two community leaders refer to this.
“The evacuation was a mess [...] they [the authorities] sent children and 
mothers to  one city and fathers to another [...]  many did not know where the others 
were for weeks. [...] In case of a new evacuation, I will  stand firm here. I will not leave 
my land, my house [...]  I will not let them take me anywhere. I prefer to  die here than 
to live how we lived during our time in Puerto Montt [city where she was evacuated 
with her family]”.
(Roberta Monsalvez, female, Community leader, July 2013, interview)
“We lost all our personal belongings [referring to pictures, memories, 
personal valuables] because they told us that we would come back in few weeks [...] 
many left their animals and pets; they all died because we trusted we could come 
back”.
(Marcela Segovia, female, Community leader, July 2013, interview)
From the above, is possible to identify two negative and still painful issues  in relation 
to the evacuation. The first refers to the splitting of families, the second to the 
possibility of returning to the city few days after the evacuation.
Families  were split. Women and children were evacuated first, followed by men. 
Chaiteninos had no means of knowing where their family members  were, being 
unable to communicate with one another during the first days, and this created 
anxiety and uncertainty. This also provides  evidence that evacuees’  destinations 
were not pre-established: nor was there a prepared plan of action for the 
evacuation. Furthermore, the existing social organisation was somehow 
disarticulated and there were no interlocutors able to represent the dispersed 
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population or to establish communication with regional and local authorities 
(Mardones  et al., 2011). As  observed here, in the presence of high risk or the 
occurrence of a disaster, the evacuation operated under a universal driver: life 
saving and the provision of basic subsistence for the affected populations. However, 
ensuring the right to information and the continuity of daily life for those displaced 
appears not to have been addressed as a policy response. A multi-scalar 
perspective on this  could tell us that the sudden evacuation was indeed nested in 
distant processes and underlying causes. The evacuation strategy followed a distinct 
pattern of life saving and reduction of losses. These, as  a rule of thumb, are found 
recurrently in the ONEMI documents consulted on emergency management, and 
this  prevalence makes  it appear as if other elements  of evacuation, such as  the right 
to information, are unimportant. The ONEMI’s  main document, the National Plan of 
Civil Protection (ONEMI, 2002), refers to emergency responses as follows:
“Emergency responses is action carried out immediately after a destructive 
event. Its  principal aim is to save life, and reduce impacts and losses. Examples: 
search and rescue, medical assistance, evacuation, temporal shelter, food supply 
and shelter”.
(ONEMI, 2002, p.28)
From this extract and the way in which the evacuation was conducted in Chaitén, it is 
evident that the lack of attention to other aspects  of emergency response, such as 
the right to information and participation, reflect the reactiveness  of the DRM 
model. This idea, directed from the ONEMI national office down to local authorities 
and practitioners, may explain the reaction of authorities during the evacuation in 
terms of both the lack of preparation in terms  of destinations  of evacuees and the 
subsequent splitting up of families that occurred.
A second conflicting issue regarding the evacuation was  the possibility of returning 
to the city a few days  after the evacuation. The interviews above point out that 
people were told that the evacuation would last for a maximum of two weeks. 
However, most would never return to their homes for their belongings and 
valuables. By May 6, 2008, the national authorities  decided that the exclusion zone —
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i.e. the commune of Chaitén— would last for an unspecified length of time. Many 
Chaiteninos felt anxious  about the future of their houses  and animals and 
livelihoods, and many regretted having believed in the authorities. From these 
views, is also possible to perceive a feeling of abandonment and distance from the 
authorities.
Finally, other issues arose in relation to the allocation of emergency and response 
resources. An audit issued by the General Accounting Office or Contraloría General 
de la República in 2009 revealed that an undetermined number of state agencies 
and departments received emergency funds to alleviate the impacts  of the disaster 
in Chaitén between 2008  and 2009. Some of the recognised government bodies 
include the SUBDERE, the Municipality of Chaitén, the regional government of Los 
Lagos Region, the National Institute for Agricultural and Livestock Development 
(INDAP), the National Service for Training and Employment (SENCE) and the Service 
of Technical Cooperation (SERCOTEC), among others. The inter-ministerial interest 
in supporting Chaitén was evident but not necessarily planned beforehand. The 
audit pointed out irregularities  in the way the emergency funds were allocated, 
distributed and spent by public and private companies (Contraloría General de la 
República, 2009). For instance, private donors such as  the retailers Cencosud S.A. 
and Walmart Chile and others, and energy and food companies such as Lipigas and 
Colun are highlighted in the report because their donations could not be traced to 
the intended destinations. The concern about these ‘irregularities’ is  that the above-
mentioned companies  received tax exemptions through their donations, and not all 
public money was accounted for, as reported in the audit. And yet the cost of the 
emergency seems ambiguous. According to the annual account prepared in 2009 
by the Intendente of Los Lagos Region, Sergio Galilea, the total cost of the 
emergency was  around US$ 61 million (Galilea, 2009), while in the annual account 
produced by the national government it reached about US$ 78.5 million 
(Presidencia de la República de Chile and Narváez, 2009). Thus, accountability 
emerged as  an issue informing and contributing to the mistrust towards authorities 
and the private sector. For Chaiteninos and its local authorities, the real cost of the 
recovery has never been clarified.
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Figure 5.13 below illustrates the connections between the elements  discussed so far 
in the chapter and it situates  them within the continuum of vulnerability progression: 
root causes → dynamic pressures  → unsafe conditions. The connections  and 
elements are not definitive at this stage, but they attempt to guide the storyline of 
the case. I will explore other elements  and strengthen the existing ones with the 
analysis of other policy responses in the next sections.
Figure 5.13.
Progression diagram of vulnerability drivers during the early response in Chaitén
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So far we have seen how a potential erosion of trust in authorities  started to take 
shape among Chaiteninos regarding the way in which the state and DRM institutions 
dealt with the emergency. In particular, the splitting of families and the false promise 
of an early return to the city created anxiety and expectations that were not met. It 
seems that the lack of preparation and awareness  of the local capacities  and realities 
is  part of how the model understands evacuations —that is, only as  a matter of life 
saving and reducing losses. Furthermore, the top-down and centralised decision-
making within the DRM may have contributed to the limited integration of local 
capacities and aspirations. Most of the decisions  were made in Santiago, opening a 
breach between Chaiteninos and the authority. The distances  between Chaiteninos, 
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regional and national authorities  were increased by the creation of a parallel 
authority named the Presidential Delegate for the Chaitén recovery. This designation 
represents a new phase in the storyline of the case and is when the recovery process 
starts.
5.3 Recovery and relocation of Chaitén
In order to examine the recovery phase, the timeline below in Figure 5.14 
introduces, in order, the elements that will be discussed in the following sub-
sections.
Figure 5.14. Distribution of policy responses in the Chaitén disaster
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This figure explains  that certain processes  in the recovery took place simultaneously: 
the Presidential Delegate, the formation of a group of rebels, the emergency 
subsidies and the relocation of Chaitén. The analysis  begins  with those elements 
that I assume to have triggered or influenced the development of others. The 
numbers  within red circles  show the sequence I will follow in this  section. Other 
events  displayed in the timeline, such as the Chaitén Law, are addressed within the 
analysis of the mentioned recovery processes.
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5.3.1 Friction between national and local decision-making
On May 9, 2008, President Bachelet designated Paula Narváez the Presidential 
Delegate for Chaitén to coordinate the recovery and a possible relocation of 
Chaitén. This  designation created friction between regional and national 
governments  and the people of Chaitén. Officials  from the national, regional and 
local governments refer to this designation and her role:
“Paula Narváez was designated as Presidential Delegate because was a figure 
we used successfully in the previous disaster of Tocopilla [2007 earthquake]  [...] the 
idea of the delegate is  to ‘reduce’  the distance between the central  government 
and local needs [...] speed up the allocation of resources and support”.
(Noria Saavedra, female, National government official, August 2013, interview)
“I remember she [Paula Narváez]  came to Chaitén with the media and other 
people to convince us that Chaitén must be abandoned [...]  we organised a big 
demonstration [around 200 people] because she did not want to defend us and 
Chaitén [...] many felt abandoned by the state”.
(Guillermo Ugarte, male, Local government council member, March 2013, interview)
“It supposed that the Presidential Delegate was a technical authority; 
however, it was political  [...]  the roles of the Intendente and the Presidential 
Delegate overlapped in many cases —for instance, in the decision on the relocation”.
(Jacinto Tello, male, Regional government official, July 2013, interview)
These excerpts shows that the designation of the Presidential Delegate created 
some friction with regional and local public authorities. Narváez’s appointment was 
issued by DS Nº608, which states: “the Presidential Delegate, under the direct 
mandate of the President of the Republic, and in coordination with the Intendente of 
Los Lagos Region, assumes the direction of the recovery of Chaitén and, if 
necessary, its  reconstruction” (Presidencia de la República de Chile, 2008b, p.2). 
However, the figure of the Intendente  is  the major representative of the President of 
the Republic in regions (Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Pública, 2005). DS Nº608 
does not specify the command hierarchy and how coordination between these two 
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authorities, the Presidential Delegate and the Intendente, should take place. Perhaps 
for that reason, people perceived that the roles  and responsibilities often 
overlapped. The tension between the local and national was  perceived by 
Chaiteninos negatively, and animosity was  centred on the figure of Paula Narváez. 
The media covered several confrontations between the Presidential Delegate Paula 
Narváez, the Intendente  Sergio Galilea and the people of Chaitén. Here are some 
headlines:
• “Paula Narváez critiques Chaiteninos’ demonstrations” by Cristina Cifuentes 
Flores. La Tercera [Newspaper]. February 5, 2009.
• “Government condemns Chaiteninos’ demonstrations using Argentinean's 
flags” by Bárbara Covarrubias. El Mercurio [Newspaper]. February 5, 2009. 
• “The other side of the tragedy” by Rodrigo Aguilera. Revista NOS [Magazine]. 
February 2009. 
• “Chaiteninos and students demonstrate in Puerto Montt during the visit of the 
President Bachelet”. La Nación [Newspaper]. June 26, 2008.
Thus, the coordination of recovery efforts, and somehow Chaitén’s future, were at 
the mercy of the political agreements  and dynamics between these two authorities. 
Nevertheless, both the Intendente and the Presidential Delegate were directly 
appointed by the President of the Republic and therefore subordinated to the 
national executive power, confirming the centralisation of decision-making in 
respect of disaster management.
However, centralisation found counteracting forces  in the community that 
demanded more participation in the decision-making process. Several 
demonstrations  took place in cities  to which Chaiteninos had been evacuated. In 
Figure 5.15, the first photograph (left) shows Chaiteninos using Argentinean flags to 
protest against the visit of Paula Narváez to Chaitén, showing their disappointment 
in Chilean policies. The second photograph (right) shows Chaiteninos marching in 
Santiago for the rescue of pets and animals abandoned during the evacuation.
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Figure 5.15. Demonstrations of Chaiteninos in Chaitén and Santiago
Sources: (left) Cristina Cifuentes (February 2009) and (right) Daydalaus (July 2008)
One particular group, called ‘the rebels’, or los rebeldes, by the media, needs to be 
addressed in this analysis  as  it represented a breaking point in relations  between the 
local people and national plans  in Chaitén. This  group, and a series  of actions 
initiated by other Chaiteninos throughout the recovery and reconstruction 
processes, are very important as  they symbolise bottom-up  attempts to negotiate 
Chaitén’s future. This  group also embodies  Chaiteninos’ agency to push for reforms 
and the capacity to cope with the disaster impacts.
5.3.2 The rebels: occupying Chaitén
Once evacuated and facing uncertainty about the future, some Chaiteninos, led by 
Patricia Troncoso,27 banded together to form a collective action group named Sons 
and Friends of Chaitén, or Hijos y Amigos de Chaitén. This  group aimed to 
communicate to the authorities their needs  as  well as  their intention to return to the 
city. Due to the low impact they had on the media, the lack of attention from 
authorities and the uncertainty about the future, some of them decided to occupy 
Chaitén despite the existing ban. I interviewed Patricia Troncoso several times 
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27 Fictitious name.
during 2013, and I accompanied her to visit other community leaders. They refer to 
the first days of the emergency as follows:
“Nobody really told us what was next [...] whether we would come back to 
Chaitén or not, if we should start to  find a job, nothing [...]  during the first weeks we 
tried to organise something [civil organisation]  to claim our rights, for answers [...] 
we organised a demonstration in Castro  [Chiloé Island’s capital] but it was funny 
because only a few of us turned up [...] nobody paid us attention”.
(Patricia Troncoso, female, Community leader, March 2013, interview)
“Even the Senator Escalona [Chilean Socialist Party] came for a meeting with 
us, but he gave hugs, shook hands, and posed for pictures with [city] Castro’s 
authorities only [...]  it was really frustrating [...]  so, we organised ourselves to  visit 
Chaitén, to know about our valuables, animals and pets [...]  we did not think twice. 
We settled back in Chaitén by late 2008”.
(Olga Pineda, female, Community leader, September 2013, interview)
From these interviews, it is  possible to observe a sort of disorientation and 
uncertainty among Chaiteninos about what was happening with their houses  and 
valuables right after the evacuation. The lack of information during the process  and 
in the following days also reveals the poor integration of Chaiteninos in the recovery 
proceedings  and their distance from powerful institutions and structures. Thus, some 
of them thought of organising something they called resistance, which included 
coming back to Chaitén despite the risks. The media named them ‘the 
rebels’ (Rojas, 2013). This  ‘emergent group’ —in Quarantelli’s terminology (1994)— 
was spontaneous  in its  formation, since at first there were only about five people 
who returned to Chaitén during the months  following the eruption. This  number 
grew over time, adding up  to well more than twenty people by the end of 2008. The 
reasons for this returning include territorial rootedness, an inability to adapt and 
access to resources, among others (Ugarte and Salgado, 2014). However, their 
intentions  converged on the idea of transmitting to their fellow citizens, and 
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especially to the public authorities, that Chaitén was not dead, alluding to Minster of 
Interior Edmundo Perez Yoma.28
 As the interviewees described, living in the abandoned city meant they had to get 
potable water from a little stream to which they had connected water pipes, while 
energy was obtained from a diesel generator. People organised themselves  to clean 
the streets  and repair their houses. They also redefined their previous  livelihoods 
into subsistence strategies to face the scarcity of goods and products available in 
the city, in light of there being no commerce or jobs available. As the interviewees 
said, these situations strengthen cohesiveness and the sense of community.
By mid-2009, the rebels’ children were arriving in the city to meet their parents  for 
holidays. However, when the regional authorities  became aware of this, they 
decided to ‘persuade’ the rebels  by ordering the Navy to bring children out of the 
occupied Chaitén, assuming their parents  would follow them. Parents refused to 
abandon the city and sent the children away alone. Two rebels  referred to this 
situation as follows:
“I had to send my 13 year old daughter alone in that ship [a Navy ship]  [...]  I 
cried for several hours and days until I knew she was good in the house of my 
brother in Puerto Montt”.
(Olga Pineda, female, Community leader, September 2013, interview)
“The strategy of the government to take us out of the city was by pushing us 
with our children. That was cruel [...]  they [government officials]  argued that we are 
adults so  we can decide to  stay in the city despite the risks, but children are another 
story, children are a ‘state responsibility’  [...]  We were treated as if we were 
irresponsible parents”.
(Margarita Salamanca, female, Community leader, September 2013, interview)
210
28 On February 20, 2009, the Minister of Interior Edmundo Perez Yoma announced “Chaitén, 
unfortunately, is dead”, asserting that there would not be investment of any kind in the city (La 
Nación, 2009).
That government move bothered people even more. For many Chaiteninos, 
especially those living already in Chaitén, the regional and national government had 
become the main obstacle to them recovering their livelihoods. Remember that 
during the emergency all people were forced to evacuate the city according to the 
national emergency plan, without considering either local knowledge or their social 
and family structure. Chaiteninos were sent to neighbouring cities, such as  Puerto 
Montt, Castro and Coyhaique, with very different urban lives, social structures and 
economies, with a greater degree of difference than those found in Chaitén prior to 
the eruption —such as  extended family relations and a sense of community rooted in 
the territory (Marchant, 2010). 
The rebels became the voice of Chaitén’s  dispersed population, the only social 
organisation that fought against national plans. Furthermore, communication 
between Chaiteninos within and outside the city was possible thanks  to a radio 
programme named Here Chaitén, or ‘Aquí Chaitén’, led by Pablo Carcamo.29  The 
programme was  broadcast from Chaitén itself and was picked up by other radio 
stations  in the region. According to Pablo, the programme “sought to encourage 
other Chaiteninos not to forget our land, to fight for it [...] to face the 
government” (Pablo Carcamo, male, Community leader, March 2013, interview). 
Despite such difficulties, the ‘settlers’30  adapted to the new situation while 
encouraging other Chaiteninos to return. By mid-2009, when the ban was still in 
force, some rebels  perceived others living outside Chaitén to be expatriated, or 
exiliados, people ‘forced’ to leave Chaitén, revealing their strong conviction that it 
was not their decision to abandon Chaitén.
After observing such struggles, it is  possible to argue that the return process finds 
justification in the uncertainty surrounding the recovery plan —if we can call it that 
(see section 5.3.3, page 212)— and the lack of attention and of participation in 
decision-making. The feeling of abandonment after the evacuation, and later the 
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29 Fictitious name.
30 This is what Chaiteninos call the people that decided to come back to Chaitén after the eruption.
impression of fighting against the state’s intentions to leave the city behind, 
encouraged them to take the lead. It is  therefore possible to identify two clear and 
antagonistic stances on Chaitén’s future. The first was the government’s  position on 
the impossibility of repopulating Chaitén, based on the early technical risk 
assessments  (PUC et al., 2009), and the second position, represented by the rebels, 
affirmed that Chaitén was  not dead. Certainly, this group has played an important 
role in the recent history of Chaitén by actively participating in the processes that 
resulted in the recognition of Chaitén as a habitable city in 2010. But before moving 
towards that episode, let us review the various  twists brought about by the central 
government that could have triggered that end: the city relocation project, called 
the ‘New Chaitén’; the presidential change in March 2010, including the regional 
Intendente; and the compensatory strategy, including benefits  and subsidies. The 
latter is the focus of the next section.
5.3.3 Compensation, benefits and subsidies
On May 2, 2008, Chaitén was declared a catastrophe zone through DS Nº588, 
signed by the President of the Republic (Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Pública, 
2008). In Chile, only the President of the Republic can declare a State of Catastrophe
—which is  one of the States  of Constitutional Exception.31  This  resolution was 
applicable for one year —i.e. until May 2, 2009— and could be extended for an 
equivalent amount of time. In Chaitén, it was  in force until May 2010. During that 
period, a still undetermined amount of public and private resources (Contraloría 
General de la República, 2009) was  allocated to government services and 
organisations to support the displaced population and its recovery.
According to government officials  and government records (Presidencia de la 
República de Chile, 2008a), the main measure implemented to support people was 
the Chaitén Emergency Subsidy, or Bono Emergencia Chaitén. This  bono involved a 
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31 As reviewed in Chapter Four, in a State of Catastrophe, the President of the Republic may authorise 
the direct allocation of resources to alleviate people suffering and provide relief (República de 
Chile, 1980).
monthly payment of up  to US$ 1,000 per family and was  awarded between May 
2008  and October 2010. During the first year, more than 3,200 families  benefited 
from it, and about 1,800 families in the second and third years. Other compensatory 
subsidies were given to farmers  and producers, alongside grants  for education. 
Between 2008  and 2009, the National Institute for Agricultural and Livestock 
Development (INDAP) allocated US$ 1.2 million in order to compensate for the 
losses of approximately 1,100 producers (INDAP, 2009). Another important 
compensatory measure was  delivered in the form of housing subsidies: 2,235 
families received a one-off housing subsidy of about US$ 20,000 each (GORE Los 
Lagos, 2009a). The housing subsidy aimed to offer special financial support to 
displaced people from Chaitén to resettle  them in other cities such as Castro, Puerto 
Montt and Puerto Varas. In some places, such as in Puerto Varas, a brand new 
neighbourhood was  constructed with the purpose of receiving several displaced 
Chaiteninos (MINVU, 2008). Likewise, other subsidies  for entrepreneurship and 
psychological support were given (GORE Los  Lagos 2009a, 2010; Presidencia de la 
República de Chile and Narváez, 2009). Some collected testimonies from 
government officials and the community refer to this support:
“I was responsible for supporting the allocation of the bono in the Province of 
Palena [...]  basically there was no supervision and there were many problems in 
knowing whether we were helping people or not [...]  Prior to 2008, people used to 
live with so much less [...]  When they received that amount of money, some people 
wasted it on holidays, travelling and expensive clothing”.
(Karina Navarrete, female, Local government official, July 2013, interview).
“I received the housing subsidy to  get a home in Puerto  Montt [...]  It was not 
easy. We got a  house very far away from the city centre [her place of work], so  not 
well connected [...]  when we heard about the return [to Chaitén] we did the 
impossible and came back to Chaitén”.
(Angela Rodriguez, female, Community leader, September 2013, interview)
As  clearly set out by the first interviewee, poor supervision in the allocation of 
resources  is  evident. This  may have produced some unforeseen effects  on people’s 
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ability to cope with the disaster impacts. According to the interviewed provincial 
officer above, people relied on benefits for two years almost without supervision, 
with an amount of money that exceeded their incomes prior the eruption in 2008. 
When benefits ran out, most people found themselves  without savings and with 
debts  (Paz, 2011; Sáez, 2009). This  lack of supervision and the misuse of recovery 
benefits, as  well as financial debts and the fact that Chaitén was  already people 
encouraging to return, seemed powerful reasons to repopulate Chaitén.
Such poor supervision was not only limited to people, but also to government 
services and the private sector. The lack of supervision and other irregularities  were 
detected by an audit commissioned by the General Accounting Office (Contraloría 
General de la República, 2009)  and covered later by the media (René González, 
2014). This  could have further eroded people’s trust in the authorities. Two audits 
found the regional government and the Municipality of Chaitén failing to allocate 
and supervise subsidies and benefits (Contraloría General de la República, 2009; 
2011). The perception of Angela Rodriguez (interview excerpt above) also reflects 
how subsidies and benefits  failed to support Chaiteninos transitioning from their 
previous lifestyles and livelihoods  to new ones. Although there are no exact figures, 
authorities assert that most of the current population residing in Chaitén today —
about 4,500 people in total— returned to the city because they were not able to 
adapt to the new urban life and/or they missed the Chaitén lifestyle. Something 
similar was found by Ugarte and Salgado (2014).
As  a part of the national government’s  strategy to encourage people to leave 
Chaitén, Law Nº20,385, or the Chaitén Law, was  promulgated in October 2009. This 
special law allowed the state to purchase properties, paying the market price prior 
to the eruption. According to experts  and local authorities interviewed, this 
strategy’s objective was twofold: on the one hand, it had to restrict the habitability 
and occupancy of Chaitén because of its high risk; on the other hand, it was  a way to 
compensate for the losses of the affected population by transferring more financial 
resources  to them. Once the Chaitén Law was approved, the state bought 889 
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properties for a total of US$ 30 million (Senado de la República de Chile, 2013). By 
the end of 2010, when the new central government of Sebastian Piñera decided to 
lift the ban on inhabiting Chaitén, more than 80 per cent of the housing stock in 
Chaitén was  public property. As only the North sector of Chaitén was  declared 
habitable, about 70 housing units  were rented to returning Chaiteninos. Other 
Chaiteninos who had not sold their properties via the Chaitén Law re-occupied their 
own houses. Forty-nine properties  were assigned to public offices  (El Mercurio, 
2013). In contrast, residing in the South sector was still prohibited, so there was  no 
permission to rent and buy back properties. Such restriction was contested by about 
200 families living informally in the South sector, and by North residents, as they 
have persistently claimed that they are one city (Rojas, 2013) (see Figure 5.16).
Figure 5.16. Demonstration on the Rio Blanco Bridge, blocking the Austral Highway in 
protest at the delay of solutions for the South sector
Source: Local newspaper El Huemúl (2013)
The Chaitén Law created conflicts that persist today, as  it aimed to compensate and 
persuade the population definitively to leave the city. It compensated losses  but it 
failed in persuading people to leave. The fact that Southern residents  of Chaitén 
lived in a permanent state of uncertainty —they still did not know whether the South 
sector will be habitable in the future or not— in addition to their inability to live 
215
formally in the area, either renting or purchasing a house, may have limited their 
possibility of securing more sustainable livelihoods  by restricting their access to 
urban services  and institutional support. As  discussed earlier, this limited access  to 
services and opportunities has  sustained the uneven distribution of risks (see Figure 
5.17) between the two sectors of the city.
Figure 5.17. Progression diagram of vulnerability drivers during the recovery of Chaitén
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Figure 5.17 explains  how the historically configured and reactive approach of DRM 
in Chile may have mediated the lack of long-term planning in this recovery phase. 
From this, it is  possible to observe that the delivery of benefits and subsidies has not 
followed a comprehensive strategy: rather, it has  been limited to the transfer of 
resources. Subsidies  and compensation, for almost two years from 2008  until 2010, 
have not by themselves served to secure livelihoods  and safer conditions for 
Chaiteninos. On the contrary, the lack of long-term planning and uncertainty seems 
to have contributed to the uneven exposure of the North and South sectors, 
enabling the restitution of urban life in the North sector but abandoning the South. 
In my view, the series  of largely uncoordinated government manoeuvres  aimed to 
reduce suffering and give more opportunities to the affected people, but the lack of 
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a long-term strategy for recovery and the poor supervision had unforeseen effects 
and perhaps contributed to the production of unsafe conditions  in Chaitén. For 
instance, the absence of a clear policy on the South sector that went beyond the 
simple prohibition of inhabitancy may have encouraged the informal settlement of 
that area which, because of its exposure and lack of disaster risk reduction 
measures, is at risk. However, this  conclusion cannot be arrived at by considering the 
delivery of subsidies  alone: it requires analysis  of other mutually influential 
processes that were ongoing in parallel, such as  the presidential change in March in 
2010 and the city relocation process  initiated in mid-2009. The latter is addressed in 
the following section.
5.3.4 The new Chaitén: the city relocation process
Just after the evacuation of Chaitén in 2008, two research groups started individually 
to collect data in order to consider possible solutions for Chaitén. One group  was 
from the Observatory of Cities (OC) from the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile 
(PUC), the other from the Universidad Austral de Chile (UACh). These two groups, 
plus the national architecture firm Elemental and the international consulting office 
ARUP, developed the idea of relocating the city of Chaitén by mid-2009. I 
interviewed several researchers  and officials who participated in the process  from 
the PUC and UACh, and the Urban Development Division (DDU) of the Ministry of 
Housing and Urbanism (MINVU). 
By October of 2008, and after several negotiations with the above-mentioned 
actors, the national government signed a contract named Consultancy for the 
Development of Strategic Guidelines of Reconstruction/Re-localisation and 
Conceptual  Master Plan Post-Disaster Chaitén (GORE Los Lagos, 2009b). The 
consultancy project was  led by the PUC team and planned in three stages between 
June 2008 and July 2009.32  The first report (PUC et al., 2008a) was delivered in 
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32 The consultancy contract had a total cost of US$ 321,000 (GORE Los Lagos, 2009b), which can be 
included within the overall government expenditure on the Chaitén disaster.
October 2008  and included a characterisation of Chaitén, the Province of Palena 
and Los Lagos Region.
The second report (PUC et al., 2008b) was  delivered in December 2008  and focused 
on the evaluation of alternatives  for Chaitén. The evaluation involved a feasibility 
assessment on the relocation and/or reconstruction of the city. Based on technical 
calculations and development estimations  such as economic potential and hazard 
exposure, the second report openly recommended the relocation of Chaitén to a 
safer area. From this  point, the relocation project was called New Chaitén. The report 
included a planning-political strategy to lead the process. This  strategy offered a 
‘recipe’ (PUC et al., 2008b, pp.121-125)  to the government on how to present the 
relocation project to Chaiteninos and the general public, based on:
• Community participation built on people’s need and ambitions
• Justifying the relocation of the city by arguing that the threats were 
permanent, giving them ‘good’ alternatives through relocation such as better 
housing, employment, health assistance, and so forth
• Respecting the right to information
• Not lying or speculating about future actions
• Strict use and management of information
Looking back now, from the perspective of almost night years after this  report, it is 
possible to observe that most of these recommendations were not followed as 
expected. Simply the declaration made by the Ministry of Interior Perez Yoma that 
“Chaitén, unfortunately, is  dead” in 2009 is  powerful evidence of how information 
was managed, and how decision-making occurred. Many times the interviewed 
Chaiteninos complained about the lack of transparency and participation, the 
delayed replies or the absence of answers from authorities, and the lack of attention 
paid to their needs and claims. 
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In June 2009, the third and final report (PUC et al., 2009) was delivered. This report 
stressed the relocation of Chaitén by assessing various alternatives for the new city 
in Santa Barbara, Fandango and Bahía Pumalín (see Figure 5.18). This shows that the 
alternative of reconstructing and repopulating Chaitén was  completely discarded by 
the consultants because of its high economic and social cost.
Figure 5.18. Location alternatives for the New Chaitén
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The conclusions  of the consultancy report significantly influenced authorities and 
decision-makers. Considering the relocation, two officials  who participated in the 
design of the New Chaitén master plan made the following comments:
“The relocation of the city to a safer area did not seem significant to most 
Chaiteninos  interviewed in the consultancy project if they were assured that their 
culture, history and lifestyle would be respected […] people wanted solutions and 
we worked hard and fast to deliver it”.
(Benjamin Vergara, male, National expert and national government official, 
April 2013, interview)
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“Technical and planning reports [referring to the consultancy report late 
2008] indicated clearly what to do [...]  there was no doubt that Chaitén had to be 
relocated”.
(Jose Morales, male, National government official, May 2013, interview)
Here it is  possible to observe that there was  an assumption about the people’s 
acceptance of the relocation. Clearly, something happened in the process, as by 
mid-2009 there were almost 500 people living in Chaitén despite the ban and the 
volcanic hazard. The New Chaitén Master Plan document issued by MINVU (2010) 
claims  that 257 Chaiteninos participated in the relocation and design process, which 
represents about three per cent of the evacuated population of about 8,000. All 
participants  were Chaiteninos living out of Chaitén, while Chaiteninos in the city and 
‘the rebels’ were not consulted. From this  perspective, the central government’s 
agenda was  a bit clearer, as  was its view on the direction of future events. For the 
central government, the New Chaitén must be realised. This  determination may 
have influenced subsequent actions in respect of the implementation of the New 
Chaitén project, with a clear top-down approach. These will be reviewed below.
By mid-2009, Chile was initiating the presidential candidates’ campaigns for the 
elections in December that year. The Chaitén disaster featured several times  in the 
election process  and in televised debates (ANATEL, 2010). It marked the end of the 
Bachelet administration. An expert planner who participated in the design of the 
New Chaitén master plan referred to this moment:
“So, once they [consultancy members]  gave the advice of relocating Chaitén, 
then MINVU decided to assume internally —that is, in-house— the development of 
the master plan, with a  specific and dedicated team for this task. […] This team 
included SEREMI,33  municipality of Chaitén and other departmental ministry 
offices. [...] it started with the conclusion of the [consultancy]  report —that is,  Chaitén 
must be relocated northward, to a safer area, and on the coastline in order not to 
lose the existing maritime routes. [...] Finally, the master plan of the New Chaitén 
was not tendered because if they [MINVU]  did so, Bachelet’s administration would 
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33 Regional Ministerial Secretaries (in Spanish, Secretaría Regional Ministerial, or SEREMI) are regional 
delegations of national ministries such as for health, education, defence and so forth. 
run out before that we could finish the process, so it [the master plan]  had to be 
done quickly [...]  Making it quick influenced the whole process: there was a lot of 
pressure [...] This decision neglected the idea that master plans are participatory 
planning processes, including different sectors of society. […] By then, Bachelet’s 
administration had less than a year to the end of its term”.
(Benjamin Vergara, male, National expert and national government official, 
June 2013, interview)
From this  excerpt, is  possible to observe how the political moment and time 
constraints added pressure to the master plan and the recovery process. This 
affected Chaiteninos in different ways in terms of their participation and subsequent 
engagement with the relocation project. When the government’s  view on the 
recovery is  contrasted with the views  of the rebels, the distance between the state 
and the locality becomes  more evident, and the top-down approach applied. As 
Figure 5.19 shows, by March 2010, Santa Barbara34 already had a police station and 
a field office for the Navy, as  well as basic urban infrastructure for electricity, water 
and telecommunications. The progress  in Santa Barbara prior to the public 
presentation of the master plan in March 2010 reflects  the pressure from the central 
government to deliver a solution to the Chaitén disaster.
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34 The selected location for the New Chaitén.
Figure 5.19. Santa Barbara station to initiate the New Chaitén
Sources: Bernardo Valdes (MINVU, 2010) and Verónica Veloso (May, 2009)
Figure 5.20. Design proposals for the New Chaitén
Source: MINVU (2010)
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According to an urban planner interviewed in 2013, who was consulted by the 
urban division team at MINVU, the New Chaitén master plan involved idealistic 
views  about sustainability and modernity which idealise the New Chaitén project as 
a unique opportunity to create an energetically efficient, resilient and vibrant city.
These views  are reflected in the pictures in Figure 5.20, which were selected from 
the master plan document (MINVU, 2010). An urban practitioner and a community 
leader who attended an ‘informative’ meeting (Cifuentes, 2009) in February 2010 in 
Puerto Montt, aiming to communicate to people the process of relocation, refer to 
the presentation of the New Chaitén master plan:
“For the government, it was very important to achieve approval [by 
Chaiteninos]  of the project before the presidential transition [March 11, 2010]  [...] 
they wanted to initiate a dialogue with the people in Chaitén [...]  but many were 
disappointed because the project was in a very early stage [...] they [the 
government]  projected a process of two or three years; the people did not want to 
wait more and many knew about Chaiteninos already living in Chaitén”.
(Gabriela Miranda, female, National consultant and planner, July 2013, interview)
“Finally,  it was something they [the government] stubbornly wanted to do, 
against everything [...] they wanted us to wait, like, three years more. No, impossible 
to accept that [...]  they spent so much, much money [...] Mr Galilea did many things 
wrong and Bachelet too [...] they played with us”.
(Patricia Troncoso, female, Community leader, September 2013, interview)
Here is  possible to observe how frictions  between the government and community 
about the relocation and the New Chaitén became more intense, in part because of 
the delay —the relocation project was  launched almost two years after the disaster— 
but also because the process  would need two or three additional years. This  eroded 
people’s  trust in the Bachelet administration, something that was reflected in the 
presidential elections  in December 2009.35 Weeks later, these delays  would confirm 
people’s  refusal to be relocated, as this and other circumstances precipitated the 
223
35 Piñera won the presidential election in the commune with 51.14 per cent of the votes. Chaiteninos 
were able to vote from other jurisdictions (SERVEL, 2017).
cancellation of the New Chaitén. Some of the circumstances include the presidential 
elections in 2009, the change of administration at national and regional levels  in 
2010, and the Maule earthquake the same year.
Some weeks after the presentation of the master plan, the national government of 
Sebastian Piñera took office on March 11, 2010. For first time since the dictatorship 
of Augusto Pinochet, from 1973–1990, a right-wing coalition was in power. It is  worth 
mentioning here that before Piñera initiated his mandate, a massive earthquake of 
8.8  magnitude struck central Chile on February 27, 2010, causing about US$ 30 
billion in losses —20 per cent of the national GDP— and a final death toll of 525 
people (Gobierno de Chile, 2014). While the new national government badly 
struggled with the social, economic and political impacts of the earthquake, plans 
for the New Chaitén started to fade. On one hand because its implementation costs 
rose to US$ 300 million, a too-high figure considering the upcoming reconstruction 
post-earthquake (Silva, 2010), and, on the other hand, because by March 2010 the 
number of people that had already returned to Chaitén had increased significantly 
from about 500 to 1500 (Rojas, 2013). Subsequently, on the second anniversary of 
the Chaitén disaster, May 2, 2010, the newly appointed Intendente of Los  Lagos 
Region, Juan Montes, announced the cancellation of the New Chaitén project, 
arguing its costs and its rejection by Chaiteninos (Municipalidad de Chaitén, 2011b).
The political shifts, the 2010 Maule earthquake, the refusal of the population and the 
fact that a significant number of people had already returned to the city despite the 
ban, may have influenced the failure of the New Chaitén project. Likewise, the way in 
which the design of the New Chaitén was  conducted —particularly in terms  of the 
lack of participation— may have affected people’s  trust in the authorities. Several of 
the interviewed Chaiteninos saw a waste of resources  and time in the project, and 
they blamed both the state and the regional and national authorities for that. 
Another aspect worth noting here is  that the recovery strategy was  organised 
vertically, and thereby intentionally or unintentionally neglected the participation of 
the community, or at least that of regional and local authorities, because of the 
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overlapping role with the Presidential Delegate. This  verticality is congruent with the 
observations made regarding the territorial structure of the Chilean state and the 
model of DRM. Figure 5.21 aims  to capture the progression of vulnerability in 
respect of the elements discussed in this section.
Figure 5.21. Progression diagram of vulnerability drivers during the relocation in Chaitén
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In the diagram above we can see how low inclusion of Chaiteninos in the design 
phase, along with time and political pressures because the Bachelet administration 
was coming to an end, helped to precipitate the cancellation of the city relocation. 
Significant delays  in the project and the definitive abandonment of the New Chaitén 
may have also contributed to erode people’s  trust in national authorities  even more. 
Likewise, the 2010 Maule earthquake added financial pressure, and the people that 
had already returned to the city despite the ban were a good excuse for the newly 
elected government to cancel the project and to decide definitively to reconstruct 
Chaitén. Likewise, it is  worth mentioning that certain processes  may have 
counteracted the progression of vulnerability, such as the sense of community and 
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cohesion that existed. These reflect existing capacities  and characteristics  in the 
community that may result in resilient actions in the future.
The beginning of the Piñera administration in March 2010, however, deserves  its 
own analysis, as the decision to cancel the New Chaitén project confronted national, 
regional and local authorities. These political confrontations, and a new political 
approach to the disaster recovery, evolved over time until finally Chaitén was 
declared habitable in December 2010.
5.3.5 Political shift on the Chaitén relocation
President Piñera began his tenure with the impact of the Maule 2010 earthquake 
and the tension resulting from the Chaitén people’s  struggle to stay in the historic 
location. This  led to a political shift on the relocation of the city. An important aspect 
of this shift relates  to the newly appointed Intendente of Los  Lagos Region, Juan 
Montes. As  explained earlier, intendentes are loyal bureaucrats  of the President of 
the Republic who exercise the administration of regions  in the country (Montecinos, 
2005). In May 2008, then Intendente Galilea was  loyal to the Bachelet administration 
as  he participated actively in the meetings  between local and regional authorities 
and Chaitén people, and actively defended the government’s intention to relocate 
the city. However, just days  after President Piñera took office, still in March 2010, 
Galilea was  replaced by Juan Montes. Table 5.2 shows different intendentes of Los 
Lagos Region during the Bachelet and Piñera administrations. In grey colour is  the 
period during which the New Chaitén project was negotiated.
Table 5.2. Intendentes of Los Lagos Region 2006-2015
Intendente Took office Left office President of the Republic
Jaime Bertin March 11, 2006 January 4, 2008
Michelle Bachelet
Sergio Galliela January 4, 2008 March 11, 2010
Juan Montes March 11, 2010 November 15, 2012
Sebastian Piñera
Jaime Brahm November 15, 2012 March 11, 2014
Nofal Abud March 11, 2014 July 13, 2015 Michelle Bachelet
Compiled by the author (2017)
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Montes  first visited Chaitén in March 2010, the same month he was appointed. A 
local government official and two community leaders  who participated in his  visit 
referred to the new approach:
“Montes was shocked by the situation in Chaitén when he took office [...] 
People living without basic services, abandoned, and the [New Chaitén] master 
plan stuck”.
(Ignacio Saavedra, male, Local government official, March 2013, interview)
“He [Montes]  positioned himself into the idea that Chaitén should be 
repopulated, contradicting the decision of the previous and even the current 
[President Piñera] national administration”.
(Alejandro Soto, male, Community leader, July 2013, interview)
 “Mr Montes promised that the regional government, if not the national, 
would lift the ban on Chaitén”.
(Regina Muñoz, female, Community leader, August 2013, interview)
It is  evident from these extracts  that the visit of Montes to Chaitén perhaps  indicated 
the clearest signal so far of the chance that Chaitén would be reconstructed. This did 
not necessarily mean that Chaitén was the best option, however, nor the safest, as 
early technical reports  indicated the risk of reconstructing Chaitén (CIMM T&S 
Consultores, 2010; PUC et al., 2008a). But beyond judging the best solution for 
Chaitén’s future, this new approach may have encouraged ‘exiled’ Chaiteninos to 
return to the city. Rojas  (2013) estimated that between March and December 2010, 
the number of people living in Chaitén increased from about 500 to 1,500, but 
figures are hazy since there are no official records for that period. A national 
government official at MINVU who participated in the development of the New 
Chaitén master plan refers to Montes’ new approach:
“We perceived Montes’  declarations as very bad [...]  by giving them 
[Chaiteninos]  hope, Montes stimulated people to remain in the devastated city, and 
maybe encouraged other Chaiteninos to return to the city despite the risks”.
(Benjamin Vergara, male, National expert and national government official, 
June 2013, interview)
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It therefore seems  that Montes’ approach aimed to shift the central government’s 
angle and thus  alleviate tension between the Chaitén people and the national 
government. Ugarte and Salgado (2014) assert that this  moment was characterised 
by a retraction of the national power and the dominant presence of the regional 
government, perhaps  also a consequence of the 2010 Maule earthquake. This 
retraction is  exemplified by the lack of coordination between the Intendente  Montes 
and President Piñera. Montes  announced the cancellation of the project in March 
but, in May 2010 during a presidential visit to Puerto Montt, Piñera amended 
Montes’  statement by insisting that the New Chaitén would be built (El Mercurio, 
2010). Several months later, Piñera contradicted himself and accepted the 
cancellation of the project. During that period, uncertainty returned to Chaiteninos 
until December 10, 2010, when Intendente Montes definitively discarded the New 
Chaitén and declared the North sector of Chaitén habitable again (Intendencia de la 
Región de Los Lagos, 2010). A community leader referred to this shift:
“It was a tremendous struggle against the government’s intention to  relocate 
us definitively [...]  we stayed firm and strong because Chaitén has always been our 
land, we did not want to live anywhere else”.
(María Jose Navarro, female, Community leader, July 2013, interview)
This view reflects the mood of many Chaiteninos living in Chaitén at the time. 
Although happy because of the recognition of a community decision that they had 
made long ago, the transition to a recovered community was far from being 
complete. As mentioned earlier, Chaitén is today a divided city, where more than 
200 families  lack access  to basic services  and are unevenly exposed to hazards, and 
the trust in authorities has eroded. The progression and configuration of this  latest 
vulnerable scenario is  understandable through analysis  of the post-disaster 
processes discussed so far —evacuation, recovery, the aborted relocation— but only 
completed with the examination of the reconstruction of (half of) Chaitén.
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5.4 Reconstruction
The ban on inhabiting the North sector of Chaitén was lifted on December 10, 
2010. Beyond the reasons behind such a decision discussed already, it represented 
an important change in many aspects  of Chaiteninos’ lives  and how they projected 
their future. This  is also true for local authorities, especially the Municipality. The 
analysis  of the reconstruction phase and its  effects on the accumulation and 
materialisation of vulnerabilities  in the city and its  population spans  December 2010 
to the end of 2013. It considers  the significant resources allocated to restore urban 
services, and a series  of pre- and post-disaster demands that remain unmet —e.g. 
connectivity and the recovery of the ‘community’ (North and South sectors together). 
Many aspects  of the reconstruction of Chaitén have already been introduced or 
mentioned in this  chapter as  they served to better understand certain processes. For 
instance, section 5.1.1 mentions  that the principal activity by number of workers 
registered between 2006 and 2013 was  the construction sector, perhaps because of 
the need to reconstruct the city, and section 5.1.2 discussed how the public sector, 
since 2010, has become almost the only source of employment and income, 
accentuated by the fact that the state still owns the majority of the housing stock in 
the city, thanks to the Chaitén Law.
5.4.1 Occupying the South sector
According to several municipal and provincial officials interviewed in 2013, the 
significant resources allocated to reconstruction of the city included the restoration 
of basic services and infrastructure, and mitigatory measures to reduce exposure, 
such as the flood barrier for the North sector constructed during 2011 (see Figure 
5.22).
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Figure 5.22. Mitigatory infrastructures in Chaitén
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Source: elaborated by the author (2017); satellite image from Google Earth Pro (2016)
These significant resources  can be substantiated by recalling the distribution of the 
Chaitén municipal income between 2000 and 2015, which shows an explosive 
increase during 2011 as  a consequence of national transactions (see Figure 5.9, 
page 193). These transactions  rose to US$ 2.29 million, representing 55.05 per cent 
of the communal budget in 2011. A municipal council member and a community 
leader referred to the reconstruction:
“We had to rebuild the municipal school, the hospital, remove all ashes from 
the streets, restore electricity, water, telecommunications [...] all  this required 
workers, and many Chaiteninos  were employed, but many outsiders came too  [...] 
there were jobs and money, and not sufficient hands”.
(Guillermo Ugarte, male, Local government council member, March 2013, interview)
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“Chaiteninos started to come back throughout 2011, especially those who did 
not sell their houses through the Chaitén Law [...] some of them had to  rent houses 
from the state [...]  others just occupied their houses. That happened especially in 
the South [...]  especially the outsider workers, they just saw empty houses [in the 
South sector]  and occupied them. […]  Many people were unable to pay rents and 
there were not many affordable houses”.
(Angela Rodriguez, female, Community leader, September 2010, interview)
From this interview, it is  possible to observe an early and yet significant element of 
the reconstruction phase: the need for labour and for housing for both the returned 
population and outsider workers. For some municipal officials interviewed, and 
highlighted by community leaders, the scarcity and lack of affordability of housing 
opportunities  in the North sector pushed people to occupy the South sector 
illegally. According to an official from the Ministry of Housing (MINVU) in Chaitén 
interviewed in September 2013, MINVU was aware of the need for housing. The 
same is true of the Mayor of Chaitén in 2013, Pedro Vásquez (Baeza, 2013). The 
same official also revealed that the government was planning housing projects in 
the future, but there was nothing concrete to talk about at that time. ‘Nothing 
concrete’ was also confirmed by some community leaders, who pointed out their 
feelings of uncertainty regarding the need for housing. Rojas  (2013) also 
documented Chaiteninos complaining about the high cost of renting a property in 
the North sector —state owned houses— because most of the houses had 
deteriorated or were damaged due to the disaster in 2008  and abandonment. This 
confirms that the lack of housing projects  and affordability may have been a factor 
that influenced the informal settlement of South Chaitén.
On January 17, 2017, under the second Bachelet administration, MINVU 
inaugurated the first new residential settlement in the North sector for about 60 
people. Perhaps further investigations  into Chaitén could look at the impact of this 
housing project in the city (see ‘New residential area’ in Figure 5.22).
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Figure 5.23. Demolition works in the South sector of Chaitén
Source: Cristian Albornoz (July 2013)
As  seen in Figure 5.23, in March 2013 the regional government initiated a 
demolition policy that sought to destroy abandoned houses  and clear the area in 
the South sector. This  policy may have influenced and accentuated the vulnerable 
situation in the city. An official from the regional government referred to this:
“The South [sector]  is risky. There is no flood barrier for this sector [...] and 
everything indicates that the South is not habitable [...]  the idea [with the 
demolitions] is to  reduce occupation and therefore people at risk [...] every year 
there are more and more people living there”.
(Ismael Henriquez, male, Regional government director, August 2013, interview)
 This  extract reflects  the interest and urgency of the government in controlling the 
number of people settling in the South sector, seeking to avoid new occupation. It 
also clearly sought to reduce the risks of a future disaster by lessening the number 
of people exposed to sudden volcanic mudflows. Figure 5.10 (page 195) shows that 
the entire South sector is  at high risk. This also reflects two related aspects  of the 
settlement of the South sector: abandonment and timing. On the one hand, the 
sector was completely ignored by regional and national authorities, and on the 
other, this  lack of attention, lasting about two years, from 2010 until 2013, 
progressively exacerbated the vulnerable situation in the area. It is interesting to see 
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that after North Chaitén became habitable in December 2010, there were no 
policies  for the South sector that were beyond the simple prohibition of inhabitancy: 
no incentives  to leave, or law enforcement and compliance. In 2014, according to 
the new Presidential Delegate for the reconstruction, Paula Forttes, “Chaitén has 
today a serious housing problem: there are not enough housing units  for all, the 
biggest obstacle to the development of Chaitén" (El Mercurio, 2014). The lack of 
attention, planning and policies for the South sector for more than two years may 
have contributed to its  repopulation. Therefore, the settlement of families in the 
sector highlighted the materialisation of an uneven distribution of risks, as  northern 
and southern Chaiteninos are unevenly exposed to hazards. This  uneven exposure 
can be understood as  a vulnerable —or unsafe— condition that Chaitén’s  people face 
at the local level. Here, ‘local’ refers  to the spatial proximity of Chaitén’s people to 
the source of hazard —the Chaitén volcano is just ten kilometres away. We would 
assume that proximity to a volcanic hazard should suppose a homogeneous 
distribution of risk, but it does  not. The North sector has  flood protections that 
mitigate its exposure to potential ‘volcanic mudflows’ that may be produced in 
future eruptions, while the South sector lacks such provision (see Figure 5.22, page 
230). However, to experience an uneven distribution of risk, Chaiteninos must not 
only have uneven exposure to hazards, but also unequal coping capacities  and 
vulnerabilities. The latter is something that will be addressed in section 5.4.4.
5.4.2 Chaitén (North) reconstruction plan?
In 2011, the Municipality’s  budget for recovery projects increased by 257.8  per cent 
in relation to the previous year, from US$ 0.64 to 2.29 million (Municipalidad de 
Chaitén, 2011a). This  indicated a significant state effort aimed at recovering 
Chaitén. ‘Chaitén solution’, the ‘Chaitén solution plan’ (Cooperativa, 2011) or the 
‘North Chaitén solution’ (Presidencia de la República de Chile, 2011) are some of the 
names that official documents  and authorities have used to refer to all the projects 
and initiatives  aimed at mitigating risk, reducing exposure and rehabilitating 
services in Chaitén (GORE Los  Lagos, 2011). Some of these initiatives  included the 
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rehabilitation of public buildings, the restoration of public transport and street 
lighting, and educational and health services, among others. During the fieldwork, 
however, when I asked local, regional and national officials to review such a plan, 
there was  no document to refer to; nor was I able to find one in the institutional 
archives. In some cases, I received copies of the Municipal Accountability Reports, in 
others, budgeting documents. The lack of a document that encapsulated the 
supposed plan for the reconstruction of Chaitén beyond the simple restoration of 
services and mitigation of risks  can be seen as an indicator of the urgency of the 
government to transition quickly from the relocation of the city to a reconstruction 
approach. The narrative of a ‘reconstruction plan’ was  regularly used by authorities 
simply to indicate that attention was being paid to Chaitén and that a significant 
amount of resources  were being allocated to rehabilitate services and rebuild the 
destroyed infrastructure. However, these resources  and projects  were not bounded 
within a comprehensive plan, within a long-term planning process. Indeed, it is  the 
lack of a plan which may have influenced the repopulation of the South sector and 
later developed an uneven distribution of exposure. The supposed ‘plan’ restricted 
all investments —including risk reduction projects— to one group of the population 
and almost entirely neglected the other in the South.
5.4.3 Unmet demands
Poor connectivity between Chaitén and the rest of the region is one of the historic 
local demands  that persisted during the reconstruction. Based on reports from the 
CASEN survey (MIDEPLAN, 2003, 2006) and the experiences shared by 
interviewees, poor connectivity has  historically produced unequal mobility and 
opportunities  between Chaitén and Los  Lagos Region, and the country. The 
literature on the relationship between remote settlements and development (Taylor 
and Susilawati, 2012) refers  to the importance of connectivity not only as  a crucial 
element for social and economic development, but also as a human security issue in 
cases  of evacuation (Pelling and Uitto, 2001). Remember that during the emergency 
in May 2008, the evacuation was possible thanks to private ships that answered the 
call. I personally experienced the connectivity issue, as it took me around 12 to 14 
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hours to reach Chaitén from Puerto Montt, an approximate distance of 200 
kilometres. The director of the Health Station in Chaitén told me in March 2013 that 
in case of health emergencies  such as  complications in childbirth, they depend on a 
regional private company which offers  air assistance to transport patients  to Puerto 
Montt’s  hospital. This  means that connectivity has been, and continues  to be, an 
important element in the development and safety of Chaitén, and perhaps  it can be 
considered an unsafe condition, although its  root causes  are not directly linked to 
policy responses. 
 For instance, although the bi-mode route36 was entirely re-established in 2012, local 
authorities from the Palena province and Los  Lagos Region assert that the route is 
just an alternative, not a real solution to the connectivity issue. A bi-mode route 
indicates that there is no direct land connection between Chaitén and Puerto Montt, 
the regional capital. Table 5.3 shows that in 2010 the regional government projected 
to invest about US$ 212 million for reconstructing and rehabilitating the existing 
transport and communication infrastructure.
Table 5.3. State budget to invest in Chaitén’s connectivity 2011-2014
Areas Include US$ million
Emergency 
connectivity
Basic road to Chaitén, Caleta Gonzalo, mechanical bridge, 
cleaning of Chaitén’s port and recourse of the river 5.566
Connectivity Fandango port, Chaitén local airport, paving of Route 7, the bi-mode section between Puerto Montt to La Junta (Aysén Region)
22.909
25.455
157.729
Total amount 212.345
Compiled by the author (2017), based on Montes and Allendes (2010)
However, only a few of these projected investments  could be traced or found within 
official documents  such as budgeting and accountability reports (GORE Los Lagos, 
2011; Municipalidad de Chaitén, 2011a). This suggests that the issue of connectivity 
will remain an important problem and likely will be an increasing demand. A 
municipal council member referred to this  demand and the relationship with 
regional and national authorities:
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36 A bi-mode route combines two modes of transport in one route, by land and sea.
“It has always been like this [poor connectivity], before 2008  [...]  we were 
alone here [...]  we have tried to  cope with the connectivity problem by investing 
here and there, subsiding transport costs, etc. but there is not much that we can do”.
(Federico Rivas, male, Local government council member, July 2013, interview)
This  excerpt indicates that despite  the investments and the supposed 
‘reconstruction plan’, connectivity issue has not been incorporated within a holistic 
view of disaster risk reduction. Community leaders  and authorities  often complained 
about remoteness and the little attention paid by regional and national authorities, 
illustrating the persistent tensions between the national and local levels, perhaps 
accentuated by the reconstruction. During the field observations, it was also 
possible to note that some projected investments, such as the local airport and the 
seaport, had yet to commence. Figure 5.24 shows  that the seaport (left) and the 
local airport (right) utilised the same infrastructure prior to the volcanic eruption in 
2008.
Figure 5.24. Seaport (left) and local airport (right), Chaitén
Source: Leonardo García (July 2013)
Besides connectivity, another unmet demand relates to the national government 
policy on considering North Chaitén as  the one and only Chaitén, neglecting the 
existence of the other Chaitén in the south. This  particularly relates to the demand 
236
for a bridge that would connect the North and South sectors, as  well as  flooding 
protection for the south bank of the riverbed. A community leader in the North 
sector referred to their southern neighbours:
“People in the South sector are our friends and families; most of them lived 
there before the eruption [...] they have the right to live there [...]  we are only one 
community, Chaitén is only one”.
(Angela Rodriguez, female, Community leader, September 2013, interview)
A member of the Municipality Council also referred to the reality of the South sector:
“People in the South sector are in need; they lack most of the basic services 
just because they [authorities in Santiago] do not want to face the reality [...]  So, we 
help them as we can, by providing a bus that takes children to the school in the 
North sector”.
(Federico Rivas, male, Local government council member, July 2013, interview)
The first interviewee reflects the feelings  of many other community leaders  and local 
authorities about the reality in the South sector and the sense of community they 
have. The second interviewee indicates that people in the South are part of Chaitén, 
and that the local government plays  a role in mediating their participation in the 
urban life of North Chaitén. In my view, it seems difficult for northern Chaiteninos to 
plan the future of Chaitén without considering the South sector, as  they shared the 
same city before the eruption and, despite the new river course, they are right there 
in front of them.
5.4.4 Limited access to services
At the beginning of this  chapter (page 194), I introduced the idea of the limited 
access to services experienced by southern dwellers as an unsafe condition which 
relates to the difficulties in accessing basic public services such as  health, water, 
sanitation, transportation and education, among others. This unsafe condition 
materialises  at the local level and creates an uneven distribution of risks if we look at 
the North and South sectors as one city. 
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Figures 5.25 and 5.26 show that Chaiteninos in the South must walk long distances 
to access  these services. Distances  in Figure 5.25 were calculated using the Google 
Earth Pro measuring tool, considering the principal street corners in the North and 
South sectors  according to the interviewees. Walking time was calculated using the 
preferred walking speed in Chile: 1.1 mts/sec. (MINVU, 2009).
Figure 5.25. Walking distances between two spots in Chaitén in 2005 and 2016
Source: elaborated by the author (2017); satellite images from IGM (2012) and Google Earth Pro (2016)
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Figure 5.26. Chaitén resident walking to the South sector
Source: Author (March 2013)
Figure 5.26 shows the difficulties  that people face every day to reach the North 
sector. The long distances  are especially difficult for the elderly and children in 
winter. To access urban services, they must walk double the distance —from 1,020 to 
2,290 metres— and spend double the time —from 15.5 to 34.7 minutes— they used to 
prior to the eruption in 2008. This spatial inequality (Atienza and Aroca, 2012)  may 
also entail unequal access to income opportunities and jobs, and safety. 
Furthermore, while  the North has received national support to clean up its streets 
from debris and ashes  and to restore basic services, people in the South still live in a 
kind of “post-war environment” (Gabriela Miranda, female, National consultant, July 
2013, interview). Figure 2.24 displays  this  everyday environment in the South, 
surrounded by demolished buildings and accumulated debris. The difference in 
urban living conditions  in terms of access  to services and opportunities, lack of 
infrastructure —especially to mitigate risks— and poor features of the urban built 
environment, illustrates the uneven distribution of vulnerabilities and risks.
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Figure 5.27. Demolished housing units in the South sector of Chaitén
Source: Author (July 2013)
During several visits  to the South sector, I observed how residents have invested in 
repairing their houses while no public services have been restored. Figure 5.28 
shows El  Rinconcito, the only grocery store in the sector. In the picture, it is  possible 
to appreciate the water storage tanks standing high on the roof of the store (black 
tank) and on the house on the right (blue tank). This  illustrates how they deal with 
the lack of water supply. In July 2014, I was informed by another researcher in the 
area, Cristian Albornoz, that the neighbourhood association Junta de Vecinos 
Chaitén Sur had signed an agreement with the Municipality to provide them with 
water through a cistern truck or tanker, which visits the sector twice a week.
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Figure 5.28. Neighbourhood grocery store in the South sector of Chaitén
Source: Google StreetView (March 2014)
Likewise, a consultant who interviewed families  in the South sector in 2012 told me 
that people have organised themselves to get water and electricity from December 
2010 until the end of 2012, sharing the cost, which is around US$ 60 monthly per 
family (Gabriela Miranda, female, National consultant, July 2013, interview). Later, in 
2013, South sector dwellers  obtained from the Municipality a new diesel electricity 
generator and a bus  service that helped children attend the school in the North 
sector, the only school in Chaitén. That was  achieved through a neighbourhood 
organisation, Junta de Vecinos Chaitén Sur. These actions tell us  a bit about people’s 
agency to organise themselves  and their capacity to cope with the lack of services. 
Such capacities  are also manifested through the various demonstrations and 
organisations, such as ‘the rebels’, that have been initiated since the very moment of 
the emergency (see Figure 5.15, section 5.3.2). Likewise, having improved access to 
water and electricity indicates  the progress  in the sector, and the support and 
recognition obtained so far. It is  perhaps an indication that vulnerabilities  and risks 
could be reduced in the future if they continue to negotiate with the local 
authorities. Nevertheless, the decision to lift the ban in the sector remains  with the 
central government in Santiago.
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Beyond the demolition policy described in section 5.4.1, and the better access to 
water and electricity, it is  possible to estimate that there is  little attention paid to the 
people and their conditions. There remains a persistent abandonment of this sector 
and its people. In Figure 5.29, I summarise the elements  of the reconstruction 
discussed so far, and connect them in terms of the progression of vulnerability and 
risks in Chaitén.
Figure 5.29. Progression diagram of vulnerability during the reconstruction in Chaitén
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As  observed in this  diagram, an uneven distribution of risks  materialises when 
considering the differentiated access  to services  and opportunities  between the 
North and South sectors and their levels of exposure, mitigated by infrastructure in 
the case of North Chaitén. However, the root causes  and dynamic pressures  that 
facilitated the realisation of such vulnerable conditions  can be traced back to 
decision-making and policies aiming, somewhat ironically, to recover the 
population. Indeed, it was the lack of a reconstruction plan and the subsequent 
abandonment of the South sector that may have pressured to people to settle in the 
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South. The political shift from Bachelet to Piñera’s approach was  of fundamental 
importance for the future of Chaiteninos, but it also demonstrated the vertical 
ordering and centralised power of the state. Certainly, this  centralisation and top-
down approach manifested during the reconstruction, as  it did in the other post-
disaster phases, in form of Chaitén’s dependency on the national economy and the 
marginalisation of DRR projects  (see section 5.1.2), and of unmet demands such as 
in relation to connectivity and integration between the North and South sectors.
Another unsafe condition detected during the analysis  of the reconstruction was the 
weaknesses  in emergency planning, based mainly on the lack of an updated 
Municipal Emergency Plan (MEP). MEPs  are crucial for the coordination of 
emergency actions at local levels such as  during evacuation, but also to enable 
preparedness  and DRR actions. Communal Civil Protection Committees  (Communal 
CPCs)37 in each of the country’s municipality are responsible for elaborating MEPs 
and updating such plans  every year. MEPs are supposedly designed collaboratively 
and yearly by different communal actors such as police, fire and health services, and 
private and civil society organisations. During the fieldwork in 2013, the latest MEP 
had been issued in 2010. The lack of an updated MEP can put people directly at risk 
by not considering actions  to assess vulnerabilities, exposure, risks  and, eventually, 
the necessary actions to reduce them. In other words, it means that the main local 
leaders such as the Mayor, the police, community-based organisations and so forth 
have not met to check their procedures for coordinated action in the event of an 
emergency. This  may have the subsequent effect that such organisations  have not 
held meetings to review the provisional resources they have and will need in order 
to ensure the effectiveness of future emergency operations, nor to detect limitations 
and opportunities  in relation to DRR, and other important measures. The weakness 
in emergency planning is accentuated by the historical problem of connectivity/
accessibility of the city with the rest of the region and the country, and the lack of 
information, something crucial for good decision-making (see section 5.1.1). The 
lack of an updated MEP —at least until the composition of this  thesis— may also 
suggest a problem with the prioritisation of DRR projects and actions.
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37 The National Plan of Civil Protection and the role of CPCs are discussed in section 4.4.1, page 156, 
Chapter Four.
Regarding Chaitén and its multi-scalar progression of vulnerability, it is  possible that 
although there was a significant presence of the state during the emergency and the 
post-disaster phase —characterised by its policy response of recovery strategy, 
relocation, reconstruction— there are other aspects of policy response which operate 
in the opposite direction to disaster risk reduction, like those reviewed above. The 
lack of planning, the little space for participation and the top-down approach of 
DRM are some examples. It seems that during the post-disaster phase two opposite 
forces  coexisted, acting at the same time: on the one hand were all the processes 
aiming to respond to the emergency and recovery, while on the other there were 
underlying processes that diminished the potential of such response actions  and 
ultimately became sources of future vulnerabilities and risks. 
However, there were also counteracting elements  inherent in people and the 
community that were able to focus  the pressure over unsafe conditions: the 
community group deemed ‘the rebels’ is a good example of self-organisation and 
determination which has  not stopped fighting for attention from regional and 
national authorities, as  is the fact that people in the South sector are now organising 
themselves  to cope with the lack of basic services and to fight for attention, too. This 
can be seen as an indication of the capacities  of people and of communities that 
should be considered when improving unsafe conditions in the sector. This  study 
has not focused on the ‘release’ aspects  of vulnerability and risk production, rather, it 
aimed to explore the pressure processes within the model of DRM and DRR and the 
institutional and policy responses, with the intention of re-problematising the 
production of vulnerability and risks from that angle. Nevertheless, I think it is 
analytically precise to recognise that communities  and people are not mere 
recipients of support who are passively affected by policy responses to disasters. For 
these reasons, I think further investigations of Chaitén and other similar cases  should 
look at incorporating a more comprehensive characterisation of the capacities  and 
abilities of people and communities.
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5.5 Mapping the progression of vulnerability
So far, I have analysed policy responses from authorities, governments  and 
institutions at different level —local, regional and national— relating them to the 
context of Chile, but specifically to the model of disaster risk management and 
reduction. I have tried to connect such responses  with the potential underlying 
causes of unsafe conditions and vulnerability, with the intention of understanding 
why policy responses to the Chaitén disaster have not effectively reduced 
vulnerability. In the process, I observed four relevant unsafe conditions:
• Erosion of trust in authorities
• Uneven distribution of risks
• Limited access to services and opportunities
• Weaknesses in emergency planning
These vulnerable conditions are specific to Chaitén city and place-dependent. 
However, the dynamic pressures  that facilitated their materialisation may have been 
influenced by the verticality of the model of DRM and DRR, as well as  by the 
centralisation of decision-making. For instance, a process  that initially contributed to 
the erosion of trust in authorities  was the evacuation. The unplanned destinations, 
the fact that families were separated and the false indication that they could return 
days later for their animals, pets, belongings and other valuables were just some of 
the reasons  given by interviewees  arguing that they would not follow authorities’ 
indications  in future emergencies. As  we reviewed in section 5.2.2, the evacuation 
was applied by the national government using a top-down approach that did not 
consider people’s  capacities, needs  and local realities, revealing how pressures that 
give rise to unsafe conditions can be distant and nested at major scales. The same 
logic is  repeated with other elements  of policy response, such as the compensatory 
measures —subsidies and benefits—, the relocation project and the reconstruction. 
Figure 5.30 tries to capture a more complete picture of the progression of 
vulnerability for the case of Chaitén, considering the elements discussed in Chapter 
Four and Chapter Five. This figure puts together all progression diagrams 
introduced throughout this chapter (Figures  5.13, 5.17, 5.21 and 5.29), which were 
in fact partial sections of the full case.
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Figure 5.30. Progression diagram
 of vulnerability for the case of post-disaster Chaitén
Elaborated by the author (2017)
Erosion of trust in 
authorities
W
eaknesses of 
em
ergency planning
Lack of 
inform
ation 
(census, CASEN)
Splitting of 
fam
ilies Lack of preparation 
for the evacuationBelief people 
could return for 
their belongings
Preparedness/contingency 
M
isinterpretation of the 
volcanic threat
Top-down approach in 
decision m
aking DRM
/DRR
Reactive approach on 
DRM
 and DRR
Centralisation
Evacuation
Dependency on 
national econom
y
M
arginalisation 
of DRR projects
Presidential 
DelegateDisarticulation of 
social structure
Accountability / 
irregularities in the 
recovery process
Uneven 
distribution of risk 
Chaitén 
Law
Compensation/
beneﬁts / subsidies
Lim
ited access to services and 
opportunities
Uncertainty and 
delay in solutions
Lack of planning 
in the recovery
Poor 
supervision
Relocation / New Chaitén
Poor 
participation
Political 
pressure / 
Tim
e 
constraints
Im
portant 
delays
High costs
2010 M
aule 
earthquake
Cancellation of 
the project by 
the executive
Num
ber of returned people 
to Chaitén increased
Political shifts
Abandonm
ent 
of South sector
Necessity 
of housing
Reconstruction
Uncertainty and 
delay in solutions
Dem
olition policy
Repopulation of 
South sector
Lack of 
reconstruction 
plan
Poor connectivity (with 
the rest of the region)
Lack of 
infrastructure to 
m
itigate risk in 
the South sector
Poor built 
environm
ent 
in the South 
sector
Unm
et 
dem
ands
P
o
licy resp
o
n
ses scen
ario
Lack of 
M
EP
Dynamic pressures / Root causesUnsafe conditions
Cohesion and sense of 
com
m
unity / leadership
Im
prove unsafe conditions
‘Release’ pressures
M
obilisation/
dem
onstration
The rebels
Every element of this progression diagram has been explained and discussed 
individually in different sections  in this chapter, so after introducing the diagram I will 
concentrate on analysing and connecting the main processes  of the case study. The 
first thing that stands out from the figure is  the gradient area. This attempts to 
represent the scenario in which root causes  and dynamic pressures  are embedded 
and which facilitates the production and progression of vulnerable conditions. This 
scenario contains  the four principal processes  of policy response analysed: 
evacuation; compensation, benefits  and subsidies; relocation and New Chaitén; and 
reconstruction.38  The gradient is  used here to visualise a continuum rather than an 
exact line that separates  root causes  from dynamic pressures, and for that reason 
these processes  should not be seen merely through the lens of cause and effect. As 
described in the PAR model, root causes and dynamic pressures  “are not 
independent of each other, they are intricately connected in a series of mutually 
influencing relationships that obscure causes and consequences” (Wisner et al., 
2004, p.62), and although the perspective adopted in the study aligns  with the 
cause-effect approach, in this study I refer to cause and effect in the sense of 
cascades, as cumulative and non-linear sequential processes that may trigger 
complex effects  such as  vulnerability (Wisner et al., 2004). Processes such as 
centralisation or the top-down approach of DRM, highlighted in blue coloured 
boxes, are proposed as  influential elements rather than single causes of single 
effects. 
Figure 5.30 also illustrates  a relevant number of processes  and events at the root 
causes/dynamic pressures  level. Among them, the reconstruction phase stands out 
because of the number of links —six in total— with several unsafe conditions. This 
could be explained by reconstruction being the latest phase in the progression 
analysis, and therefore closer to the materialisation of unsafe conditions. 
Centralisation also attracts  attention because of its  connections —eight in total— with 
the four main processes of policy response analysed. This could be related to the 
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38 Analysis of each of these processes is found in this order: early response on page 193 (summarised 
in Figure 5.13); compensation strategy on page 212 (summarised in Figure 5.17); relocation and 
New Chaitén project on page 217 (summarised in Figure 5.21); and reconstruction on page 229 
(summarised in Figure 5.29).
fundamental role of decision-making of DRM in Chile, characterised by its 
centralisation at the national level. Nevertheless, analysis  of the progression of 
vulnerability would benefit from a multi-scalar visualisation that better distributes  the 
analysed elements, in terms  of the geographical scale at which they were generated 
and their historical moments.
For that reason, a multi-scalar visualisation could offer an advantageous  perspective 
for looking at dynamic pressures and root causes in relation to structural factors  of 
society and institutions, increasing the chances of scaling up observations and 
positing conclusions, although still within the inherent limitations of the study. By 
scaling up, I meant looking at how the progression of vulnerability takes  place 
beyond the materiality of Chaitén, and how general processes of DRM and DRR 
could reproduce vulnerabilities in the future in other cases  in Chile. To address  the 
question of enabling a multi-scalar perspective for the progression of vulnerability, I 
have the elements discussed so far are plotted on a Cartesian coordinate system 
(see Figure 5.31) that considers different geographical scales  (X-axis)  and the 
progression of vulnerability (Y-axis). To place each element, I asked two simple 
questions in this order:
• At which level is the process or event originated or nested? —global, national, 
regional or local.
• If it is not possible to know its origin, which scale is this element or event 
affecting?
Figure 5.31 plots  a significant proportion (nearly two-thirds) of processes  and events 
that are situated above the first horizontal dotted line. This  line separates  the area of 
dynamic pressures (rectangle at the centre) from the unsafe conditions at the 
bottom. This  reflects an underlying and intricate web of causes and drivers that 
participate in the production and progression of vulnerability, a complexity that is 
somehow tamed thanks  to the PAR model and the adoption of a multi-scalar 
perspective. Another observation is that certain processes of policy response are 
more or less  dispersed on the scale dimension (X-axis). For instance, the elements  of 
relocation/New Chaitén (in red colour) are mainly concentrated in the area of the 
national scale, reflecting that the process of relocation may have been influenced 
principally by national processes and decision-making.
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In contrast, the elements of the reconstruction are more dispersed along the X-axis, 
indicating that more actors and processes interacted in the reconstruction than in 
the relocation process. This  may be so because, firstly, during the relocation in 
2009, Chaiteninos were dispersed and not very active —except the rebels— and, 
secondly, the reconstruction encountered a local government back in place, people 
and community structures already existing in the city, and a national government in 
retreat or less present than in previous  years as  a consequence of the presidential 
shift and the Maule earthquake in 2010.
Despite its  potential, however, this diagram needs to be complemented by the 
previous progression diagram (Figure 5.30) to better understand why these policy 
responses have not reduced people’s vulnerability. Figure 5.31 does not completely 
show the relationships between the elements —for instance, how the relocation 
project (in red) influenced the return of people to Chaitén and the erosion of trust in 
authorities. In that respect, I would like to point out that the lack of planning during 
the post-disaster phase was an important driver of vulnerability in the current 
Chaitén. In the diagram above, it is  possible to observe that evacuation, 
compensation/benefit and reconstruction all contain the lack of planning element 
‘lack of planning’ —underlined text— as a fundamental and root cause: for instance, 
the lack of a reconstruction plan provoked the abandonment of the South sector by 
the authorities and then its repopulation (see section 5.4.2, page 233). In contrast, 
the New Chaitén project did not have problems with planning, in the sense that the 
government worked on a master plan for the new city, dedicating time and 
resources  to studying and planning solutions. However, it faced critical problems in 
coping with political and economic pressures, and time constraints that created 
important delays. So, being costly, without political and popular support, and 
delayed, the relocation was  definitively aborted by the national government in 
December 2010 (see sections 5.3.4. and 5.3.5, pages 217 and 226 respectively).
Finally, a last observation on Figure 5.31 is  directed to the gap  that exists on the 
intermediate or regional scale, that is, the empty space between national and local 
scales. This gap  may have been produced because most of the policy responses 
were nested within and articulated from the national power: the national 
government had the power to decide and articulate most of the policy responses, 
showing its gravitational role within the model of DRM and DRR. Likewise, this gap 
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reflects the centralisation of decision-making in the case of Chile, exposing the 
power of the national over regional and local powers (see more details  in sections 
4.2.3 and 4.3 in Chapter Four).
Concluding this  chapter, I would like to offer a complementary third diagram 
centred on the temporal scale. The conceptual diagram in Figure 5.32 uses the same 
progression of vulnerability dimension (Y-axis) as Figure 5.31, but it replaces 
geographical scales  with a temporal dimension (X-axis). The exercise is  exploratory 
and seeks  to analyse how distant the causes and drivers are from the unsafe 
conditions. By exploratory, I mean that this  exercise cannot be completely 
exhaustive because the data collection instruments  and methods  were designed to 
look at the geographical scale dimension rather the temporal. 
To initiate the exercise, I selected only the elements that could be expressed in time, 
asking two simple questions:
• At what time/date was this event or process initiated?
• If it is not possible to estimate an initial date, at what time was this event or 
process realised or materialised?
At first sight, the diagram shows a more distinctive pattern of distribution of the 
analysed elements, suggesting a more linear relationship between time and the 
progression of vulnerability. Wisner et al. (2004, p.52) assert that the root causes  are 
always “distant in a spatial and temporal sense”, so the pattern found in Figure 5.32 
is  congruent with such a proposition. If we look at the details, we can find some 
differences  from the geographical dimension in Figure 5.31. For instance, processes 
of policy response such as the evacuation are less dispersed: the elements are 
concentrated at the beginning of 2008  (May) because the evacuation occurred in a 
relatively short period of time. This is  also the case for the relocation/New Chaitén 
(in red). This may indicate that policy responses  in the case of Chaitén have tended 
to occur concatenated over time, which is plausible if we consider the cyclical, but 
sequential, process  of disaster management (see Figure 3.3 in Chapter Three). 
Nevertheless, other processes remain dispersed over time, such as the 
reconstruction. This  may be because the reconstruction covered a larger period of 
time —from 2010 onwards. This  may imply that, over time, longer processes of policy 
response may present more dispersed dynamic pressures and root causes.
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Figure 5.32. Tentative scatter diagram
 for policy responses in post-disaster Chaitén, 
considering ‘progression of vulnerability’ and ‘tim
e in units of years’
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Finally, it is  true that the temporal dimension of the progression of vulnerability was 
not directly included in the methodological design, nevertheless, time is  a constant 
within such progression (Wisner et al., 2004). Therefore, during the study, I collected 
the dates of the different policy responses, decision-making, events and actions 
almost unintentionally. The data collected refer to the year or month in which a 
policy was conceived, the date on which a decision was  made, and the like. I think 
that incorporating a historical perspective to analyse the progression of vulnerability 
from the beginning would perhaps have facilitated a deeper look at more distant 
events  and processes than those examined here. This  could, of course, be a matter 
for future investigations.
The next chapter is  the last of this  thesis, in which I will try to offer a comprehensive 
reflection on the process of research. Centred on the analysis  made during the last 
two chapters, I seek to address how the thesis  responds to the research questions 
and how it contributes to knowledge in epistemological, methodological and 
empirical terms.
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Chapter Six
Conclusions
Introduction
In the previous  chapters, we explored and analysed specific links  between 
temporally and spatially distant processes —e.g. policy responses, governance and 
decision-making, institutions— and the local ‘materialisation’ of vulnerability in the 
form of ‘unsafe conditions’ in Chaitén. As  formulated in Chapter One, the main 
research question reads: How have policy responses to disasters influenced the 
progression of disaster vulnerability, at different scales, in post-disaster Chaitén?
Each chapter unpacked the different components  of the enquiry to provide the 
empirical grounds  for answering the question. This  study found that policy 
responses and other vulnerability causal factors were distanced from Chaitén itself —
as  the theory of vulnerability suggested— and organised according to their scalar 
nature: national, regional, and local.
The main question had two subsidiary dimensions  that aimed to focus on specific 
elements of vulnerability creation. The first centred on critically determining that 
vulnerabilities  in Chaitén are locally materialised in form of, for instance, uneven 
distributions  of risks. The second looked at how these unsafe conditions were not 
exclusively locally produced —as  distant, extra-local processes of policy response 
and decision-making may have contributed to the materialisation these 
vulnerabilities. These two dimensions are two sides of the same coin, and were 
expressed on the research design as  ‘entry points’ (see Figure 6.1).39  The figure 
below develops  these two dimensions investigated in the case study. One could be 
called ‘inductive’ or ‘bottom-up’, because it tried to reflect the progression from the 
specificity and locality of Chaitén, to processes of policy response and decision-
making. In contrast, the second could be called ‘top-down’ entry point, as  it 
attempted to trace, document, and reflect these processes of policy response from 
more general social processes such as the Chilean state territorial organisation and 
its model of DRM.
255
39 See alternatively the ‘research process’ in Figure 2.5, page 53.
Figure 6.1. Case study entry points
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Although case-based, the research questions  also sought to expand and contribute 
to the epistemological debate on disaster vulnerability, conceiving it as a ‘process’ 
where “multiple pressures and factors that combine to create and increase 
vulnerability” (Twigg, 2015, p.329). It is  in this process  and ‘progression’, as a 
terminology that embraces  dynamism and incrementality as  well as  suits to scale, 
that the thesis is built on. The causes and drivers of vulnerability in Chaitén pointed 
out policy responses and decisions made by the central government after the 
disaster in 2008. This  aims to re-problematise the progression of vulnerability and 
risks in a post-disaster context, and seeks to challenge some still dominant views 
instilled in many national governments  that “hide or dissimulate the causality of risk 
[and disaster] generation and accumulation” (UNISDR, 2015a, p.262). The thesis, 
besides offering of a specific case study grounded in a specific institutional 
geography, sought to re-problematise and develop new ways  of ‘thinking 
vulnerability’ and risks  from a multi-scalar and wider perspective. That may help to 
tackle the lack of understanding and uncertainty among policy makers  and decision 
takers who tend to address  immediate dynamic pressures and unsafe conditions, 
while “neglecting both the social causes  of vulnerability as well as the more distant 
root causes” (Wisner et al., 2004, p.61).
This chapter aims to provide a series of conclusive remarks. It is  divided into four 
sections. The first answers the research questions and introduces some 
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epistemological implications illustrating how policy responses  to disasters may, 
counterintuitively, contribute to (re)produce risks. This part also answers  the 
question showing how vulnerability is  locally ‘materialised’, and how the state 
territorial organisation of Chile and its  model of managing and governing disasters 
are connected. The second section introduces  some methodological and empirical 
implications  that re-problematise the progression of vulnerability and risks and 
advances policy responses to disasters. The third section offers some final remarks 
and reflections  on the research journey, while the fourth section presents 
suggestions for further research.
6.1 Research questions and epistemological implications
6.1.1 Vulnerability locally materialised
Dominant views of ‘disaster risk’ still recall the dilemma of ‘taking the naturalness out 
of natural disasters’ (O'Keefe et al., 1976), restricted views that see disasters 
‘natural’, “as if nature were the executioner and not the victim” (Galeano, 2012, p.
113). This  ontology determines that models  of management are still dominated by 
the paradigm of ‘disaster risk’, where efforts and resources  are concentrated in 
emergency management and preparedness, as well as  in corrective or 
compensatory risk management, rather than in prospective governance of risks, with 
sensitive risk development in social, economic, and environmental terms (Lavell and 
Maskrey, 2013). Restricted views  that still persist in many countries and national 
models  of disaster management (UNISDR, 2015a): “this  is the space into which most 
nations  have yet to tread” (Lavell and Maskrey, 2013, p.7). Chapter Two posed the 
question: How and why did the Chilean model of DRM facilitate the production 
and progression of specific vulnerabilities in post-disaster Chaitén? with the 
intention to explore and bring to light the underlying causes  and relations  that take 
place at multiple scales to, ultimately, see what makes  possible vulnerability become 
actual  vulnerability. To disentangle the multiple causes and drivers  that create and 
reproduce vulnerability, the disaster Pressure and Release (PAR) model is  a useful 
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analytical tool, allowing us to distinguish and categorise diverse elements into ‘root 
causes’, ‘dynamic pressures’, and ‘unsafe conditions’.
In Chapter Five, the current vulnerabilities  detected in Chaitén are expressed in the 
form of local-specific unsafe conditions and specifically: a) the erosion of trust in 
authorities, b) the uneven distribution of risks, c) the limited access to services, and 
d) the weaknesses in emergency planning. These conditions were materialised 
through several stages, both spatially and temporally, by policy responses and 
decision-making actions40. For instance, the figure below develops the progression 
of the unsafe condition in Chaitén that we defined as ‘weak emergency planning’. 
This links  basically to the lack of a Municipal Emergency Plan (MEP), which puts 
people at risk because there is  no preparedness. Some of the reasons behind this 
lack of preparation relates to the centralisation of disaster governance, which is 
mainly reactive and top-down oriented, producing inadequate reconstruction 
planning and poor participatory mechanisms.
Figure 6.2. Vulnerability progression diagram, Chaitén reconstruction phase
Unsafe conditions
Root causes
National Local
Top-down 
DRM/DRR
Reactive 
DRM/DRR
Centralisation
Marginalisation 
DRR actions
Abandonment 
South sector
Necessity 
Housing
Delays on 
solutions
Demolition 
policy
Lack (participatory) 
reconstruction plan
Lack mitigation 
South sector
Unmet 
demands
Lack of 
MEP
Weak 
emergency 
planning
Uneven risk 
Limited accessMain root causes
Main unsafe conditions
Reconstruction
Legend
As  we reviewed in section 4.2 (page 134), the scalar logic of policy responses and 
decision-making resides  in the way in which the national model of disaster 
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40 See other examples in Chapter Five —Figures 5.13, 5.17, 5.21, 5.29, and 5.30.
management operates and its organisational structure, which has tended to 
reproduce the hierarchical structure of the state. Centralised, top-down 
approached, and reactive, the practice of managing disasters  set the ‘ground rules’ 
that allowed national authorities  ‘dictate’ policies and decisions without taking into 
consideration local aspirations, demands, and needs. This  creates the conditions for 
national actors such as the Presidential Delegate to ignore and underestimate 
people’s  demands and aspirations while it justifies a top-down response to disasters 
and recovery. The Presidential Delegate, for instance, eroded the trust of 
Chaiteninos on public authorities  and institutions, and this  may negatively affect 
future evacuations and the effectiveness of DRR strategies in the long run.
In Chaitén, the ‘uneven distribution of risk’ to volcanic hazards can be understood as 
a vulnerable condition that Chaiteninos face at the local level. Here, ‘local’ refers  to 
the spatial proximity of women and men to the source of hazard —the Chaitén 
volcano at just 10 Kilometres  from the city. Such proximity to a volcanic hazard 
should suppose a homogeneous distribution of risk, but it does  not. Chapter Five 
expounded upon the observation that exposure and risks  are unevenly distributed 
despite the common spatial feature of volcanic proximity. Exposure to volcanic 
hazard in Chaitén is disproportionally distributed between people settled to the 
North and South. The North sector counts with flood protections that mitigate its 
exposure to potential volcanic mudflows  that may be produced in future eruptions, 
while the South sector lacks such measures (see Figure 5.22, page 230). More 
importantly, the ‘origins’ of this  imbalance or, to use the PAR terminology, its ‘root 
causes’ point to the decision-making process headed by authorities  who are far 
removed in time and space from the affected location. Three particular decisions 
affected the ‘uneven distribution of risk’: i) aborting the New Chaitén relocation 
project, ii) reconsidering the North sector as  habitable in 2010 but maintaining the 
state of ‘uncertainty’ about the South sector, iii)  and postponing the expansion of 
housing development. These had an important impact on the number of people —
i.e. 200 families  by late 2014— that informally reside in the South sector at present 
Policy responses aimed to support the entire community, but failed in facilitating the 
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development of multi-scale partnerships  between stakeholders  —including extra-
local actors— and in providing appropriate and timely solutions. As other 
documented cases have suggested (Bicknell et al., 2009; Gero et al., 2011; Pelling 
and Wisner 2009), successful disaster management efforts are those that include 
major and minor scale actors, allowing “local strength and priorities to surface in 
disaster risk management, while acknowledging also that communities  —including 
local government— have limited resources  and strategic scope and alone cannot 
always address the underlying drivers of risk” (O’Brien et al., 2012, p.464).
The analysis  of local leaders’ narratives  and voices, collected in Chapter Five, 
pointed to an ‘erosion of trust in authorities’. The lack of trust can negatively shape 
vulnerability by altering evacuation strategies  as well as  by diminishing the effect of 
compensatory and recovery policies  (Cutter et al., 2003). Although trust in 
authorities is  somehow ‘observable’ at local level, its  root causes  are linked to the 
fact that decision-making and policy responses  are applied by temporally and 
spatially distant actors. Several of the evidences  collected in interviews pointed 
towards the same idea: in case of an eventual volcanic eruption, people will not 
follow authorities’ instructions, and it will be difficult to ‘believe’ again in what 
authorities say. In other words, Chaitén’s  people may react negatively to the idea of 
evacuating the city again in case of future extreme events. Six situations propitiated 
the ‘erosion of trust in authorities’:
i) ‘Misinterpretations’ by authorities about the existence of a volcano in the 
area, as well as the early and wrongly conclusions on the ‘tremors’ days before 
the eruption,
i) the splitting up of families during the evacuation, as well as the false 
statement that they could return to their belongings days later,
ii) poor supervision over spending of public money that triggered several 
investigations about irregularities and misuse of public funds by authorities,
iii) the lifting of the ban to inhabit the North sector but not considering the South,
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iv) the abandonment of the New Chaitén project after two years of planning, 
‘spending’, and consulting efforts,
v) and the creation of a ‘parallel’ authority —the Presidential Delegate— that 
bypassed regional and local authorities.
Because its historical roots in de- centralising and centralising strategies  of the 
Chilean state formation (see sections  4.2.1 and 4.2.2, pages  134 and 139 
respectively), the mode of operation of the Chilean DRM in the case of Chaitén 
reflects a centralised and top-down governance system. Although much of the 
recent literature on DRR stresses  the importance of good governance as a key factor 
that creates an enabling environment for risk reduction policies  and programmes 
(UNISDR, 2009b, 2015b), Scott and Tarazona (2011) assert that an important majority 
of countries  operated with centralised and top-down models of management. In a 
certain way, we can say that what we found in Chile is corroborated and confirmed 
by different disciplinary research on disasters.
The 2015 Global  Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (GAR) (UNISDR, 
2015a) points  to poor governance as  a key underlying risk driver. But in Chaitén it 
was not ‘poor governance’ or ‘weak policy responses’ alone that created the 
conditions  to reproduce risks  or create new ones. Rather, it was  that the verticality of 
the model of management somehow obstructed the inclusion of local actors. In 
other moments  of the post-disaster phase, as during the New Chaitén relocation 
project, it seems that good DRM governance not only was dependent on its  own 
internal arrangements but also on a broader context of existing governance 
systems. How the presidential elections and the change of the central administration 
precipitated the end of the New Chaitén project are good examples  that disaster 
governance is  intertwined with a multiplicity of actors and political processes. It 
seems that the DRM model of Chile works  well to respond to emergencies and 
reducing fatalities, something that has been highlighted nationally and 
internationally (American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team et al., 2011; Kaufmann, 
2010; López Tagle and Santana Nazarit, 2011; MAE Center et al., 2010). But Chaitén 
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sheds  light on how policy responses to disasters, when they do not provide sound, 
participatory, and timely solutions, could facilitate the production and reproduction 
of unsafe conditions, and contributing to and perpetuating the generation of risks 
over time.
6.1.2 Root causes of disaster vulnerability are often distant
Although Wisner et al. (2004) developed an analytical framework to consider root 
causes of vulnerability and risks, these concepts  have been criticised for being too 
generic (DKKV, 2012; Birkmann, 2011). For instance, they are based on a widely-
used definition41  of disaster risk to identify root causes of disasters as  a result of 
different development patterns  that determine dynamic pressures, which then 
shape a range of unsafe conditions. According to the DKKV (2012), this  view is 
limited as  they present more general or “macro-economic root causes  […] based on 
the perspective of political economy” (p.14) and therefore, in some cases, 
underestimate “the role of context specific and local root causes” (Birkmann, 2011, 
p.1127). Although is  clear that context-specific processes are important to define 
drivers and root causes of vulnerability, this  present study raises  the issue of which 
scale we should consider as  ‘context’ specific. A ‘context’ of disaster risk creation 
should not be only grasped at one single scale, whether it be local, regional, ‘or’ 
national. Rather we should always  consider the vertical and horizontal linkages 
between local ‘and’ extra-local scales (Brenner 2009). The institutional configuration, 
functions, histories, and dynamics  of any unsafe condition at local scale should be 
always grasped relationally, in terms  of its  “upwards, downwards, and transversal 
links to other geographical scales  situated within the broader interscalar 
configuration in which it is embedded” (Brenner, 2009, p.72). Practically no ‘local’ 
processes occur isolated from other territorial units, making it imprecise to speak of 
root causes in single-scale terms. Such formulations misleadingly imply that, from a 
local scale, the multiplicity of factors that create vulnerabilities and risks at local level 
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41 “hazard × vulnerability* = risk → disaster” (Wisner et al. 2004, p.49). *root causes, dynamic 
pressures, and unsafe conditions. 
can be contained and coherently grasped. This, however, ignores the essential task 
of analysing the relational nature of the progression of vulnerability.
The second question posed earlier in Chapter Two: Why have policy responses to 
disasters in Chaitén not effectively reduced vulnerability? was made with the 
intention of understanding how certain causes and drivers such as  policy responses 
and decision-making may have influenced the ‘materialisation’ of vulnerability in 
Chaitén. Specifically addressed in Chapter Five, the features of ‘centralisation’, ‘top-
down decision-making’, and ‘reactiveness’ of the DRM model were diagnosed as 
historically reproduced in the manifold dimensions on how the state is structured. 
Built on the national concentration of powers and in a process  of ‘administrative’ and 
‘vertical’ decentralisation with little intention to redistribute economic and political 
powers to regional and local levels  (Montecinos, 2013), this  ‘context’ has influenced 
the managerial model of DRM and DRR in Chile, especially influencing policy 
responses and decision-making.
The territorial structure of the Chilean state is representative of a ‘centralised’ scalar 
organisation where most of the economic activities, people, and opportunities 
concentrate in the Santiago Metropolitan Region (SMR) —see section 4.3 in Chapter 
Four. Such structure, established by its  history of socio-economic and political 
struggles, is  influencing the geographical distribution and hierarchical organisation 
of disaster management decisions  and its  relative budgeting: from the National 
Emergency Office (ONEMI) to the Territorial Planning Instruments  (IPTs), and 
Municipal Emergency Plans (MEPs).
As  Chapter Four points out, IPTs and several legal frameworks —such as the Law 
Nº19,175 on regional and municipal powers, the Law Nº18,695 on municipal 
attributions on security, and the Regional Plans of Territorial Planning or PROTs— aim 
to ‘transfer’ the autonomy of dealing with preparedness, prevention, reduction of 
exposure and promotion of resilience from national to regional and municipal 
levels. However, Chapter Five confirmed that such ‘autonomy’ has not been really 
concretising in DRM and DRR governance arrangements  that considers  local needs, 
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priorities, and capacities in Chaitén. Policy responses to the Chaitén disaster, such as 
compensatory measures, relocation, and reconstruction. were the result of the 
national government’s  decisions. This  move was  further supported by the decision 
of the central government in 2008 to create a ‘parallel’ authority named ‘Presidential 
Delegate’. This  literally bypassed local and regional authorities when dealing with 
recovery, relocation, and reconstruction of Chaitén.
Finally, as  described in the previous section, policy responses  to the Chaitén disaster 
were ineffective in avoiding the (re)production of vulnerabilities  because they did 
not consider local realities  and lacked long term plans that effectively integrate local 
actors  and people, as  well as their ideas and concerns, from the very moment of 
evacuation until even today. Whether this  should not be treated as a simple 
uncritical support of DRM and DRR ‘decentralisation’ —in part because literature have 
not empirically demonstrated that ‘decentralisation’ per se is  positive or negative 
(Scott and Tarazona, 2011) or its unfinished open discussion (Garschagen, 2016)—, 
the central point in question here is that a national model of DRM would be always 
embedded in broader existing governance system —either centralised or 
decentralised, national and/or regional such as  in the EU42. And this  national 
governance system would ultimately influence the form and content of any national 
DRM models. In the case of Chile, the findings in Chaitén suggest that inclusive risk 
governance will not be possible unless  deeper institutional configurations  of power 
and political will are overcome in the first place.
From another perspective, Chapter Five demonstrated that specific risks in Chaitén 
are not only the result of presence or proximity to the volcano —the ‘natural’ hazard
—, rather, its  vulnerabilities  materialise and risks  emerge because of a series  of 
decision-making and policy responses during the post-disaster phase. During that 
period (2008  and 2014), the analysis of Chaitén allows us to see that policy 
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42 More and more, member states of the European Union (EU) see how the economic and social 
integration is altering national governance systems —e.g. through EU laws and directives—, this posits 
changes also in the arena of managing disasters and recovery —see for instance the EU Parliament 
resolution on stepping up the Union's disaster response capacity (European Parliament, 2008).
responses to disasters, although well intended, have contributed to generate new 
and reproduce previous  vulnerable conditions. Specifically, the informal settlement 
in the South sector of Chaitén and the uneven distribution of risks  between North 
and South were unforeseen effects of, or at least mediated by, policy responses and 
decision-making. The reasons  why these have not effectively reduced vulnerability in 
communities  is  because the centralisation of the Chilean state has influenced the 
top-down model of managing disasters  and its  policy responses. These, in turn, were 
ineffective in preventing the generation of new unsafe conditions  because 
inadequate reconstruction planning and poor participatory mechanisms did not 
effectively consider local actors and people, as well as their ideas and concerns.
6.2 Methodological and empirical implications
Chapter Three reviewed different schools of thought and approaches  on the 
causation of disasters and its related discourses. They were examined to place the 
question of the multi-scalar progression of vulnerability at a suitable junction within 
the discussion: at the crossroad between causation and progression of 
vulnerabilities. The discussion on the causation of disasters  has focused on the 
dialectic of natural and human-made systems (Bankoff, 2006; Quarantelli, 1987b). 
Some authors  such as  Turner, Kasperson et al. (2003), Turner, Matson, et al. (2003) 
and O’Brien et al. (2004) have focused on the characteristics  of social-ecological 
systems  —biological, biophysical processes, and social systems made up of rules  and 
institutions that mediate use of resources— to highlight people’s  agency and 
resilience to disasters, as well as  on responsibilities of social systems over 
environment change. 
Others  such as  Wisner et al. (2004), Bankoff et al. (2006), and Gunewardena and 
Schuller (2008), have focused on the social relations, structures of domination, and 
politics  behind the production of disaster vulnerability, assuming this is  as  a 
determinant aspect of disaster causation. Building upon the latter, the re-
problematisation of the progression of vulnerability and risk from a multi-scalar 
perspective may have several implications. The first of these implications refers to 
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methodological aspects and visualisation of the progression of vulnerability., 
whereas a second implication concerns about guidance for policy and practice.
6.2.1 Considering a multi-scalar perspective
Methodologically speaking, the incorporation of a multi-scalar perspective is the 
main implication and contribution of this  thesis  to the analysis  of risks. Synoptically, 
this  implication could be reflected in the scatter diagram displayed in Figure 6.3 
below, where root causes, dynamic pressures, and unsafe conditions are plotted 
according to their scalar relations. In this example, causes and drivers  concentrate 
on the process of reconstruction of Chaitén, reusing the example mentioned above 
(see Figure 6.2).
Figure 6.3. Scatter diagram of vulnerability progression, Chaitén reconstruction phase
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However, the way of grasping and organising causes  and drivers as proposed here 
cannot be disassociated from more traditional methodological approaches to 
conceive and apply the PAR model. Such unidimensional viewpoints  are still 
dominant among PAR-focused disaster studies as they generally reflect lineal causal 
and outcome factors  in form of ‘problem trees’ (Michael et al., 2017), ‘iceberg 
diagrams’ (Canadian Red Cross Society, 2008), or mimicking the PAR model layout 
(Moeketsi, 2017) to denote underlying causes  of risks, vulnerabilities, and disasters 
(See Figure 6.4 and 6.5).
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Figure 6.4. Two common diagram usages in PAR model analyses
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Figure 6.5. Progression of vulnerability in Botshabelo, South Africa
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Nevertheless, the multi-scalar analysis  compacted in a bi-dimensional scatter 
diagram such as in Figure 6.343  requires a previous progression analysis  as 
summarised in Figure 5.29 in Chapter Five. The figure below is  recalled from that 
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43 See more complete examples in Chapter Five —Figures 5.13, 5.17, 5.21, 5.29, and 5.30.
figure to illustrate how certain processes and decisions  during the reconstruction of 
Chaitén relate to each other —in form of a ‘problem tree’— to produce unsafe 
conditions.
Figure 6.6. Progression diagram of vulnerability during the reconstruction in Chaitén44
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This exercise of arranging causes  and drivers  of, for instance, ‘limited access to 
services’ allowed us to initially identify and establish the causal relations between 
the analysed elements. But both ‘pictures’, the ‘problem tree’ and the ‘scatter 
diagram’, need to be read together because of their complementarity (see Figure 
6.7). In the figure below, letters ‘A, B, C...’ represent elements of the progression of 
vulnerability plotted differently for each diagram.
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44 A detailed explanation of this diagram is made in Chapter Five (pages 242-243), this is displayed 
here to illustrate a ‘problem tree’ diagram.
Figure 6.7.
Complementarity of diagrams for analysing the multi-scalar progression of vulnerability
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 But beyond these visual representations, perhaps  the main contribution of this  
thesis  lies  in trying to go further from these traditional approaches in disaster 
research —problem trees  and iceberg diagrams—, as visualisations  not only to 
communicate information but to make sense of data (CASCADE project, 2013). And 
with more cases in the future, it would be possible to discover if root causes, 
dynamic pressures, and unsafe conditions are associated with or dependent on 
certain territorial scalar configurations: for instance, decentralised and centralised 
forms of governance.
6.2.2 Guidance for policy and practice
In empirical terms, this  thesis  contributes  to advancing policy responses to disasters 
in the context of Chile in at least three areas. These are oriented to avoid the 
(re)production of vulnerable conditions:
• Holistic and planned evacuations that include local participation
• Long term plans and timely solutions
• Decentralisation of disaster risk management
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Holistic and planned evacuations
In Chaitén —but also in other cases  in Chile (León, 2012)—, evacuation processes 
pointed out the importance of men and women’s  participation in such important 
decisions. Their involvement helps them to keep  control over their future and their 
opportunities, as well as  creating trusting relations  with government institutions and 
authorities essential to secure quality, equity, and sustainability of post-disaster 
programmes (Gall et al., 2014). 
The analysis  of public polices linked to managing and reducing disaster risks shows 
that Chile counts  on ambitious  national plans  and holistic views. However, these 
were not well adapted to promote long term plans  and sustainable solutions for 
both North and South sectors  of Chaitén. Even though Chaitén may constitute only 
one particular example, the analysis  of the national DRM suggests  that 
centralisation, top-down approach, and reactiveness are systemic features  of the 
model of DRM and DRR. This may mean that unforeseen effects of policy responses 
—including forced evacuations— may have contributed in the past and may 
contribute in the future to reproduce risks in other cases. 
Some indications  of this may be found in other Chilean cases  such as  in Lilco during 
the 2010 Maule earthquake (Imilan  et al., 2015). The case of Lilco describes the 
slowness with which the state support arrived after the earthquake, and how the 
inhabitants  were marginalised from planning processes and during the 
implementation of reconstruction projects. As a result, policy responses failed to 
utilise people’s  knowledge and organisational capacities. According to Imilan et al. 
(2015), in Lilco and elsewhere in Chile, post-disaster reconstruction processes  miss 
the opportunity to improve living conditions for the affected communities  and to 
develop policies  for disaster management that incorporate and use their social 
capital. Then, it is  fair enough to say that policy responses  in Chile continue focusing 
on life saving and attending basic needs  as  this  save lives. Nevertheless, everything 
seems to indicate that, without ‘right to information’, ‘participation’, and ‘securing the 
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continuity of daily life’ after disasters, forced evacuations  may (re)produce new and 
unforeseen vulnerabilities.
Policy responses with long term plans
Although well intended and apparently well designed, the New Chaitén plan failed 
in eluding political pressures  and economic constraints within a period that took 
longer than desired —almost three years since the volcano eruption in 2008. In 
general, recovery and especially reconstructions are not immune to political and 
economic pressures (Lyon  et al., 2010). At least in Chile, when post-disaster 
processes extend longer than expected, such tensions tend to easily escalate (Platt 
and So, 2017; Santiago Research Cell, 2015). Then, as  the New Chaitén project 
demonstrated, ‘time’ becomes a tangible thing that needs to be seriously 
considered in policy responses. From this point, planning tools such as ‘scenario 
planning’, ‘contingency plans’, as  well as  IPTs, take special relevance in dealing with 
time pressures  and uncertainty. Policy responses that consider recovery as a long-
term plan, inclusive and participatory, can serve to create systematic decision-
making through decisions  that can be made in advance concerning potential 
contingencies, as  well as  to avoid to reproduce unsafe conditions. For example, 
Chad Briggs (2011) uses the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull volcano eruption in Iceland to 
illustrate how ‘scenario planning’ for designing, testing, and maintaining 
contingency plans related to volcanic activity in Europe may help to reduce impacts 
and losses.
Decentralisation of disaster risk management
The GAR 2015 (UNISDR, 2015a) and the Sendai Framework (SFDRR) (UNISDR, 
2015b)  emphasise the importance of local governments in disaster risk reduction, 
highlighting the ‘positiveness’ of decentralised models  disaster risk management. 
However, there is  still limited empirical evidence that confirm this (Garschagen, 
2016; Grady et al., 2016; Scott and Tarazona, 2011) and that document the critical 
barriers  to achieve it. This  thesis, in that sense, acknowledges and endorses the 
importance of local governments, by suggesting that the lack of inter-sectorial and 
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multi-scale planning, as well as  poor inclusion of local actors, have been main 
obstacles  for successful DRR in Chaitén. But besides  this, or perhaps  more 
importantly, the nature of such obstacles  are apparently in the way the territorial 
structure of the Chilean state is  organised and constructed. This  may constitute one 
of the barriers  to truly transfer power —especially on decision-making: financially and 
politically— to local governments  in terms of DRM and DRR. Some ideas  that may 
help to advance a true decentralised disaster risk and risk reduction management:
• Create awareness  among national, regional, and local actors  about the 
‘transversality’ —inter-sectorial and multi-scale— of DRM and DRR. An effective 
decentralisation of disaster risk management may not only consist in an 
administrative de-concentration —or ‘vertical decentralisation’— of state 
functions, but in a true balance between national, regional, local capacities with 
equal decision-making. Awareness  certainly involved research and 
communication but it may work by incentives such as showing financial 
information to authorities and politicians about the cost of future disasters 
versus  the possible savings that DRR can potentially secure; including DRR 
activities within job descriptions/requirements  and performance assessments 
for regional and local officials; and the importance of citizen participation in 
DRR through public campaigns that show how pressure from citizens on their 
locally elected politicians can encourages these officials  to take direct and 
specific DRR actions (Scott and Tarazona, 2011).
• Enabling local capacities  in disaster risk management by strengthening 
institutions and mechanisms  at lower levels of the territorial organisation. In 
Chile, regional academic institutions have demonstrated usefulness in 
providing DRR skills that local governments do not have, for instance, in 
disaster risk assessments, risk mapping, participatory strategies, and even with 
infrastructures and facilities (UNESCO et al., 2012). Likewise, regional and local 
NGOs and civil societies alike have demonstrated the ability to create 
awareness  and mobilise local communities about their own capacities  and 
agency (Korten, 1990; Alemneh, 2003; Aravena and Sepúlveda, 2011).
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• Decentralisation of disaster risk management requires decision makers to 
effectively allocate national funds into local governments. Scott and Tarazona 
(2011) point out that local DRR funds  are easily diverted to other projects  and 
priorities  or even more dangerously, not used and so returned to the central 
government. One idea to secure effective DRR funding may be articulating 
local development, climate change adaptation, and DRR agendas. In 2015, 
three high-profile global agreements  for development were achieved: the 
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, the Sustainable 
Development Goals  (SDG), and the Paris  Agreement on the COP21. These 
post-2015 agendas  share, join, and embrace common objectives such as 
tackling impacts  and losses as  a result of climate change. According to Roberts 
et al. (2015, p.1024), “framing post-2015 development as  a means to address 
loss and damage can synergize these agendas”. For instance, poverty 
reduction and sustainable development play a crucial role in preventing 
vulnerability and building resilience to climate change. Efforts  to address 
climate change should therefore build on robust sustainable development and 
poverty reduction policies  and plans, which will increase the extent to which 
losses and damages can be avoided Roberts et al. (2015).
• Decentralisation of DRM does  not mean a weak national governance system. 
On the contrary, some evidence (Scott and Tarazona, 2011) points  out that 
effective decentralisation requires an active national leadership: “strong 
regional and local DRR is more likely when there is  a strong national entity that 
provides  oversight and enforcement” (Scott and Tarazona, 2011, p.26). The 
thesis  shows precisely that the ONEMI (national) lacks enforcement and 
compliance mechanisms at local level. So, effective decentralisation of disaster 
risk management would require the giving of such mechanisms to the ONEMI, 
or another national actor. This also means that a decentralised model of DRM 
should consist in a ‘constant’ leadership  —not only during emergencies— in 
enabling and strengthening local and regional capacities to deal with pre- and 
post-disaster actions, to the point that its  ‘function’ seems unnoticed and 
completely normalised in the everyday management and responsibilities  of 
local institutions. Likewise, a national leadership should also focus on the 
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underlying causes and drivers of disaster vulnerability as they are often distant 
from local and regional levels and capacities. This view differs  from the current 
model in Chile, where the ONEMI and the central government appear 
overwhelmingly more relevant than other institutions and actors  at lower levels 
—the top-down approach utilised to conduct the evacuation, relocation, and 
reconstruction of Chaitén are good examples.
Following these recommendations, this  thesis points  out that the current situation in 
Chaitén may be also improved, firstly —although superficially—, by improving access 
to services and opportunities to Chaiteninos residing in the South sector. This would 
help to increase their capacities  as  well as  enable favourable circumstances for all 
residents. However, improving access would not solve the problem alone. This 
requires that the ‘uncertainty’ of the future of the South sector would to be solve. If 
the central government and the Congress  decide to keep or lift the ban to inhabit 
the sector, the trust in authorities  and institutions need to be also restored and 
strengthened, especially in regard to the regional and national institutions.
6.3 Some reflections on the research experience
Once the study was  concluded, I initiated a process of reflexibility on the research 
decisions I made and the directions I took. Some of the factors  that influenced these 
came from my own personal history. I am a mestizo, heterosexual, cisgender male, 
and I have lived in southern Chile for most of my life. Prior to conducing the research 
study, I worked in territorial planning at a regional office in La Araucania Region. My 
experiences working with diverse regional and national actors influenced my 
interest in the territorial imbalance between national and regional levels. Finally, my 
studies  in Berlin and my experience with the earthquakes in Chile and Haiti in 2010 
ultimately led me to focus  on the causation of disasters. Through conversations  with 
affected people and volunteers, I heard stories in which people shared their 
struggles  with the impacts  of disaster in very different ways, depending on their 
locations, the social group they belong to, their economic resources, social networks 
and the like. I initiated this  research in the hope of developing an understanding of 
the ways in which these territorial imbalances mediate the causation of disasters.
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By acknowledging who I am as an individual, and as a member of a group, and as 
resting in and moving within a social position, I had to be careful not to attempt to 
speak for research participants  both at national and local levels. Instead, I tried to 
reflect their voices  as an ally and advocate, although always contrasting their 
perceptions with the existing literature. I took a similar attitude to dealing with my 
positionality, as I always tried to share and discuss my appreciations with more 
experienced colleagues in the field, and to confront these on literature. 
During the research I became particularly interested into how policies to disasters 
associated with long-term processes, such as  relocation and reconstruction, may 
affect future disaster vulnerability. Disaster vulnerability research has, during the 
years I was  preparing this  study, been competing with ‘resilience’ research (Miller et 
al., 2010). Though resilience has  become a popular concept among academic 
circles  and development agencies alike, criticism has been raised, considering it to 
serve neoliberal politic purposes, “which shifts  the burden of recovery —and implied 
blame— to individuals and communities themselves” (Brown, 2015, p.191). Having 
this  in mind, I decided to take the opposite direction to turn into the core of 
vulnerability and analyse the progression of vulnerability as a multi-scalar process, 
embedded within a governance system of disaster management. As  pointed out in 
Chapter One, this was done with the idea that the more studying we dedicate to the 
implication of causes and drivers  of disasters, the more powerful will be the reasons 
to mobilise men and women and authorities  towards a disaster risk causation and 
reduction thinking. Otherwise, as Wisner et al. suggest “[disaster] problems  will 
recur again and again in different and increasingly costly forms unless  underlying 
causes are tackled” (2004, p.61).
On the other hand, during the development of the thesis, there was  a growing 
interest among some academic circles  for moving forward to the tackling of disaster 
risk creation, instead of simply seeking disaster risk reduction (Oliver-Smith et al., 
2016). As noted by Lewis  and Kelman (2012), this  requires more detailed 
investigation into these multi-scalar and historical realities of the causes  of 
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vulnerability, which would support the integration of disaster risk reduction within 
the many wider contexts  that foment and perpetuate vulnerability. Such 
developments corroborate that this thesis goes in the right direction.
The research process  had to undergo various  transformations  and overcome several 
challenges throughout all these years to reach this final stage. This revealed its non-
linear nature, the inherent complexity of social phenomena, but also my own 
positionality within the research process  and disciplinary debate. Some reflections 
about my position within this  study were already introduced in this  section and in 
Chapters  One and Two, but now I would like to offer a brief projection of my 
positionality in the future.
At the end of the research, I was more conscious  about my position as  a ‘male’ within 
a system of unequal gender relations, where women and girls are relatively less 
powerful and often materially deprived in almost all cultures (Cannon, 2014), and 
this  is  a significant factor in making females more vulnerable to some types of 
hazards  (Habtezion, 2013). And although I did not consider gender relations as a 
root cause to be analysed in the case of Chaitén, being aware of this will make me to 
reconsider such gender relations, as well as  my position within these relations, in 
future investigations. I strongly believe that to advance disaster risk reduction 
necessarily we should advance also on equal gender relations.
A similar positionality applies for the area of disaster research when I recognise 
myself as a Chilean. Because my personal experiences with hazards and risks in 
Chile, related to the country’s location and long history with disasters  —as well as of 
disaster-related institutions—, my initial perceptions  about how disaster and risk 
management operate was  mediated by such personal experiences. For instance, my 
experience with disasters, democracy, the inequalities of neoliberalism and 
centralisation, the strength of national institutions  in Chile, among other elements  of 
the contemporary Chilean context, moderated my positionality about the important 
role that institutions play in emergencies  and recovery. But also because I grew up  in 
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a remote region in Chile, La Araucanía, my position about the necessity to 
redistribute power and opportunities among the national territory is very clear. 
Being a Chilean who has  studied abroad, especially between Germany and the 
United Kingdom, has established my positionality in regard to my future role with, 
and viewpoints about, Chile and its  model of DRM. When I come back to Chile, 
specifically to La Araucanía Region, my experiences  mainly with European 
institutions, and development and disaster risk discourses, will mediate my 
perspectives  on Chilean institutions, social relations, and the like. In this regard, I 
consider it fundamental to review my own positionality from time to time when 
relevant personal or external societal transformations  take place, as  our positions  are 
dynamic and vary depending of our experiences throughout life  (Throne et al., 
2016).
To end this journey, I would like to offer some suggestions for further research.
6.4 Call and suggestions for further research
Further case-based analyses in Chile that look at disaster risk creation and the root 
causes of vulnerability and risk
One of the motivations to conduct this  research was that there were few studies 
dedicated to understanding and documenting the underlying and socio-economic/
political causes and drivers  of vulnerability and risk in Chile. Further research using 
the PAR model, or other similar analytical frameworks, may contribute to systematise 
root causes and dynamic pressures of vulnerability in different cases. This may, in 
turn, allow us to contrast and compare drivers and causes beyond the nearness  of 
each case, to try to identify patterns within the model of DRM and risk governance in 
Chile. As mentioned in the previous section, there is a growing interest in some 
academic circles, such as within the group RADIX, in the idea that governments and 
institutions should acknowledge and take action to tackle disaster risk creation 
(Oliver-Smith et al., 2016). In the 2017 Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, 
taking place on 22-26 May in Cancun, Mexico, there will be several sessions that aim 
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to discuss and present advances  on the governance of risks and disasters  and 
accountability, as a fundamental perspective on advance disaster risk reduction. 
Nevertheless, there is  still a need for further case-based research at the country 
level, including Chile, that looks  at the root causes of vulnerability, as  well as  the 
governance and accountability of disasters and risks.
‘Perspective of scale’ to disaster vulnerability, and with attention to other forms of 
state territorial organisation.
The GAR 2015 (UNISDR, 2015)  points out that in order to develop a comprehensive 
analysis  of disaster vulnerability and to integrate topics like environment and 
society, vulnerability assessments  need to be aware of scale implications. 
Vulnerability assessments  and scales are highly intertwined, not only in technical 
application but also in conceptualisation (Fekete et al., 2010). Chaitén is  embedded 
in a particular scalar system of risk and territorial governance historically mediated 
by political and social tensions. Its  resultant centralisation and top-down approach 
have influenced the post-disaster Chaitén, and it will influence other cases  in Chile 
insofar as  its  scalar system of governance continue evolving over time. Although this 
makes the case study and thesis  quite specific, further research could be developed 
on the light of other —different than Chile— state territorial structures, where different 
political-administrative spaces exist and other scalar configurations dominate —e.g. 
federalist systems, global-cities, urban-regions, and metropolitan areas, among 
others. 
Evacuations
Emergency evacuation research has  often looked at the behaviour of people during 
disasters: what people are likely to do, when they are likely to do it and how they are 
likely to do it, but rarely on the role of institutions  and decision-making (DeYoung et 
al., 2016). The evacuation of Chaitén points  out the importance of people’s 
participation in decision-making as  well as their ‘right to information’ and continuity 
of daily life. Unfortunately, beyond the case of Chaitén there is not strong evidence 
based on other cases that demonstrate how these may help to better articulate 
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evacuations, displacements, resettlements, as  well as  forced migrations, to longer 
term policy responses such as  compensatory strategies and reconstruction 
processes (Kates et al., 2006). Further investigations on past and future disaster 
evacuations  in regard to some elements  observed in Chaitén such as  ‘right to 
information’, ‘participation’, and ‘continuity of daily life’ may ultimately help  to 
develop better policy responses in this respect.
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Appendices
Appendix 1. Research participants
For practical and ethical reasons, explained Chapter Two on the methodology, I decided that 
all research participants should be protected in terms of confidentiality and anonymity. In 
order to facilitate reading and understanding, fictitious  names  are used for the interviewees 
while gender, institutional affiliation, position and date of interaction is provided.
List of participants: interviews and focus group
Reference codes for affiliation/group:
MI:  Ministry of Interior and Public Security
OM:  Other Ministries —e.g. Education, Health, Finance.
CS:  Civil Society organisations
AP:  Academia and Practitioners
LP:  Local leaders and Chaitén people
Ref. cod. Fictitious name Gender Institution Position Date of interaction
AP01 Heinrich Schmidt Male Academia Inter. Director Mar., Sep. 2013
OM01 Mónica Álvarez Female Congress Member December 2014
MI01 Carlos Villalobos Male National gov. Director July 2013
MI02 Pablo Benavente Male Regional gov. Director July 2013
MI03 Rafael Montenegro Male National gov. Official March 2013
MI04 Javier Martinez Male Regional gov. Official March 2013
AP02 Gabriela Miranda Female National consultant Expert Apr.,Jul. 2013; Nov., Dec. 2014
CS01 María Fernandez Female National consultant Expert March 2014
AP03 Mauricio Fuentes Male Academia national Director, Expert Mar., Apr. 2013; Dec. 2014
AP04 Mónica Acevedo Female National consultant Expert December 2014
AP05 Beatriz Moreno Female National consultant Expert Mayo 2014
MI05 Victor Sanhueza Male National gov. Official April 2013
MI06 Pablo Gonzalez Male National gov. Director July 2013
MI07 Jorge Mardones Male National gov. Director June 2013
LP01 Teodoro Benitez Male Community Local leader March 2013
LP02 Rosa Carcamo Female Community Local leader March 2013
OM02 Pedro Delgado Male Local gov. Director, expert May 2013
OM03 Veronica Zarate Female Local gov. Director March 2013
MI08 Antonio Gomez Male Local gov. Council member Mar., Jul. 2013
LP03 Pablo Carcamo Male Community Local leader Mar., Jul. 2013
LP04 Isabel Jimenez Female Community Resident March 2013
MI09 Mauricio Poblete Male Local gov. Council member July 2013
MI10 Javier Hernandez Male Local gov. Director Mar., Jul., Sep. 2013
LP05 Roberta Monsalvez Female Community Local leader July 2013
LP06 Marcela Segovia Female Community Local leader July 2013
MI11 Ricardo Bosques Male Regional gov. Director, expert March 2013
LP07 Patricia Troncoso Female Community Local leader Mar., Sep. 2013
LP08 Olga Pineda Female Community Local leader September 2013
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Ref. cod. Fictitious name Gender Institution Position Date of interaction
LP09 Margarita Salamanca Female Community Local leader September 2013
LP10 Ramón Arevalo Male Community Local leader September 2013
OM04 Benjamin Vergara Male National gov. Official, expert Apr., Jun. 2013
OM05 Jose Morales Male National gov. Official May 2013
MI12 Catalina Mujica Female Regional gov. Director, Expert July 2013
MI13 Ignacio Saavedra Male Local gov. Council member March 2013
LP11 Alejandro Soto Male Community Local leader July 2013
LP12 Regina Muñoz Female Community Local leader August 2013
OM06 Guillermo Poblete Male National consultant Expert April 2013
LP13 María Jose Navarro Female Community Local leader July 2013
MI14 Karina Navarrete Female Local gov. Director July 2013
LP14 Angela Rodriguez Female Community Local leader September 2013
MI15 Federico Rivas Male Local gov. Director July 2013
MI16 Guillermo Ugarte Male Local gov. Council member March 2013
MI17 Fernando Torque Male National gov. Director August 2013
MI18 Roberto Izquierdo Male National gov. Director December 2014
MI19 Samuel Rojas Male National gov. Director August 2013
MI20 Cristobal Reyes Male National gov. Director, Expert August 2013
MI21 Jimena Pozo Female National gov. Director June 2013
MI22 Martín Heredia Male National gov. Director June 2013
MI23 Felipe Romero Male Regional gov. Director July 2013
CS02 Joaquín Opazo Male National civil society Director Apr. 2013; Dec. 2014
CS03 Susana Rueda Female National civil society Director April 2013
CS04 Alex Montoro Male National civil society Director April 2013
AP06 Fidel Puertas Male Academia national Director, Expert Sep. 2013; Dec. 2014
AP07 Paola Rua Female Academia national Director, Expert Sep. 2013; Dec. 2014
AP08 Juan Pablo Estero Male Academia national Director, Expert Sep. 2013; Dec. 2014
AP09 Jaime Montoya Male Academia national Director, Expert April 2013
MI24 Joel Chueca Male Community Director July 2013
OM07 Leon San Martin Male Community Director July 2013
OM08 Heraldo Astudillo Male Community Official March 2013
OM09 Justina Murillo Female Community Official July 2013
MI25 Rayen Mora Female National gov. Director, Expert Apr. 2013; Dec. 2014
MI26 Renato Navas Male National gov. Director, Expert March 2013
MI27 Noria Saavedra Female National gov. Official August 2013
MI28 Jacinto Tello Male Regional gov. Director July 2013
MI29 Ismael Henriquez Male Regional gov. Director August 2013
MI30 Rosa Miranda Female Local gov. Director Jul., Sep. 2013
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Descriptive statistics of the sample
Gender N Percentage
Female 25 37.9%
Male 41 62.1%
Total 66 100%
Geographical scale
National level 32 48.5%
Regional level 7 10.6%
Local level 27 40.9%
Total 66 100%
Institution
Ministry of Interior and Public Security (MI) 30 45.5%
Other ministries (OM) 9 13.6%
Civil Society organisations (CS) 4 6.1%
Academia and Practitioners (AP) 9 13.6%
Local leaders and people (LP) 14 21.2%
Total 66 100%
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Appendix 2. Academic events where feedback was collected.
List of presentations
• Sandoval, V.  (2014) ‘The progression of vulnerability A multi-scalar perspective on 
disaster. The case of Chaitén in Chile’ for the National Research Center for Integrated 
Natural Disaster Management (CIGIDEN). Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Chile, 
18th December.
• Sandoval, V. (2014) 'Desastres, Emergencias, y Reconstrucción en Chile' for the 8th 
International Conference Encuentros ChileGlobal Santiago 2014. Santiago de Chile, 
15th-17th December.
• González-Muzzio, C. and Sandoval V. (2014) ‘Neoliberalism and reconstruction 
processes in Chile, discussing the role of State and communities’ accepted for 2nd 
International Conference on Urban Sustainability and Resilience USAR. UCL: London, 
UK, 3rd–5th November.
• Sandoval, V., González-Muzzio, C. and Albornoz, C. (2014) ‘Resilience and Environmental 
Justice: Potential linkages’ accepted for 4th International Conference on Building 
Resilience. University of Salford: UK, 8th–11th September.
• Sandoval, V. (2014) ‘The progression of Vulnerability: A multi scalar interpretation of 
disaster causation’ for the Disaster Research Unit colloquium. Freie Universität Berlin: 
Germany, 17th June.
• Sandoval, V. (2014) ‘Questioning disaster risk and reconstruction: A multi-scalar inquiry’ 
accepted for the 3rd Shelter Forum 2014. UCL: London, UK, 12th March.
• Sandoval, V. and Albornoz E., C. (2013) ‘La producción de la Vulnerabilidad: Re-
interpretando el PAR model a través del caso de Chaitén, en Chile’ accepted for 1st 
Seminário Internacional de Investigações sobre Vulnerabilidade dos Desastres 
Socionaturais. Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, GEDN, CIVDES: Florianópolis, 
Brazil, 20th-22nd November.
• Sandoval, V. (2013)  ‘Community vs. State in Post-disaster Context: Uneven Outcomes on 
Environmental Justice and Resilience in Chaitén’ accepted for the 2nd ChileGlobal 
Seminar UK on Disaster, Emergency and Reconstruction. UCL: London, UK, 14th 
November.
• Sandoval, V. (2013) ‘The “scalar” progression of vulnerability: Decisions taken and their 
effects on local disaster risk’. DPU Fieldwork Presentations. DPU-UCL, London, UK, 15th 
November.
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• Sandoval, V. (2013) ‘Disaster and Sustainability: Development at Risk’ accepted for the 
1st International Alumni Conference on Conservation and Sustainable Use of Ecosystems. 
Greifswald University: Greifswald, Germany, 11th-17th October.
• Sandoval, V., González-Muzzio, C. and Albornoz E., C. (2013) ‘Community versus State in 
post-disaster context: Uneven outcomes on environmental justice and resilience in 
Chaitén, Chile’ accepted for the workshop Resilience and Environmental Justice in the 
Urban Global South. EJUR Research Cluster, DPU-UCL: London, UK, 12th-13th 
September.
• Sandoval, V. and Boano, C. (2013) 'The progression of vulnerability: A multi-scalar 
perspective on disasters, the case of Chaitén in Chile' accepted for 4th EUGEO 
Congress: Europe, what’s next? Changing geographies and geographies of change. 
University of Rome, Italy, 5th-7th September.
• Sandoval, V. (2013) ‘PhD thesis: The progression of vulnerability: A multi-scalar 
perspective’ for the Thesis Presentation Seminar at the Research Centre for Vulnerability 
and Socio-natural Disasters (CIVDES). Universidad de Chile: Chile, 13th March.
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Appendix 3. Interview record
Excerpt of the interview record to Ignacio Saavedra1 (24 March 2013)
311
1 Fictional name.
312
Excerpt of the interview record to Federico Rivas 2 (05 July 2013)
313
2 Fictional name.
Appendix 4. Interview records
Excerpt of the focus group record to community leaders, Chaitén (05 July 2013).
In Spanish.
315
316
Post-interview notes. Interview to a SUBDERE official, Santiago (14 June 2013)
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Appendix 5. Newspaper records
List of newspaper records consulted for the 1960 Valdivia earthquake 
Newspaper Date Retrieved page(s)
La Nación 24 May 1960 1-6
La Nación 25 May 1960 1, 8, 18-20, 22
La Nación 26May 1960 1-8, 24
La Nación 27 May 1960 1-2, 5, 18
La Nación 28 May 1960 1, 5, 8, 18
La Nación 29 May 1960 1, 5, 10-12, 24
La Nación 09 June 1960 1
La Nación 08 June 1960 1, 5
La Nación 01 June 1960 1-2, 18
La Nación 04 June 1960 8
La Nación 05 June 1960 4
La Nación 06 June 1960 1
La Nación 07 June 1960 1-2
La Nación 10 June 1960 1, 5, 14, 21, 25
La Nación 13 June 1960 1
La Nación 15 June 1960 1
La Nación 01 July 1960 1, 4-5, 14
La Nación 03 July 1960 2
La Nación 05 July 1960 1
La Nación 06 July 1960 1
La Nación 07 July 1960 1, 8
Revista VEA 02 June 1960 1-21, 25-30
Revista VEA 09 June 1960 4-9,18-26, 30
Revista VEA 16 June 1960 1-14, 19, 23-25, 27, 31-32
Revista VEA 23 June 1960 7-13, 20-21
Revista VEA 30 June 1960 8-14, 19, 24-25
El Mercurio 23 May  1960 1
El Mercurio 24 May  1960 1
El Mercurio 25 May  1960 1
El Mercurio 26 May  1960 1
El Mercurio 27 May  1960 1
El Mercurio 28 May  1960 1
El Mercurio 31 May  1960 1
El Mercurio 01 June  1960 1
El Mercurio 02 June  1960 1
El Mercurio 03 June  1960 1
El Mercurio 04 June  1960 1
El Mercurio 09 June  1960 1
El Mercurio 11 June  1960 1
El Mercurio 14 June  1960 1
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El Mercurio 15 June  1960 1
El Siglo 22 July 1960 1
El Siglo 20 July 1960 1
El Siglo 16 July 1960 1
El Siglo 12 July 1960 1
El Siglo 26 June 1960 1
El Siglo 12 June 1960 1
El Siglo 11 June  1960 1
El Siglo 03 June  1960 1
El Siglo 02 June 1960 1
El Siglo 30 May 1960 1
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Appendix 6. Relevant disasters in the recent history of Chile
Relevant disasters in the last 200 years of the Chilean history according to the National 
Commission for Resilience to Disasters of Natural Origin or CREDEN (2016 pp. 36-37).
Timeline of relevant disasters
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Appendix 7. Regions of Chile
Political-administrative division of the Chilean territory
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Appendix 8. Municipal personnel in Chaitén
Municipal personnel in Chaitén between 2009-2015 by number and type of contract
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Municipality
Permanent contract 23 23 22 22 23 23 25
Fixed-term contract 65 6 13 19 25 23 55
Service contract 75 36 36 149 132 130 181
Municipal 
services
Permanent municipal health 
service 26 26 32 30 35 37 38
Permanent municipal 
education service 98 113 104 123 134 160 147
Total contracts 287 204 207 343 349 373 446
325
Appendix 9. Distribution of Chaitén municipal income
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